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ABSTRACT 
Foreign  operation  modes  and  their  use  are  of  crucial  importance  to  any  company that  
operates in an international environment. The previous research on foreign operation 
modes has tended to view these modes from a rather simple, static perspective, which, 
arguably, does not necessarily reflect the reality of foreign operation mode use in many 
international companies.  
To better capture the nuances of the foreign operation mode use in contemporary 
international business environment, the newest research regarding foreign operation 
modes was reviewed in this study. It was seen that the new thinking of foreign operation 
modes significantly challenges the previous thinking on this field.  
This study offered further research on foreign operation mode topics that have been 
somewhat neglected in the previous research. This research provided further evidence of 
mode switching that has not been covered extensively in the literature previously. This 
study also shed some more light on mode stretching and mode combinations, which are 
topics that are quite novel in the field of foreign operation modes. This research did 
one’s  bit  in  offering  further  research  that  has  been  called  for  by  different  scholars  of  
foreign operation modes. 
To shed some more light on the more novel approaches to foreign operation modes, this 
study analyzed empirically the foreign operation mode strategies of a selected group of 
Finnish firms in South Korea. A special emphasis in this analysis was placed on mode 
switching, mode stretching and mode combination strategies. The analysis was guided 
by a theoretical framework that was developed in the theoretical part of this study. 
In the empirical analysis of the foreign operation mode strategies of a selected group of 
Finnish firms in South Korea, inter-mode switches turned out to be quite common. The 
inter-mode switches were mainly triggered by changes in the external environment of 
the studied case companies. Some evidence on mode combinations was received, 
although mode combinations did not turn out to be common among the case firms 
studied. Mode stretching was not common, either and intra-mode switches were very 
uncommon. The firms that did not change their foreign operation mode strategies 
mainly had their reasons in switching barriers and mode myopia. 
The paper was finalized with the discussion of recommendations for future research. 
Clearly, more research is needed on these rather underresearched aspects of foreign 
operation modes and their use. 
 
 
Keywords: foreign operation mode, mode switching, mode stretching, mode 
combination, South Korea, internationalization 
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TIIVISTELMÄ 
Ulkomaantoimintamuodot ja niiden käyttäminen ovat ratkaisevan tärkeässä asemassa mille 
tahansa yritykselle, joka toimii kansainvälisessä ympäristössä. Aikaisempi tutkimus 
ulkomaantoimintamuodoista on yleensä katsonut ulkomaantoimintamuotoja hieman 
yksinkertaisesta, staattisesta näkökulmasta, mikä ei välttämättä vastaa todellisuutta 
ulkomaantoimintamuotojen käytöstä monessa kansainvälisessä yrityksessä. 
Ulkomaantoimintamuotoja koskeva uusin tutkimustieto käytiin läpi tässä tutkimuksessa, jotta 
voitaisiin paremmin ymmärtää ulkomaantoimintamuotojen käyttöä nykyisessä kansainvälisessä 
liiketoimintaympäristössä. Tässä tutkimuksessa havaittiin, että tämä uusi 
ulkomaantoimintamuotoja koskeva ajattelu voimakkaasti haastaa aiemman näkemyksen tällä 
alalla. 
Tämä tutkimus tarjosi lisätutkimusta ulkomaantoimintamuotoja koskevista aiheista, jotka ovat 
jääneet vähemmälle huomiolle aiemmassa tutkimuksessa. Tutkimus tuotti lisätodistusaineistoa 
ulkomaantoimintamuotojen vaihtamisesta, mitä ei ole aiemmin laajasti käsitelty 
kirjallisuudessa. Tämä tutkimus tarjosi myös lisätietoa ulkomaantoimintamuotojen 
venyttämisestä ja ulkomaantoimintamuotojen yhdistämisestä, mitkä ovat aivan uudenlaisia 
lähestymistapoja ulkomaantoimintamuotoja käsiteltäessä. Tämä tutkimus kantoi kortensa 
kekoon tarjoamalla lisätutkimusta aiheesta, mitä useat eri ulkomaantoimintamuotojen tutkijat 
ovat pyytäneet. 
Tuottaakseen lisätietoa näihin uudenlaisiin lähestymistapoihin ulkomaantoimintamuotojen 
käsittelyssä, tämä tutkimus analysoi empiirisesti valikoidun suomalaisyritysten joukon 
ulkomaantoimintamuotostrategioita Etelä-Koreassa. Erityinen painoarvo tässä analyysissä 
asetettiin ulkomaantoimintamuotojen vaihtamiselle, ulkomaantoimintamuotojen venyttämiselle 
ja ulkomaantoimintamuotojen yhdistämiselle. Analyysiä ohjasi teoreettinen viitekehys, joka 
kehitettiin tutkimuksen teoreettisessa osiossa. 
Analysoitaessa empiirisesti valitun suomalaisyritysten joukon 
ulkomaantoimintamuotostrategioita Etelä-Koreassa, havaittiin, että toimintamuotojen väliset 
vaihdokset olivat yleisiä. Syynä näille toimintamuotojen vaihdoksille oli pääasiassa muutokset 
tutkittujen case-yritysten ulkoisessa toimintaympäristössä. Todistusaineistoa toimintamuotojen 
yhdistämisestä saatiin hieman, vaikka toimintamuotojen yhdistäminen ei ollut yleistä tutkittujen 
case-yritysten osalta. Toimintamuotojen venyttäminen ei ollut myöskään yleistä. 
Toimintamuotojen sisäiset vaihdokset olivat erittäin harvinaisia. Niiden yritysten tapauksessa, 
jotka eivät vaihtaneet ulkomaantoimintamuotostrategiaansa, yleensä oli syynä vaihtamisen 
esteet ja toimintamuotoja koskeva lyhytnäköisyys. 
Tutkimuksen lopuksi annettiin suosituksia ulkomaantoimintamuotoja koskevalle tulevaisuuden 
tutkimukselle. Voitiin selvästi havaita, että lisätutkimus on tarpeen tässä työssä käsiteltyjen 
ulkomaantoimintamuotoja koskevien uusien lähestymistapojen osalta.  
 
Hakusanat: ulkomaantoimintamuoto, toimintamuodon vaihtaminen, toimintamuodon 
venyttäminen, toimintamuotojen yhdistäminen, Etelä-Korea, kansainvälistyminen 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Sune Carlson established a group to conduct international business research at Uppsala 
University in Sweden in the 1960s. He said that “international business is against 
human nature”. His statement reflected the fact that companies that try to export or 
invest abroad always do so with an incomplete knowledge and a high degree of 
uncertainty about foreign markets and possible alternatives. In Carlson’s view, doing 
business abroad was like taking cautious steps into unknown territory rather than a 
consequence of rational choice based on economic analyses. (Björkman & Forsgren 
2000: 7) A lot has been gained through research on internationalization thereafter and 
these scary steps abroad are probably not that scary today. However, even though 
Carlson’s view seems stunning, there is a pinch of truth in it. 
Different markets always pose numerous challenges for a firm. For example, the 
following questions can be asked: which markets to enter, how to serve these markets, 
which products to offer to the market, how to organize the company to handle the 
international business activity, where to get personnel that has international skills and 
experience, how to finance the international operations, and so on (Luostarinen & 
Welch 1988: 85). In fact, the list could be continued on and on, because the challenges 
that a company faces in the international sphere are almost endless. Generally speaking, 
the level of complication increases as a firm enters more distant markets in terms of 
political, cultural and physical distance. 
This study investigates the operation mode strategies of Finnish firms in the Republic of 
Korea, more commonly referred to as South Korea. Finland and South Korea may 
appear distant and different from each other but many similarities can be found as well 
(Korhonen 2005: 92). Personally, I was an exchange student in South Korea in 2007. 
Based  on  this  experience,  I  concluded  South  Korea  to  be  very  different  from Finland.  
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This applies also to conducting business in the country. Korean chaebols, 
conglomerates, which are usually family-controlled and government-assisted corporate 
groups, seemed to control many fields of business and it seemed like it was hard for a 
foreign company to enter to and operate in this market. Some fields of business seemed 
to be totally controlled by South Korean companies, whereas some other fields of 
business, such as fast-food and refreshment drink industry, seemed to welcome foreign 
entrants. All in all, I got an impression that there is something mysterious regarding 
doing business in this country and I became interested in business in South Korea 
because of this. I knew that some Finnish firms operate in South Korea successfully but 
at the same time, I felt that there would be possibilities for many more. Thus, the 
starting point for this research is personal interest in South Korea and the possibilities 
that the country could offer for Finnish companies. 
This study strives to take a different stance towards the operation modes and strategies 
in their use. As discussed in the subsequent chapters of this paper, foreign operation 
modes have often been viewed in the international business literature as somewhat 
simple selections between different options. To be exact, foreign operation modes have 
tended to be viewed as ‘singular entities’ and the choices between different foreign 
operation modes have tended to be viewed as representing clear-cut changes from one 
operation mode to another. However, as declared by Benito et al. (2008: 1), 
“observation of business practice reveals a ‘messier’ reality: in particular, mode 
packages, mode changes and mode role changes, seem quite common.” They continue 
that “these aspects of international business development have been relatively ignored 
in the literature and in theoretical and empirical research.” (Benito et al. 2008: 1) Taking 
note  of  this  novel  approach  that  reflects  this  ‘messier  reality’,  this  study  sets  forth  at  
analyzing the operation mode strategies of Finnish companies in South Korea utilizing 
these new theories and concepts that have been proposed by e.g. Benito et al. (2008), 
Welch et al. (2007), Benito and Welch (1994) and Pedersen et al. (2002). 
This research is closely connected to a bigger research program that is carried out in the 
Center  for  Markets  in  Transition  (CEMAT)  in  the  Helsinki  School  of  Economics.  
CEMAT is running a research program called ‘Managing Business in Turbulent 
Markets’, where they investigate the operations of Finnish firms and business 
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opportunities available in the rapidly developing markets. The markets that CEMAT is 
interested in include China, India, Russia, South Korea, Baltic countries and Latin 
America. Also, the competitiveness of Finnish firms in these markets is analyzed. The 
empirical data is gathered by interviewing representatives of Finnish firms that are 
operating in these markets. The faculty of CEMAT writes a report on each market area 
as an operating environment for Finnish firms. For example, the report on South Korea 
will  be  labeled  ‘South Korea as an Operating Environment for Finnish Firms’. The 
main sponsor of this research program is TEKES, the Finnish Funding Agency for 
Technology and Innovation. 
As said, this research will be conducted alongside CEMAT’s ‘Managing Business in 
Turbulent Markets’ research program. To be exact, this research will be conducted 
alongside  South  Korean  sub-program  of  this  above-mentioned  research  program  of  
CEMAT. Personally, I participate in the South Korean sub-program of CEMAT’s study 
by conducting 10 interviews for CEMAT and analyzing them. 
CEMAT is interested in three areas in the target market: Finnish firms’ relations in 
South Korea to public sector, local partner companies and local employees. CEMAT is 
interested in the possible problems and solutions thereto in the above-mentioned issues. 
My research interest is, generally, on the operation mode strategies of Finnish firms in 
South Korea. More specifically, I will analyze the foreign operation mode switching, 
mode stretching and mode combination strategies of the Finnish companies operating in 
South Korea. Mostly the same interviews will be utilized for both the CEMAT’s study 
and my thesis. 
 
 
1.2 Research Problem and Gap 
 
The research problem is to analyze the operation mode strategies of Finnish companies 
in South Korea. A special emphasis is placed on possible mode switching, mode 
stretching and mode combination strategies. These concepts, offered by e.g. Pedersen et 
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al. (2002), Benito et al. (2008) and Welch et al. (2007) represent the new thinking 
regarding foreign operation modes and are, therefore, a central theme in this study. 
In general, South Korea and the business of Finnish firms there have been studied quite 
little in Finland. Kristiina Korhonen who previously worked for CEMAT is an expert on 
South Korea and business in South Korea in Finland but her studies have focused on the 
investments between Finland and South Korea and on relations between Finnish and 
South Korean firms (e.g. Korhonen 2005; Korhonen et al. 2005; Korhonen and 
Kettunen 2006). The operation mode strategies of Finnish firms in South Korea have 
not been studied earlier in Finland. Thus, there is a research gap that this study sets forth 
to fill. 
 
 
1.3 Research question 
 
How and why are the foreign operation modes used in a particular country in terms of 
mode switching, mode stretching and mode combination strategies? 
Empirically, this question will be answered in terms of a selected group of Finnish firms 
in South Korea. 
 
 
1.4 Definitions 
 
Foreign operation mode: Foreign operation modes (FOMs) can be defined as the 
institutional or organizational arrangements that are used in order to conduct an 
international business activity, such as the manufacturing of goods, servicing customers, 
sourcing various inputs – in fact, undertaking any business function. In principle, the 
alternatives are plentiful, ranging from various types of trade arrangements, often in 
 15 
some form of exporting organizations, to investments in manufacturing operations in 
wholly-owned subsidiaries. (Welch et al. 2007: 18) 
Foreign operation mode switching: Foreign operation mode switching refers to a 
situation in which a company changes its institutional or organizational arrangement, 
that is, foreign operation mode, from one FOM to another. Mode switching allows for 
more intensive operations to be developed in the markets concerned, supporting a 
strategy of deeper market penetration. Alternatively, mode switching may be used to 
recover a problem situation in a foreign market associated with existing mode use. Two 
types of mode switches can be identified: ‘inter-mode switches’ and ‘intra-mode 
switches’. Inter-mode switches imply a change of organizational form that is, in 
essence, the foreign operation mode in a given foreign market. In intra-mode switches, 
the  entrant  company maintains  the  organizational  form,  that  is,  FOM, but  a  new local  
operator is appointed. (Welch et al. 2007: 361-363) 
Foreign operation mode stretching: Foreign operation mode stretching challenges the 
thinking of foreign operation mode switching. It is often thought that FOM switches 
present clear-cut changes between two distinct FOMs. However, FOM stretching views 
these switches as a great deal subtler, seeing a mode switch as an incremental process. 
Mode switches sometimes emerge as incremental processes in which one FOM virtually 
grows into another. The foreign operation modes that an entrant firm uses in a specific 
market over a period of time are not necessarily sequential, that is, mutually exclusive. 
It  is  not uncommon for entrant companies to add new FOMs to existing ones,  thereby 
practising mode mode combination. Mode switches may also be incremental in the 
sense that within-mode changes precede as well as follow a formal shift of ownership 
and organizational form. (Welch et al. 2007: 367) 
Foreign operation mode combinations: A  FOM  combination  refers  to  a  situation  in  
which an entrant company adds one – or several – FOMs to an existing one, instead of 
replacing one FOM with another. The correct term to use for this phenomenon would be 
a ‘mode addition’ rather than a ‘mode switch’. The addition of one – or several – modes 
to an existing one may be a very temporary arrangement where the two FOMs overlap 
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for a short, transitional period. In other cases, though, mode additions may take on the 
characteristics of a long-term, or even permanent, arrangement. (Welch et al. 2007: 393) 
Internationalization: Broably speaking, internationalization is the process of increasing 
involvement in international operations. Internationalization can be expected to be 
associated with, and dependent upon, developments along several dimensions of the 
phenomenon, such as operation mode, sales objects, target markets, organizational 
capacity, personnel, organizational structure, and finance. (Welch and Luostarinen 
1988: 84-88)  
 
 
1.5 Limitations 
 
This study investigates the foreign operation mode strategies of Finnish companies in 
South Korea. For its part, this research aims to some extent at helping Finnish firms to 
operate in South Korea more successfully. At the same time, this is a major limitation of 
this study: it only focuses on the Finnish companies, leaving the experiences of other 
firms from other countries uncovered. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
2.1 Foreign operation modes 
 
Whenever a company does business abroad, it is exposed to an array of new challenges 
and decisions have to be made regarding how its business activities in a foreign market 
should be conducted (Welch et al. 2007: 18; Benito & Welch 1994: 8). Also, a company 
may have to think how its linkages to a foreign actor should be organized (Welch et al. 
2007: 18). Several definitions for foreign operation modes (FOMs) have been offered 
by different scholars. Welch et al. (2007:18), for instance, see that “foreign operation 
modes can be defined as the institutional or organizational arrangements that are used in 
order to conduct an international business activity, such as the manufacturing of goods, 
servicing customers, sourcing various inputs – in fact, undertaking any business 
function”. Root (1994: 24) writes that “an international market entry mode is an 
institutional arrangement that makes possible the entry of a company’s products, 
technology, human skills, management, or other resources into a foreign country”.  
While different definitions, in essence, depict the same phenomenon with slightly 
different words, the terminology used deserves a special note. Welch et al. (2007: 10) 
raise up an important point when discussing and analyzing different foreign operation 
modes. They see that in much of the academic literature on foreign operation modes the 
topic  is  dealt  with  under  the  heading  of  ‘entry  modes’  which  has  become  for  many  a  
generic term covering foreign operation mode use in all situations. This is the case even 
when modes are being switched and the actual entry context no longer applies. (Welch 
et al. 2007: 10) Welch et al. (2007: 10) claim that “this terminology is unfortunate as 
well because it has tended to focus mode thinking and analysis on the entry situation, 
rather than the longitudinal context in which mode use is applicable”. According to 
Welch et al. (2007: 10), the research shows that mode change in individual foreign 
markets is common in internationalizing firms and mode development, sometimes even 
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to a substantial degree, occurs with a given mode as its use proceeds. This could be 
called a ‘within-mode’ expansion in the use of a given mode. A change can be brought 
about also by the addition of a new mode to the use of an existing mode, rather than 
replacement of a mode altogether. In addition, a mode may be deleted from an initial 
mode package, consisting of several foreign operation modes used in conjunction in a 
given foreign market, after some time. Limited research indicates that mode additions to 
the initial mode arrangement are far from uncommon. However, there has been so little 
research on this phenomenon that it is hard to generalize on the circumstances, patterns 
of use and explanations of mode additions and deletions. (Welch et al. 2007: 10) Mode 
changes, mode additions and mode deletions are covered later in this study thoroughly 
but here they were touched upon to highlight the problem of discussing foreign 
operation modes as ‘entry modes’. Because of the above-mentioned problem of using 
the term ‘entry mode’, the term ‘foreign operation mode’ is used in this study. Some 
researchers may refer to foreign operation modes as ‘foreign operation methods’, which, 
in essence, is the same as foreign operation modes, the terms ‘methods’ and ‘modes’ 
used as synonyms interchangeably. 
 
 
2.2 The importance of foreign operation modes 
 
Clearly, the selection of a foreign operation mode is of utmost importance to a firm that 
wants to enter a new foreign country. One could hypothesize that the selection of 
foreign operation mode in a particular market determines the success or failure of an 
international business  endeavour. To highlight the critical role of this decision, we can 
turn to words of several well-known researchers on the field. Agarwal and Ramaswami 
(1992: 1) see the FOM selection as very important, if not a critical, strategic decision. 
Luostarinen and Welch (1988: 86), in their analysis of the development of the concept 
of internationalization, state that “one can perhaps argue that the future international 
success of companies will partly depend on their ability to master and successfully 
apply a range of methods of foreign operation.” Welch et al. (2007: 20) see that in the 
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short run, how a firm chooses to operate in a given foreign market is likely to have 
considerable impact on the revenues from and costs of being involved in that market, 
and the firm’s exposure to the risks and uncertainties of operating there. Equally 
important is that such decisions have effects on the more long-term considerations 
regarding the degree of various types of risk, the degree of strategic and operative 
control, the level of resource commitment and the opportunities for the development of 
a company’s capabilities and network connections (Welch et al. 2007: 20). 
Having quoted some well-known researchers on the field and acknowledged the 
importance of foreign operation modes in international business, we will now turn to 
analyze foreign operation modes. First, the repertoire of different operation modes is 
presented in a cursory fashion. Due to the scope of this study, different mode options 
are only touched upon in this study. For a thorough review of different FOMs, please 
see e.g. Welch et al. (2007) or Luostarinen and Welch (1990). 
 
 
2.3 The repertoire of foreign operation modes available to a firm 
 
The options available to a firm in terms of foreign operation modes are numerous. The 
extant literature on the subject is vast and the classifications between different authors 
may differ slightly, but the general consensus among researchers classifies different 
operation modes roughly in three groups, that is, export modes, contractual modes and 
investment modes. These three broad groups are depicted in Figure 1 below: 
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Figure 1: The major foreign operation mode options 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Welch et al. 2007: 4 
Exporting, contractual and investment operation modes can be termed primary modes 
(Root 1987: 7). As indicated by Welch et al. (2007: 3), some modes straddle such a 
broad classification, such as contractual joint ventures that would fit to both contractual 
and investment modes of entry. Welch et al. (2007: 3) continue that within these broad 
categories there can be many variations, and the multiplicity of mode options for firms 
allows for quite fine-grained variations from one market situation to another. To 
illustrate the multiplicity of options available to a firm and differences in terminology 
and categorization by different authors, another categorization of different operation 
modes as suggested by Root (1994: 26) is presented in Figure 2 on the next page: 
Exporting Contractual modes Investment modes 
? Indirect 
? Direct: 
agent/distributor 
? Own sales 
office/subsidiary 
? Franchising 
? Licensing 
? Management contracts 
? Subcontracting 
? Project operations 
? Alliances 
? Minority share 
(alliance) JVs 
? 50/50 JVs 
? Majority share JVs 
? 100% owned 
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Figure 2: The major foreign operation mode options, an alternative classification 
Export Entry Modes Contractual Entry Modes Investment Entry Modes 
Indirect Licensing Sole venture: new establishment 
Direct agent/distributor Franchising Sole venture: acquisition 
Direct branch/subsidiary Technical agreements 
Joint venture:new 
establishment/acquisition 
Other Service contracts Other 
  Management contracts   
  Construction/turnkey contracts   
  Contract manufacture   
  Countertrade arrangements  
  Other   
Source: Root 1994: 26 
When analyzing the categorization of Root (1994: 26), it can be seen that Root uses the 
term ‘entry mode’ to refer to foreign operation modes. The problem inherent with the 
term ‘entry mode’ was discussed above. When the categorizations of Root (1994: 26) in 
Figure 2 and Welch et al. (2007: 4) in Figure 1 are contrasted, it can be seen that the 
main differences are in contractual and investment foreign operation modes, exporting 
foreign operation mode options being mostly the same. Root (1994: 26) identifies more 
mode options in contractual foreign operation modes than Welch et al. (2007: 4). In 
addition, Root (1994: 26) concentrates on differentiating between a newly-established 
sole venture and an acquired sole venture in investment operation modes, whereas 
Welch et al. (2007: 4) emphasize the different options as to how to divide the ownership 
in a joint venture (JV). In essence, however, the categorization by both of the authors 
discusses the same phenomenon, which, therefore, makes the minor differences in the 
content of the categories irrelevant, at least for this study.  
Luostarinen (1989: 109-111) combined the different operation modes in homogeneous 
groups on the basis of the functional and investment character of the modes. His 
groupings can be seen in Table 1 one the next page: 
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Table 1: The combined categories of foreign operation modes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Luostarinen 1989: 109-111 
In this study, the question of how FOMs are categorized and how are they are termed is, 
although not irrelevant, but of minor importance. This study sets forth at analyzing the 
development of the use of foreign operation modes, that is, mode strategies, of Finnish 
companies in South Korea over time, thus concentrating on the possible changes in the 
use of different FOMs and their possible combinations in the course of Finnish 
companies’ operations in Korea. 
Export modes differ from the other two primary modes in that a company’s final or 
intermediate product is produced outside the target country and subsequently transferred 
to it. Therefore, exporting is confined to physical products. (Root 1994: 27) Indirect 
export takes place when the exporting manufacturer uses independent organizations 
located in the producer’s country and who actually do the exporting (Welch et al. 2007: 
308, Root 1994: 27). In contrast, direct exporting does not use home country 
middlemen, although it may utilize target country middlemen (Root 1994: 27). In direct 
A Non-direct investment marketing operations (NIMOS) 
 1. Indirect export operations for goods 
 2. Direct export operations for goods 
 3. Service export operations 
 4. Know-how export operations 
 5. Partial project export operations 
 
B Non-direct investment production operations (NIPOS) 
 1. Licensing operations 
 2. Franchising operations 
 3. Contract manufacturing operations 
 4. Turnkey operations 
 5. Coproduction operations 
 
C Direct investment marketing operations (DIMOS) 
 1. Sales promotion subsidiaries 
 2. Warehousing units 
 3. Service units 
 4. Sales subsidiaries 
 
D Direct investment production operations (DIPOS) 
 1. Assembling subsidiaries 
 2. Manufacturing subsidiaries 
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exporting,  exporter  sells  directly  to  an  importer  or  buyer  located  in  a  foreign  market  
area (Albaum & Duerr 2008: 321). The target country middlemen, in the form of agents 
or distributors, are responsible for marketing exporter’s product in the target market. 
Finally, exporting may take the form of an own sales office or a sales subsidiary. In this 
case, company’s own operating units in the target country are responsible for marketing. 
(Root 1994: 27) 
Contractual modes are long-term non-equity associations between an international firm 
and an entity in a foreign target country that involve the transfer of technology or 
human skills from the former to the latter. Contractual modes are distinguished from 
export modes because they are primarily vehicles for the transfer of knowledge and 
skills, even though they may also create export opportunities. On the other hand, they 
are distinguished from investment modes because there is no equity investment by the 
international firm. (Root 1994: 27) Contractual modes include franchising, licensing, 
management contracts, international subcontracting and project operations, with a wide 
range of forms within each of these categories (Welch et al. 2007: 3). In a licensing 
arrangement,  a  firm  transfers  to  a  foreign  entity,  usually  another  firm,  for  a  defined  
period of time the right to use its industrial property, e.g. such as patents, know-how, 
trademarks, or manufacturing processes, in return for a royalty or other compensation 
(Albaum & Duerr 2008: 377, Root 1994: 27). Although quite similar, franchising differs 
from licensing in motivation, services and duration. In addition to granting the right to 
use the firm name, trademarks, and technology, the franchisor also assists the franchisee 
in organization, marketing, and general management under an arrangement that is 
intended to be permanent. (Root 1994: 27) Management contracts, subcontracting, 
project  operations  and  alliances  involve  the  transfer  of  services  directly  to  foreign  
entities in return for monetary compensation or in return for products manufactured 
with those services (Welch et al. 2007; Root 1994: 27). Importantly, international 
companies often combine contractual entry modes with export or investment modes, 
reflecting the use of foreign operation mode combinations that is dealt with later in this 
study. (Root 1994: 27) 
Investment entry modes involve ownership by an international firm of manufacturing 
plants  or  other  units  in  the  target  country.  In  terms  of  production  stage,  these  entities  
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may  range  all  the  way  from  simple  assembly  plants  to  plants  that  undertake  the  full  
manufacture of a product. In terms of ownership and management control, foreign 
affiliates may be classified as sole ventures, meaning they are 100 % owned by the 
parent  firm,  with  full  ownership  and  control,  or  as  joint  ventures  with  ownership  and  
control shared between the parent firm and one or more local partners, who usually 
represent a local company. An international firm may start a sole venture from scratch 
as a new establishment or by acquiring a local firm as an acquisition. (Root 1994: 27-
28)  
 
 
2.4 Foreign operation mode selection 
 
Several theoretical perspectives have been offered to explain firms’ choice of foreign 
operation modes. Such decisions can be very complex in their very nature. Because 
researchers with different theoretical and methodological backgrounds have examined 
them, the literature on foreign operation modes is rather heterogeneous. (Welch et al. 
2007: 20) 
Literature on foreign operation modes identifies two main approaches to foreign 
operation mode selection – a so-called ‘economics-strategic’ approach, and a behavioral 
or process approach (e.g. Welch et al. 2007: 20-42; Clark et al. 1997: 605-606; Pedersen 
et al. 2001: 326-327; Benito & Welch 1994: 7). The behavioral or process approach has 
also been termed ‘internationalization process’ approach by some scholars (Welch et al. 
2007: 20; Benito & Welch 1994: 7) The two main approaches to operation mode 
selection are reviewed below. 
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2.4.1 Economic-strategic approach to foreign operation mode selection 
 
The economic-strategic theories to foreign operation mode selection put a strong 
emphasis on rational decision making and economic considerations. According to the 
thinking of this ‘school of thought’, mode choice is an economic decision, and a firm is 
expected to choose the mode that offers the highest risk-adjusted return on investment 
(Zhao et al. 2004: 525). Companies are expected to choose the governance or operation 
mode that minimizes the costs of carrying out particular transactions (Burgel and 
Murray 2000: 37). Because of the strong emphasis of this approach on the effectiveness 
of transactions, this approach has also been termed ‘transaction cost economics’ (TCE) 
approach by many scholars (e.g. Burgel and Murray 2000: 37; Zhao et al. 2004; 
Brouthers and Hennart 2007). Brouthers and Hennart (2007: 400), in their review of 
international entry mode choice literature, concluded that transaction cost analysis 
(TCA),  effectively  the  same  issue  as  TCE,  is  the  most  widely  used  theoretical  
perspective in international entry mode research and appeared in almost half of the 
studies  that  they  reviewed.  Three  TCA factors  are  seen  to  influence  decisions  –  asset  
specificity, uncertainty, and frequency. Uncertainty is seen to mean both internal-
behavioral and external-market specific uncertainty. (Brouthers and Hennart 2007: 400)  
Asset specificity concerns a broad scope of resources particularly tailored to a 
relationship and reflects a company’s ability to differentiate its strategy and products. 
Specificity is seen to exist when one or both parties to the transaction make investment 
that involves design characteristics or unique resources specific to the transaction. This 
investment is likely to have a lower value in alternative uses. Knowledge- or 
information-based assets are often embedded in the people working for an organization. 
These intangible assets generate monopolistic advantages for companies to exploit in 
foreign markets but, at the same time, the very nature of intangibility and the difficulties 
of codifying and transferring knowledge also create a need for internalization, that is, to 
carry out transactions in-house instead of resorting to market mechanisms. Proprietary 
and specialized knowledge is also subject to maladaptation and opportunism, and this 
feature of specialized assets therefore requires safeguarding exchanges to reduce 
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behavioral uncertainty. In a situation like this when it is hard to protect proprietary 
technologies, vertical integration simplifies protection. Therefore, it is seen that a high 
presence of specialized assets leads to a high degree of integration and control. What 
comes  to  external  uncertainty,  volatile  environments  are  seen  to  compel  companies  to  
choose a flexible entry mode rather than an ownership-based entry mode. Internal 
uncertainty manifests itself in a company’s deficient experience or knowledge of 
foreign markets – companies that lack international experience are hesitant to pursue 
foreign market entry aggressively. (Zhao et al. 2004: 526) 
The economic-strategic stream of research on foreign operation modes has largely taken 
for granted that whenever a choice in foreign operation mode is made, it will be the 
most suitable one given the circumstances (Pedersen et al. 2001: 326). The principal 
line of reasoning in the ‘economics-strategic’ approach to foreign operation mode 
selection is that the choice is essentially a question of finding the appropriate degree of 
control. This degree of control has a bearing on risk exposure and companies’ degree of 
strategic flexibility over foreign operations, given internal and external contingencies. 
(Welch et al. 2007: 20) The economic approaches are static approaches in their nature, 
examining a company’s foreign expansion as a series of static choices that are dictated 
by efficiency considerations and relative costs and benefits (Clark et al. 1997: 605). 
Transactions, resources, assets, and firms are at the core of economics-based analyses 
(Welch et al. 2007: 42).  
The economic approaches to foreign operation mode selection have been subject to a 
great deal of criticism, too. Benito and Welch (1994: 9) point to the concerns that have 
been raised about the limitations of the assumptions underlying the economic 
frameworks, such as their rather simplistic view of organizational decision-making 
behavior and the degree of rationality assumed. For instance, one simplifying 
assumption is the notion that different foreign operation modes entail different relative 
levels of control, resource commitments, and risk, which again are regarded as largely a 
function of ownership. Control, though, can also be gained by means other than 
ownership. A joint venture, for instance, may feature different levels of control – high, 
medium or even low control – depending on other characteristics of the actual 
arrangement. (Benito & Welch 1994: 9) A licensing agreement, for instance, in 
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association with a joint venture may be an important means of raising the effective level 
of control, as originally pointed out by Luostarinen and Welch (1990: 39). Such 
combinations have rarely been dealt with in the literature as these frameworks do not 
encompass bundles or packages of foreign operation modes as viable alternatives. In 
addition, the perceived levels of control and risk, for instance, offered by a given 
foreign operation mode, may vary considerably across different companies. (Benito & 
Welch 1994: 9) Benito and Welch (1994: 9) point also to the lack of attention to the 
dynamics of foreign market servicing in the economics approach because of a primary 
focus on how firms, as rational economic actors, arrive at a more or less ‘optimal’ 
foreign operation mode into a particular market at a given point in time. They continue 
that less attention has been paid to changes to the initial entry decision, to how 
relationships between entities evolve over time and influence the decision-making 
process, and to how market servicing decisions interact with other aspects of the 
internationalization of the firm (Benito and Welch (1994: 9). Pedersen et al. (2000: 326) 
reinforce this point by stating that “the economics literature on foreign operation 
methods is basically static and tells little about changes of the initial entry mode”. They 
see that the questions of how often firms change FOMs, what induces changes and what 
impedes them have only been paid modest attention by the international business 
scholars (Pedersen et al. 2002: 326). 
 
 
2.4.2 Process approach to foreign operation mode selection 
 
In contrast to the ‘economics-strategic’ school of thought with its strong emphasis on 
rational decision making, the internationalization process approach, also termed as the 
behavioral approach, takes as a starting point that a framework of unconstrained 
rationality provides limited understanding of the way companies actually make foreign 
operation mode decisions. Instead, the internationalization process approaches view 
such decisions through the lenses of limited rationality and organizational learning 
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processes, theories that were originally presented by Cyert and March in 1963 and 
Simon in 1955 and 1979. (Welch et al. 2007: 33) In this approach, there is a strong 
emphasis on behavioral factors as driving forces over time in internationalization, of 
which any given step is seen as an integral part of the overall process (Benito & Welch 
1994: 10). One of the reasons for the considerable attention on the foreign operation 
mode as a means of assessing a pattern of internationalization of individual firms is that 
it does represent a clearly overt manifestation of the overall process, although it is only 
one dimension of this process (Luostarinen & Welch 1988: 86). Being only one 
dimension of the overall process of internationalization, process perspectives also tend 
to take a more holistic approach (Welch et al. 2007: 34). 
Various patterns of operation mode developments over time, also called ‘establishment 
chains’, have been revealed by different empirical studies (Benito & Welch: 10). 
Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) carried out an influential research on the 
internationalization process of four Swedish companies. They concluded that firms that 
were studied went through the following stages, which they termed the ‘establishment 
chain’, when they internationalized: 
1. No regular export activities 
2. Export via independent representatives (agent) 
3. Sales subsidiary and 
4. Production/manufacturing 
This conclusion was based on the fact that of the 63 sales subsidiaries which were 
studied, 56 were preceded by agents and this pattern was the same for all the companies 
that were studied. What comes to manufacturing establishments mixed findings were 
found but nevertheless, in no case did a company start production in a country without 
having sold in the country via an agency or a sales subsidiary before. (Johanson & 
Wiedersheim-Paul 1975: 321-322) 
In this seminal research on the internationalization of four Swedish firms, Johanson and 
Wiedersheim-Paul (1975: 307) maintained that each stage in the establishment chain 
requires different levels of resource commitment and brings different levels of 
information about the market to the internationalizing company. Obviously, no resource 
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commitments are needed in the first phase of no regular export activities. Each 
successive stage requires more resources to be committed to the market and therefore 
involves the company more to the market. When the company is more involved in the 
market, it is in a better position to get information from the market, which facilitates 
learning concerning the market in question and operations in that country. (Johanson & 
Wiedersheim-Paul 1975) This mechanism was further elaborated by Johanson and 
Vahlne (1977), who saw this mechanism as a kind of ‘feedback link’ as termed by some 
scholars (e.g. Benito & Welch 1994: 10). In the model of Johansson and Vahlne (1977), 
market knowledge is a prime development factor. They see that market knowledge and 
market commitment affect both commitment decisions and the way current activities are 
performed – the more an entrant firm learns about a foreign market, the more it is ready 
to commit resources to this market, and this, in turn, yields additional market 
knowledge, which, again, leads to increasing market commitment. This knowledge is 
very important in their model because they see that when entrant firms encounter 
problems in a foreign market, they are likely to search for solutions ‘in the area of the 
problem’, that is, the problems and opportunities are handled in their contexts instead of 
the entrant firm seeking for totally new solutions to solve the situation. As a result, they 
see the internationalization as a process where the present state of internationalization is 
one important factor explaining the course of following internationalization. Current 
activities are a prime source of experience, that is, knowledge, of the foreign market and 
this knowledge would be hard-to-get by sourcing it from outside of the entrant firm. 
Instead, this knowledge has to be acquired through a long learning process in 
connection with current activities. This is an important reason, they claim, why the 
internationalization process often proceeds slowly. (Johanson & Vahlne 1977) 
When discussing this important knowledge, Johanson and Vahlne (1977: 28) distinguish 
between objective knowledge and experiential knowledge. Their argument is that 
experiential knowledge is the critical kind of knowledge in internationalization because 
it can only be learnt through personal experience – in essence, through the operations in 
a given country. Objective knowledge, on the other hand, can be taught, which 
simplifies the acquisition of this type of knowledge. They also distinguish between 
market-specific knowledge and general knowledge. They see that market-specific 
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knowledge can be gained mainly through the experience in the market, whereas 
knowledge of the operation can often be transferred from one country to another. 
(Johanson & Vahlne 1977: 28) 
Luostarinen (e.g. 1989) has done remarkable research on the internationalization of 
Finnish companies. A major work by him was the research on the internationalization 
process of Finnish firms where he utilized responses from 1006 companies. In this 
study, the operation mode use of the studied companies was only one dimension that 
was studied as an indicator of internationalization but, largely, his findings support the 
notion of gradual internationalization as suggested by Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul 
(1975) and Johanson and Vahlne (1977), for instance. To easen his analysis, 
Luostarinen combined the different operation modes in homogeneous groups on the 
basis of the functional and investment character of the modes as discussed above in part 
2.3 and depicted in Table 1. Luostarinen found that 97 % of the companies that were 
studied started their internationalization by utilizing marketing operations instead of 
production operations. Non-investment marketing operations (NIMOS) were used first, 
before direct-investment marketing operations (DIMOS), in 98 % of firms. Non-
investment production operations (NIPOS) were usually used before direct investment 
production operations (DIPOS). NIMOS were used by 98 % of the companies as the 
first penetration method abroad, DIMOS by 64 % of the companies as the second 
operation type abroad, NIPOS by 44 % of the firms as the third operation mode abroad 
and DIPOS by 60 % as the last penetration method abroad. (Luostarinen 1989: 122) 
Despite having received empirical support, process models are frequently criticized for 
being too deterministic and for failing to take firm-specific factors other than experience 
into account. (Burgel & Murray 2000: 37) Clark et al. (1997: 608) point out that a 
number of studies fail to corroborate the notion that firms increase their commitment to 
individual markets through the four successive stages of the establishment chain. For 
instance, Hedlund and Kverneland (1985: 56) found contradicting evidence for the 
establishment chain when they investigated the entry of Swedish firms in Japan. They 
concluded that entry and growth strategies are changing to more direct and rapid entry 
modes than those implied by theories of gradual and slow internationalization 
processes. In their study, about half of the companies went directly from a sales agent to 
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manufacturing in Japan, instead of taking the route via a sales subsidiary. Importantly, 
they claim, “the extent of companies’ general international experience is associated with 
the degree of directness of approach”. (Hedlund & Kverneland 1985: 56) The role 
played by general international experience is further emphasized by Clark et al. (1997) 
when they challenge the role of market-specific knowledge that was underlined by 
Johanson and Vahlne (1977). Clark et al. (1997: 617-618) make a strong argument 
against the underlying assumption that each entry decision and subsequent modal shifts 
in a market is made in isolation of the decisions in other markets. They claim that 
experiential knowledge from within a specific national market represents only one 
source of information to the firm but that the general knowledge of operating 
internationally has a critical impact on the market servicing decisions in individual 
countries. As a consequence of this, companies do not necessarily develop 
incrementally along an identical continuum in each market they enter. Instead, if a 
company enters different foreign markets via export, and subsequently enters other 
nations via sales subsidiaries, a move direct to foreign direct investment is not a 
fundamental deviation from the evolutionary model of internationalization that was 
suggested by Johanson and Vahlne (1977) – the sequential development has occurred at 
the company level rather than within individual markets. (Clark et al. 1997: 617-618) 
Welch and Luostarinen (1988: 91) reinforce this point by claiming that “as skills, 
experience and knowledge in the use of a more advanced form of operations are 
developed in some foreign markets we might expect that this will eventually allow a 
company to leapfrog some intermediate steps in others”. According to Clark et al. 
(1997: 618), this suggests that direct moves to FDI in individual markets should not be 
considered in isolation to the development of operations in other markets. They 
continue that “the pattern within individual markets may not be as neat and evolutionary 
as that indicated by the Nordic case studies, but nevertheless at the level of operating 
firm,  when  account  is  taken  of  the  institutional  development  in  all  foreign  markets,  a  
stepwise pattern is observed.” (Clark et al. 1997: 618-619) 
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2.4.3 Models for foreign operation mode selection 
 
Clearly, FOM choice is not a simple exercise for any company. As stated by Welch et 
al. (2007: 451), “mode choice is a difficult domain for companies”. They see that the 
more a firm engages in systematic investigation as a prelude to FOM choice, the greater 
the number of mode options that are likely to be exposed, with increased complexity of 
potential combinations, and the more that unresolvable, conflicting objectives in this 
choice process may be unearthed (Welch et al. 2007: 451). Erramilli and Rao (1990: 
137) see the company’s choice of a particular FOM as a function of a large number of 
diverse factors. It varies with product characteristics such as degree of differentiation, 
importance, age and technological content. It may also depend on certain firm 
characteristics such as size and resources, degree of diversification, and corporate 
policies. Finally, FOM choice may also be determined by external environmental 
factors, such as host country trade and investment restrictions, host country market size, 
host country geographic and cultural distance, and exchange rate fluctuations. (Erramilli 
& Rao 1990: 137) Erramilli and Rao (1990: 137) term these product, firm and 
environmental variables as “nonbehavioral” determinants. They also acknowledge the 
role of the knowledge of foreign markets, and especially lack thereof, in connection 
with the “behavioral” factors that play a role in a wide range of international marketing 
decisions, such as initial involvement in foreign markets, choice of country markets, and 
choice of FOMs (Erramilli & Rao 1990: 137). The role of knowledge was discussed in 
part 2.4.2. 
Having recognized the complexity of the foreign operation mode choice, it is 
worthwhile to simplify this phenomenon a little bit. It is outside the scope of this study 
to review and discuss each different model for operation mode selection, keeping in 
mind that this study investigates mode strategies – mode switches, mode stretches and 
mode combinations – of Finnish firms in South Korea, not exactly just mode choices. 
Therefore, only one mode selection scheme is presented here, that presented by Welch 
et al. (2007: 442). This scheme is presented in Figure 3 on the next page: 
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Figure 3: Foreign operation mode choice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Welch et al. 2007: 442 
The model represented by Welch et al. (2007: 442) that is depicted in Figure 3 can be 
read as follows: a firm’s stimulus, interest in, and action towards mode use is mediated 
through the firms own interests, target or partner company interests and foreign market 
conditions, which leads to the mode determination process. This process, then, leads to 
final mode choice. However, the term ‘final’ is a bit misleading, since it can be argued 
that mode choices are made all the time, not just when a country is initially entered. As 
seen by Welch et al. (2007: 11), passage of time creates new influences, which may lead 
to a perceived need for mode change, and, as a result, choice of a new operation mode. 
This represents mode switching that is discussed later in this study. 
The FOM choice model presented above in Figure 3 was only illustrated to bring the 
reader to the context in which FOM choices take place. As said, FOM choices are not in 
the focal point in this study, and therefore, further discussion on different FOM choice 
models is bypassed at this point. 
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2.5 Foreign operation mode switching 
 
 
2.5.1 Why mode switching? 
 
Despite increasing evidence of considerable instability in foreign operation modes, such 
as switches from one mode of operation to another, and even though companies often 
appear to use certain types of modes for relatively short periods only, these aspects have 
been largely neglected in the literature (Benito et al. 1999: 214; Pedersen et al. 2002: 
326). Most firms with international operations will eventually experience switches of 
foreign operation modes. Some companies may even develop standard routines for such 
undertakings. (Welch et al. 2007: 361) Operating in a turbulent environment, firms by 
no means have a proven guarantee that a mode decision once made will remain the best 
way of servicing a foreign market (Pedersen et al. 2002: 325). Mode switching allows 
more intensive operations to be developed in a foreign market, which supports a 
strategy of deeper market penetration (Welch et al. 2007: 361). The entrant firms 
themselves evolve over time and as they grow larger and become more experienced, 
barriers to high-commitment operation modes tend to diminish (Pedersen et al. 2002: 
325-326). Alternatively, mode switching might be used to recover a problem situation 
in a foreign market that is associated with the existing operation mode use (Welch et al. 
2007: 361). 
When companies do mode switches, internalization is a common outcome. 
Internalization in this context means a transition from serving the foreign market 
through an outside agent to an in-house operation in that market, most often in the form 
of an FDI. Examples of internalization processes are switches from independent local 
distributors to own sales subsidiaries, from licensing arrangements to production 
subsidiaries, and from franchised outlets to company-owned outlets. Mode switches in 
the form of externalization are less obvious but not uncommon, though. Examples are 
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conversions from company-owned shops into franchised shops, and outsourcing of 
foreign subsidiary production to local contract manufacturers. (Welch et al. 2007: 361-
363)  
Welch et al. (2007: 363) see that both internalization and externalization processes in 
the foreign markets are so-called ‘inter-mode’ switches. Inter-mode switches imply a 
change of organizational form that is, in essence, the foreign operation mode in a given 
foreign market. In contrast to inter-mode switches, entrant companies also make ‘intra-
mode’ switches. In these cases, the entrant company maintains the organizational form, 
that is, FOM, but a new local operator is appointed. As an example, an entrant firm may 
cancel its contract with a local sales agency and thereafter appoint a new sales agent. 
(Welch et al. 2007: 363) The reasons for the change of foreign intermediary are 
numerous. In some cases, the entrant firms simply have to find a new intermediary 
because the old one left the industry, went bankrupt, or was taken over by a competitor. 
In most cases, however, it is the exporter that takes the initiative to terminate the 
agreement with the existing intermediary and subsequently starts cooperating with a 
new sales agent or distributor. The exporting firm does so because it expects to do better 
with another intermediary, frequently arguing that the performance of the existing 
intermediary has not been satisfactory. (Petersen et al. 2000: 46) Petersen et al. (2000: 
59) concluded that foreign intermediaries are generally appointed on loose grounds, and 
only in rare cases do the exporting firms’ choices prove to be optimal. Their observation 
was in line with previous studies of companies’ internationalization process that 
describe exporters’ recruitment of foreign intermediaries as spontaneous and incidental, 
rather than thoughtful and planned. They saw that this was the case for both experienced 
and in-experienced exporters. Their results indicated that firms’ ability to learn is rather 
limited and that their capability of selecting appropriate intermediaries is not enhanced 
by increased experience of doing business with foreign intermediaries. (Petersen et al. 
2000: 59-60) 
According to Welch et al. (2007: 363), companies switch FOMs for two basic reasons: 
either as a correction of managerial misjudgments or as an adaptation to new 
circumstances as foreign operations evolve. Decision-makers’ perceptions regarding 
costs, risks, and benefits of being involved in a market change as they learn more about 
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that market (Pedersen et al. 2001: 327). As a result, managers may find that the initial 
mode of foreign operations was founded on false premises, and, therefore, a mode shift 
seems compelling (Welch et al. 2007: 363). Quite often, managers are seen to rush into 
mode decisions that generate negative outcomes; companies do not necessarily make 
decisions in the rational manner suggested by classical decision-making models (Calof 
1993: 116). The initial wrong selections having led to problems, sometimes managers or 
their successors recognize their FOM misjudgments and take steps to correct them 
(Welch et al. 2007: 363-364). Another and perhaps more important reason for mode 
switches is that internal as well as external factors may change considerably after the 
initial foreign market entry, sometimes in rather unforeseen ways, which renders the 
original entry mode less suitable given the new circumstances (Welch et al. 2007: 364; 
Pedersen et al. 2001: 326). The change factors that trigger mode switches are numerous 
and of very different character. In most cases, though, the changes relate to the local 
market, the local operator, or the entrant company itself. (Welch et al. 2007: 364) 
Dissatisfaction with local intermediaries is a major reason for intra-mode switches but 
less so for inter-mode switches. Because the dissatisfaction is with the operator rather 
than the operation mode as such, entrant companies in many cases will remedy the 
situation by replacing the operator. Sometimes, though, suitable alternative operators 
may not be available, which forces the entrant firm to take over, that is, internalize, the 
local operations. The dissatisfaction with the local operator often prompts a critical 
appraisal of the existing operation mode. Companies may see that if changes are needed 
anyhow, perhaps the whole operation mode should be changed. Decision theory 
suggests that managers often take actions as reactive, ad hoc responses to emerging 
problems, in contrast to proactive follow-ups on recurrent appraisals of existing 
business practices. Thus, mode switches tend to appear as problem-solving devices 
rather than as systematic streamlining of the entrant company’s organizational structure. 
The important exception to this, are mode switches in connection to changes of 
management in the entrant company. A new management team is more inclined to 
enforce changes and unlikely to indulge with the expectations of the organization. (Ibid. 
2007: 364-365) 
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Growth aversion within local operators may lead to increasing dissatisfaction within the 
entrant company. Paradoxically, this dissatisfaction grows out of business success, that 
is,  the  increasing  sales  in  the  local  market  which  at  a  certain  point  strain  the  
management  resources  of  the  local  operator.  Normally,  the  local  operator  would  just  
expand the management team and increase the delegation of management tasks. 
However, local operators may be closely-held companies in which the founders take 
pride in maintaining the daily control of all business functions. Because of these private 
reasons, the founder may resist management delegation and expansion of the firm 
beyond a certain size, reflecting the growth aversion of the company and forming, thus, 
a major barrier for the exporter to develop its business in the target market in question. 
(Ibid. 2007: 365) 
Sometimes a change in foreign operation mode can be triggered by new ownership or 
management of a local operator. In principle, the entrant company can just accept the 
new ownership or management or appoint another local operator but only in principle. 
In practice, the suitability of a foreign operation mode tends to be closely related to the 
identity of the operator. In a management decision context, the two issues – FOM and 
the identity of the local operator – cannot always be separated. For instance, a license 
arrangement may be regarded as a superior FOM because of the manufacturing skills 
and market position of the particular licensee. However, in the case of the local 
operator’s exit, licensing may not constitute an optimal FOM to the entrant company 
because  an  equivalent  local  operator  may  not  be  available  or  willing  to  become  a  
licensee. In addition, replacing a local operator often evokes increased communication 
and  bonding  costs  in  relation  to  a  new  partner.  It  may  take  a  long  time  to  obtain  the  
level of informality and confidentiality that characterized the previous relationship – the 
entrant company must foresee higher communication costs and more uncertainty during 
the first years of collaboration with a new operator. These additional costs, then, may tip 
the balance in favour of internalizing the local market activities. (Ibid. 2007: 365-366) 
According to Welch et al. (2007: 366), local market growth is probably the most 
decisive factor for both re-localization and internalization of international operations. At 
a certain point in time, local market growth may justify local production instead of 
serving the market from home through exporting, for instance. Sometimes it may be 
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preferable to include a licensing agreement as an intermediate stage. The change factor 
in these models is the growth of sales in the local market. Assuming that a production 
unit, such as a manufacturing plant, has a certain minimum efficient technical scale, 
below  which  unit  production  costs  rise  rapidly,  at  a  certain  point  sales  in  the  foreign  
market will reach a volume that allows for throughput and scale economies that are 
sufficient for running a local production unit cost-efficiently. (Welch et al. 2007: 366) 
Market liberalization, in the form of a change of local government policy on foreign 
ownership, is a potentially important external factor. Often governments in emerging 
markets have imposed restrictions on foreign ownership of companies in certain, 
strategic industries, thus impelling entrant companies to form joint ventures with local 
firms.  As  these  restrictions  are  lifted,  entrant  firms  tend  to  switch  to  fully-owned  
subsidiaries. (Ibid. 2007: 367) 
Change factors may also grow out of the entrant firm itself. The growth of the entrant 
firm can be important. (Ibid. 2007: 367) When a foreign market is entered, the entrant 
company may be constrained in terms of resources available, leading the entrant firm to 
exclude any mode of operation that involves substantial requirements of capital or 
management resources (Welch et al. 2007: 367; Welch and Luostarinen 1988: 93). This 
would obviously make the entrant firm to select a low-commitment operation mode in 
this situation. However, in the long run, the entrant company may accumulate capital 
and excess management resources. (Welch et al. 2007: 367) The more resources that are 
available, the stronger the ability to serve foreign markets through high-commitment 
modes such as setting up own sales forces (Pedersen et al. 2002: 332). In this new 
situation of abundant capital resources and underutilized management capacity, it would 
seem appropriate to replace the low-commitment foreign operation mode with in-house 
arrangements, such as sales subsidiaries or company-owned outlets (Welch et al. 2007: 
367). 
In addition, the entrant company may become less risk-averse as a result of business 
diversification: growing bigger, the entrant firm may become less risk-averse and 
therefore more inclined to take over operations in foreign markets. In the first phase of 
international expansion, companies usually pursue rather limited geographical 
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diversification. Being novices in international marketing, they tend to be averse to risk 
and therefore they tend to avoid high-commitment modes such as having their own 
subsidiaries and rely on external intermediaries instead. Their foreign partners, such as a 
foreign sales agency or a licensee, often have no geographical diversification, either, but 
they usually spread their business risk over product lines or over several exporters, such 
as in the case of a sales agency. As a result, these foreign partners tend to be risk-
neutral. As time passes, though, the risk profiles are likely to change. While the entrant 
company often increases the number of foreign markets in which it operates, the local 
sales  agent  or  the  licensee  may  find  that  a  growing  proportion  of  its  total  turnover  is  
concentrated in the product lines of the entrant company. As a consequence, the entrant 
firm moves towards becoming less risk-averse and, eventually, becomes risk-neutral, 
whereas the foreign sales agent or licensee, for instance, move in the opposite direction, 
or keep their risk preferences unchanged. As a result of this development, at a certain 
point the entrant firm may find it economically beneficial to take over the business risk 
by integrating these overseas operations. (Ibid. 2007: 368) 
Importantly, learning about the local market and different FOMs may evoke foreign 
operation mode changes. Decision-makers tend to perceive market risk as being high 
whenever they lack knowledge about a foreign market. (Ibid. 2007: 368) According to 
Johanson and Valhne (1977: 28), this knowledge that is central to the development of 
international operations of a given company in a given foreign market can be divided 
into two subcomponents: objective and and experiential knowledge as discussed earlier. 
Their argument was that objective knowledge can be taught, whereas the experiential 
knowledge can only be learnt through experiences during the operations in a given 
country. Experiential knowledge in a given foreign market is seen to be critical kind of 
knowledge in this context. (Johansson and Vahlne 1977: 28) Lacking this important 
experiential knowledge leads to increased uncertainty regarding market conditions in a 
given foreign market, which tends to restrict the choice of foreign operation mode of 
entrant firms to low-commitment arrangements (Luostarinen and Welch 1988: 95) As 
time passes, entrant companies gradually accumulate market knowledge, partly because 
information flows increase as a result of their interaction with local operators, but also 
by more actively seeking it through visits to foreign markets (Pedersen et al. 2002: 330). 
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Although the accumulation of market knowledge may occur at a decreasing rate, as 
entrant companies become more knowledgeable about a foreign market, the attraction of 
high-commitment foreign operation modes increases (Welch et al. 2007: 368; Pedersen 
et al. 2002: 330). Often, the main motive for entrant companies to form JVs with local 
firms is to benefit from the local market knowledge of the latter. Arguably, this market 
knowledge is difficult to buy on an arm’s-length basis. (Hennart 1988: 365-367) After 
acquiring experience and knowledge on the local market through the JV arrangement, 
the entrant firm will no longer need the local JV partner and the entrant firm may 
convert the JV to a wholly-owned subsidiary (Gomes-Casseres 1987: 100). 
 
 
2.5.2 Barriers to mode switching 
 
While change-inducing factors, discussed above, certainly are important, such a 
description of mode changes seems one-sided, since it ignores that several factors can 
make mode changes difficult to implement, or even, from an economic perspective, 
poorer alternatives in the first place (Pedersen et al. 2002: 326). There are many barriers 
which may hamper firms’ switch of foreign operation mode (Welch et al. 2007: 369). 
These  barriers  or  factors  have  broadly  been  termed  ‘switching  costs’  (e.g.  Weiss  and  
Andersson 1992: 112; Benito et al. 1999; Pedersen et al. 2002: 326). To be exact, the 
concept of switching costs refers to difficulties – or costs – in changing the current 
behavior of companies, for instance regarding their foreign operation modes (Pedersen 
et al. 2002: 331). 
According to Benito et al. (1999: 214), even if it becomes necessary later to adjust the 
initial entry mode, it is often assumed that changing to a completely different way of 
serving the market will be very difficult and costly. As stated by Anderson and 
Coughlan (1987: 71), “channel choices, once made, are often difficult to change”. This 
point was further emphasized by Burgel and Murray (2000) in their study of operation 
mode choices of a sample of 246 UK high-technology firms on entry to the foreign 
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markets in which they were operating. They concluded that the strongest predictor of 
the chosen foreign entry mode was the existing, domestic sales mode of the firm, 
underlining the importance of the presence of the embedded routines and experiences 
with the domestic sales mode (Burgel & Murray 2000: 54). 
It was said above that mode switches have largely been neglected in the international 
business  literature.  In  addition,  it  is  seen  that  the  concept  of  switching  costs  has  also  
been overlooked in the international business literature. (Benito et al. 1999: 214; 
Pedersen et al. 2002: 326) 
Some switching barriers are very distinct and tangible, whereas others are more subtle. 
Indemnification costs that are associated with termination of distributors, for instance, 
are an example of very distinct and tangible switching costs. On the other hand, the 
uncertainty about the true costs of acquiring a local distributor, including the estimation 
of  post-acquisition  costs,  is  an  example  of  more  subtle  switching  costs.  (Welch  et  al.  
2007: 369) Often, the switching barriers are not so much about expected costs but more 
about the opportunity costs of sales revenue that may be sacrificed as a consequence of 
dismissing an outside agent who maintains strong bonds with local customers (Welch et 
al. 2007: 369; Pedersen et al. 2002: 331). Local customers will often identify the export 
product with the local sales and service organization rather than with the manufacturer 
or exporter. Therefore, if the terminated intermediary manages to replace the products 
of  the  exporter  with  close  substitutes,  there  is  a  considerable  risk  that  many  of  the  
customers will stick to the intermediary. (Pedersen et al. 2002: 331) Thus, taking over 
the marketing activities could lead to a direct loss in sales, either permanently or for a 
time.  Hence, switching barriers refer to outlays and expenses that are incurred as well 
as potential loss of revenues, as discussed above. What comes to expenses, a switch 
from a foreign sales agency to a sales subsidiary, for example, may entail switching 
costs in the form of severance payment to the former sales agent. This severance 
payment is a sum of money paid to the foreign agency to compensate for the premature 
cancellation of the contract. (Welch et al. 2007: 369) Another example, as suggested by 
Welch et al. (2007: 369), could be the legal expenses paid by an entrant company when 
a dispute regarding the conditions of terminating a local operator’s contract is settled by 
litigation. 
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Cancelling a contract with a local distributor could also result, albeit more indirectly, in 
revenue losses elsewhere, by affecting the reputation of the entrant company adversely 
with  the  distributors  in  other  markets.  To  illustrate,  an  exporter’s  termination  of  a  
distributor in one of its foreign markets gives rise to uncertainty among distributors in 
other markets about the exporter’s general commitment to long-term collaboration. As a 
result, the other distributors may take precautions in response to this uncertainty. Either 
the distributors will ask for economic guarantees in the form of credible commitment to 
continued collaboration or the distributors will adjust their investments and activities 
accordingly, reasoning that operations which entail exposures to hold-up risk should not 
be undertaken. (Welch et al. 2007: 370) Thus, the loss of reputation regarding enduring 
relations may entail indirect switching costs in the entrant firm’s markets as a whole 
(Ibid. 2007: 370; Benito et al. 1999: 218-219). 
Although Weiss and Anderson (1992: 105) did not distinguish between outlays and 
revenue losses, they call these costs ‘take-down’ costs or barriers. According to Welch 
et al. (2007: 370), mode switches may also entail various expenses and revenue losses 
in setting up a new mode – the ‘set-up’ costs. For instance, by dropping an outside agent 
the entrant company must undertake what are often quite substantial investments in 
hiring and training people in order to establish its own marketing or production 
arrangement in the foreign market (Welch et al. 2007: 370; Pedersen et al. 2002: 331). 
In addition, as commonly noted in the internationalization literature, companies that are 
expanding into new markets or serving markets in new ways cannot usually rely entirely 
on their existing stock of knowledge (Welch et al. 2007: 370). Much of the knowledge 
that is needed is of an experiential kind, which can mostly be gained through a process 
of learning-by-doing (Luostarinen and Welch 1988: 94). Welch et al. (2007: 370) see 
that adjusting and fine-tuning business activities in order to become fully competitive in 
a new market context will take a while and the efficiency is likely to suffer during this 
time. In addition, since novice companies are more prone to making mistakes that result 
in lost sales, revenues may also suffer (Welch et al. 2007: 370). To the extent that firms 
are unfamiliar with the markets and operation modes in question, the anticipated 
learning costs, and, therefore, the loss of revenue, may act as an impediment to setting 
up new operations (Ibid. 2007: 370; Pedersen et al. 2002: 332). 
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The entrant company may switch operation mode by taking over the local operator 
either partly or completely instead of breaking up and starting from scratch with a new 
organization. This kind of acquisition may, however, be constrained by switching costs, 
just  as  with  taking  down  operations,  although  these  switching  costs  are  of  a  different  
nature. First, the acquirer may incur ‘bundling costs’, which are the costs of acquiring 
assets of little value, but nevertheless imposed as part of a greater deal. To illustrate, the 
entrant firm may acquire a local distributor in order to get access to a valuable 
distribution network, but as part of the acquisition package inherit a number of 
distributorships of producers with which the entrant company has only vague, or no, 
relations.  These  distributorships  represent  assets  of  little  or  no  value  to  the  entrant  
company, and any price paid for these useless assets effectively constitutes a switching 
cost, indeed. (Welch et al. 2007: 371) 
A conceptually different type of switching cost concerns barriers of a more qualitative 
kind, such as the way decision makers perceive risk and uncertainty, their relations with 
other people, or even an apparent attachment on their part to specific courses of action. 
This, in turn, may reflect a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. An important 
type of perceptual switching cost is the increase in assumed risk that decision makers 
perceive  when  they  consider  replacing  a  well-known,  low-commitment  mode  with  an  
unfamiliar, high-commitment FOM. Case research suggests that changes in the mode of 
foreign operation are sometimes delayed for a considerable time, or, in the extreme 
case, are not carried out at all, even though they might seem appropriate in an economic 
or strategic perspective. A critical factor appears to be the perceptions and opinions 
entertained by managers and entrepreneurs. Because the managers of an exporting firm 
may be reluctant to accept anything but a small incremental increase in the commitment 
of resources and the attendant market risk, a switch from a sales agent to a wholly 
owned sales subsidiary may very well be impeded by the higher market risk involved in 
setting up a subsidiary. (Ibid. 2007: 372; Benito et al. 1999: 219-220) 
In addition to constituting set-up barriers, perceptual switching costs may also be in 
operation when it comes to discarding current business practices (Welch et al 2007: 
372; Benito et al. 1999: 220). Thus, they may act as a take-down barrier, perhaps 
because personal ties have been developed with a foreign agent over a long period (Ellis 
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2000: 462). Also, since changing current operation modes can be interpreted as an 
admission of earlier mistakes in the choice of operation mode, decision makers may 
regard a change as carrying a personal risk, such as loss of prestige, or even a possible 
career setback. As a consequence, rather than exposing themselves to such risks, they 
retain their established practices. (Welch et al. 2007: 372; Benito et al. 1999: 219-220) 
To sum up, there are different types of switching costs that are either easily quantifiable 
or more of a blurred nature, each of them having an impact on the decision to switch 
from one operation mode to another. These switching costs, also termed switching 
barriers, are depicted in Table 2 below: 
 
Table 2: Types of switching barriers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Welch et al. 2007: 373 
 
Categories of  
switching barriers 
Costs 
 
 
 
 
Revenue losses 
 
 
Perceived barriers 
 
 
 
 
Take-down barriers 
 
? Termination 
compensation (severance 
payment) 
? Lawsuit expenses 
 
 
 
 
? Reputation effects among 
local operators in other 
markets 
? Loss of customers owing 
to their loyalty to current 
agent 
? Personal bonds to 
individuals in existing 
foreign operations 
? Loss of prestige for 
managers responsible for 
initial mode decision 
? Risk of career setbacks 
Set-up barriers 
 
? Hiring/recruiting and 
training costs 
? Foreign operation 
learning costs 
? Costs of acquiring local 
operator assets of little or 
no value to the entrant 
firm 
? Loss of customers owing 
to failures in initial phase 
of own operation 
? Costs of integrating the 
acquired local operator 
 
? Risk associated with ‘new’ 
foreign operation method 
perceived as being 
unacceptably high 
 45 
 
2.5.3 The implementation of mode switch strategies 
 
According to Welch et al. (2007: 372), the ideal mode switch strategy aims for more 
than eliminating switching costs. It also ensures that the switch, or the anticipation of a 
switch, in no way makes the local operator disinclined to exploit the opportunities in the 
market. Put differently, the entrant company should see to it that its local operators 
consider a mode switch as a natural and acceptable, or even a welcome, part of the 
collaboration.  As  such,  it  should  be  seen  as  an  event  that  is  discussed  and  negotiated  
openly between the business parties. (Welch et al. 2007: 372-373) Petersen et al. (2000: 
692) write that “given the tendency to seek greater control through alternative operation 
modes, it would seem important that companies put in place the means to facilitate the 
process of switching modes in a way that minimizes the associated difficulties and 
costs.” 
To implement a foreign operation mode switch from using a local intermediary to an in-
house arrangement successfully, the relationship and its development with the local 
operator is of crucial interest. According to Welch et al. (2007: 375), the ‘termination 
dilemma’ adds to the difficulty of managing the relationship with a local intermediary. 
Poor performance, as seen by the entrant company, increases the likelihood that the 
collaboration will come to an end. Alternatively, the entrant company may replace the 
local distributor with its own sales organization that operates from home country or that 
is located in the export market. In this case, it is less obvious that dissatisfaction with 
the local distributor is the only decisive factor for the termination. In fact, the entrant 
company’s decision to integrate the sales and marketing responsibilities may be 
triggered by large sales in the local market, which could actually be a result of the effort 
made by the local distributor. Interestingly, to the extent that ending the local distributor 
relationship can be attributed to the successful sales effort of the same local distributor, 
this is an unfortunate and somewhat paradoxical consequence as seen through the lens 
of the distributor. (Welch et al. 2007: 375) 
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According to Welch et al. (2007: 375), there are strong reasons to believe that local 
operators are generally aware of the termination risk that they face. As a result, in order 
to keep the assignment, local operators may, therefore, aim for mid-level performance. 
Yet, local operators cannot know exactly what the entrant company considers to be the 
basis for termination. In other words, there are limits to how well local operators know 
the utility functions of their foreign business partners, that is, the entrant companies. In 
addition, exogenous factors may affect the foreign market performance in an 
unforeseeable positive or negative direction. The sales revenue achieved in the foreign 
market, which is only partially controlled by the local operator, may turn out to be less 
than acceptable to the entrant company, but, at the same time, also more than sufficient 
for establishing a subsidiary. In both cases, a likely result is termination. (Welch et al. 
2007: 375) 
Interestingly, both low and high performance will put the foreign distributor at risk of 
being terminated. If the foreign distributor is performing poorly, the entrant company 
may lose its patience, terminate the relationship, and then appoint another local 
distributor in the foreign market. If the local distributor is doing well and boosting the 
sales in the foreign market, the entrant company may find it lucrative to terminate the 
distributor contract and take over the sales and marketing responsibilities. (Ibid. 2007: 
375; Petersen et al. 2000: 692) Caught in this termination dilemma, the foreign operator 
is better off when providing a mediocre effort, that is, generating a certain level of local 
sales, but not reaching a volume that economically justifies the entrant company’s 
establishment of a subsidiary in the local market. (Welch et al. 2007: 375) 
Because of the inherent problems for the performance of the foreign intermediary due to 
the termination dilemma, Welch et al. (2007: 376) call for the entrant companies to 
release their foreign partners from this dilemma. If this is not done, the entrant company 
may lose out in several ways. First, in the absence of goal congruence between the two 
parties, the entrant company risks sacrificing potential sales revenue in foreign markets. 
Second, the entrant firm may incur the otherwise avoidable costs of prematurely 
establishing a subsidiary in a given foreign market. (Welch et al. 2007: 376) According 
to Welch et al. (2007: 376), the business press regularly refers to cases of exporters 
experiencing losses during the first years of operation of subsidiaries, sometimes 
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leading to shutdowns of non-profitable foreign affiliates, supposedly as a result of over-
ambitious entries into markets where the sales revenue generated did not support the 
considerable fixed costs of setting up and running a subsidiary. These issues are seen to 
be general for entries into any market. (Welch et al. 2007: 376) 
As a strategy to tackle the termination dilemma and to switch FOMs, Petersen et al. 
(2000: 693) suggest the following framework, depicted in Table 3 below: 
 
Table 3: Basic strategic alternatives for future switching of operation mode 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Petersen et al. (2000: 693) 
Table 3 presents some of the basic options that the entrant company may select, at the 
outset, to planning for a later operation mode switch. The switch options have been 
compressed into two main categories, termination and integration. Termination means 
the formal ending of the relationship with the local operator and the establishment of a 
new, unrelated entity. Integration means that the existing foreign operation is absorbed 
in some form into the entrant firm’s concern, such as a switch from exporting via an 
agent to the use of a sales subsidiary. Alternatively, this may be a switch from a 
licensing arrangement to a wholly-owned production subsidiary. Also, this can take 
place  by  means  of  taking  over,  or  merging  with  the  existing  agent’s  or  licensee’s  
operation. (Petersen et al. 2000: 692-693) Petersen et al. (2000) state that “while it is 
difficult for the entrant company to anticipate its future steps in the foreign market, we 
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during initial negotiations 
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TERMINATION 
 
CONCEAL – TERMINATE 
 
 
REVEAL - TERMINATE 
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CONCEAL – INTEGRATE 
 
 
REVEAL - INTEGRATE 
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suggest  that  consideration  of  termination  or  integration  options  at  the  outset  is  an  
important basis for strategic flexibility”. 
In the framework of Petersen et al. (2000: 693), a more fundamental question is whether 
the entrant company should conceal or reveal its possible future intentions to the other 
party during the initial negotiations. Generally, an entrant company will conceal its 
intentions as to when or if termination or integration may apply. Therefore, to conceal 
may be regarded as the default option. Thus, during the initial negotiations most 
international companies will address the issue of termination in terms of stipulating the 
notice of termination, property rights subsequent to termination and sometimes the 
compensation, that is, severance payment. In addition, the agreement will usually 
stipulate that termination can take place in case of breach of contract by one of the 
contract parties, sometimes specifying what events may qualify as contract violation. 
However, companies in general seldom address the question of when termination or 
integration is likely to take place as part of the entrant company’s overall strategy for 
the market in question. For instance, the entrant firm may have the intention of 
substituting a sales subsidiary for a local intermediary as soon as sales in the foreign 
market has reached a level that justifies the higher fixed costs of a subsidiary. (Petersen 
et al. 2000: 693-694) 
Table 3 above shows four basic strategic alternatives open to a company when 
considering operation mode switches which may be deemed necessary, or appropriate, 
in the future (Ibid. 2000: 693). These options are described below. 
In a ‘conceal–termination’ situation, the entrant firm conceals its ultimate intention to 
terminate the initial operation mode arrangement. The company may already have a 
firm idea of the form of operation it wants to switch to at a later stage, or may want to 
keep its options open as to the replacement operation mode at the time of termination. 
In both cases, the initial form is viewed as a ‘stepping stone’ to something else. As a 
part of this strategy, during the negotiation process the entrant company may be 
concerned that to reveal its possible or firm intention to terminate would be viewed as a 
sign of mistrust, which could jeopardize the whole deal. In many foreign operation 
mode negotiation situations, contractual terms relating to termination arrangements are 
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normally raised as part of the process. However, agreeing to the terms does not 
automatically reveal intention to terminate. The ability to maintain a conceal-
termination approach, and to have real options at a later stage, will also depend on how 
the initial operation form and the relationship with the local operator are handled in the 
implementation phase. (Ibid. 2000: 694) 
Following a ‘conceal-integration’ strategy, the entrant company intends to integrate the 
local operation at  some future point but,  for various reasons,  will  conceal this purpose 
from the prospective local operator during the initial negotiations. Ultimately, it may be 
able to integrate with the consent of the local operator, but it will not necessarily require 
this. Thus, the firm may be prepared to go as far as a hostile takeover, if it is feasible in 
the relevant market. Alternatively, the firm can effectively integrate the local operation 
through strategic hiring of key local staff, such as specifically targeting personnel from 
research and development or sales departments as a means of obtaining critical  know-
how and networks. Of course, in some cases a firm may not have a clear intention to 
integrate but, unless it puts in place the means to do so, effectively the firm ends up in a 
conceal-integrate situation. (Ibid. 2000: 696) 
If the intention to foreign operation mode switch is approached following a ‘reveal-
termination’ strategy, the conditions under which the relationship is to be terminated at 
the completion of the term of the arrangement are negotiated and spelt out clearly. The 
formal agreement is likely to contain specific clauses relating to matters such as the 
obligation of both parties at the end of the contract, severance payment, extension 
options, buy-backs, intellectual property rights, and the like. Some firms have taken the 
reveal approach a stage further and sought to include comprehensive terms and 
conditions for termination of the contractual arrangement, particularly in the case of 
JVs. In such situations, the terms of the ‘divorce’ settlement are negotiated in advance, 
in the nature of a ‘pre-nuptial’ agreement, including such aspects as asset transfer 
prices. There have been strong arguments for including exit options in JVs and other 
alliances. This approach of revealing termination plans, though, may be difficult to 
apply in cultures where the notion of discussing ‘divorce’ before the parties have even 
embarked on a relationship is difficult to comprehend. (Ibid. 2000: 696-697) 
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A ‘reveal-integration’ approach involves a company signaling in advance to a future 
foreign intermediary or contractual partner, in whatever form, its intention to eventually 
integrate the foreign operation. Various forms and degrees of integration are feasible, 
including a takeover, a strategic alliance or JV, a share swap, or the transfer of capital 
assets and/or market information banks. Placing the option of future integration on the 
table in the initial negotiations does reveal the entrant company’s possible future 
intentions, but if the prospective local operator agrees to the integration proposal, the 
entrant company has created a switching option for the future. If a prospective licensee, 
for instance, agrees to the inclusion of an option-to-buy clause in the licensing 
agreement, the licensor has created a clear, legal option of future takeover. (Ibid. 2000: 
697) 
Petersen et al. (2000: 703) write that “only as future events unfold will the entrant firm 
know whether termination or integration is preferable, or achievable”. They see that 
while companies cannot be expected to correctly anticipate future events, they still have 
to make commitments than run into the future, especially with regard to operation mode 
decision. This is an important concern, particularly for firms in the early stages of 
internationalization. (Petersen et al. 2000: 703) According to Petersen et al. (2000: 703), 
“a  low-commitment  entry  mode  comprising  a  real  option  for  a  later  switch  to  a  high-
commitment operation mode will clearly be preferable to a low-commitment mode 
without this option”. They also see that for the manager of such a firm, uncertain about 
the business opportunities in the foreign market, a low-commitment entry mode with 
real options for mode switch must appear as being ‘the best of all worlds’ – the manager 
avoids high market risk but maintains the option of exerting greater control over the 
business operation at a later stage. However, although a very tempting alternative for an 
internationalizing firm, this kind of switching option may be difficult to accomplish 
because of the possible reaction of the local operator once the intention has been 
revealed. (Petersen et al. 2000: 703) 
The strategic framework in Table 3 above represents only one set of options that an 
entrant firm can resort to when negotiating with prospective future partners. Arguably, 
there are other approaches to mode switches but these are not discussed in this study. 
The reason this framework was raised up in this paper was to expose the reader to the 
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importance of having strategic flexibility when a company is entering different foreign 
markets. This strategic flexibility is requested by Petersen et al. (2000: 689) who offered 
their framework to deal with the following problem that is best illustrated by their own 
comment: “Research has shown that when companies make operation mode decisions, 
they frequently do not consider, or plan for, future mode options, in spite of evidence 
that operation mode changes are quite common”. 
 
 
2.6 Foreign operation mode stretching 
 
In  the  discussion  above,  an  implicit  assumption  has  been  that  FOMs  are  mutually  
exclusive. This, according to Welch et al. (2007: 387), is a somewhat simplified 
assumption which does not reflect the reality of many FOM decisions made by 
internationalizing companies. This simplified assumption means that one FOM is 
replaced by another. In addition, the assumption has been that FOMs are distinguishable 
organizational forms in relation to which switches constitute clear-cut changes. A 
switch from a local outside agent to a fully integrated in-house operation, for instance, 
is very distinct. In practice, though, mode switches may be a great deal subtler. 
Sometimes mode switches emerge as incremental processes in which one operation 
mode virtually grows into another. The operation modes that an entrant firm uses in a 
specific market over a period of time are not necessarily sequential, that is, mutually 
exclusive – it is not uncommon for entrant firms to add new operation methods to 
existing ones, thereby practicing mode combination. Mode combinations are discussed 
later in this paper. Mode switches may also be incremental in the sense that within-
mode changes precede as well as follow a formal shift of ownership and organizational 
form. Generally,  there is  a variety of ways of easing the path of mode switches which 
are not obvious in the overall form of operation mode. For instance, it is not uncommon 
for firms to hire staff from their former, or current, agent to facilitate the transition to 
use of a sales subsidiary. Cooperative forms of association with the agent may be used 
even  after  the  sales  subsidiary  set-up,  which  represents  a  type  of  organic  extension  of  
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the existing arrangement, as a way of easing the demands and risks associated with the 
mode switch. Sales subsidiaries can also be set up in a form that minimizes the degree 
of commitment by the company. In assessing the significance of a mode switch from an 
internationalization perspective, whatever the overt pattern, much depends on the 
changes  that  have  taken  place  prior  to  the  formal  switch,  and  also  on  the  form of  the  
new mode. (Welch et al. 2007: 387-388) Interestingly, Welch et al. (2007: 388) state 
that “the essence of change is not simply captured by the existence of a mode switch”. 
Welch et al. (2007: 388) continue that “it is even conceivable that a mode change which 
would normally have been viewed as an escalation in international commitment might 
in fact amount to de-escalation”. They exemplify this through a situation in which a 
firm has invested heavily in its agency operation as a base for exporting, then switches 
to a sales subsidiary in the foreign market, but this sales subsidiary is poorly supported, 
staffed on a part-time basis only and provides a very limited service to customers in that 
foreign market. This could be described as a de-escalation of commitment. (Welch et al. 
2007: 388) 
There is potentially a wide variation in the extent of a firm’s commitment to its foreign 
intermediaries, which is reflected in aspects such as visits, support and internal 
company adjustments for the foreign market servicing operation. These can be 
generalized as within-mode changes along three main scales: activities, resources and 
organizational changes. The resources dimension is seen to be a very broad indicator of 
the extent of involvement with a foreign intermediary but it tells little about the nature 
of that involvement. It is the activities and organizational change dimensions that 
provide better indicators of whether there has been a significant change in the use of a 
particular foreign operation mode over time, including aspects such as the extent and 
form of communication, staffing, training and other forms of support. Extension of the 
range of activities may be a part of a process of extension of control over foreign market 
penetration, leading to the ultimate step of takeover or replacement by a company-
owned sales function. The activity dimension can also be linked to likely changes in 
experiential knowledge, even though there may be substantial differences in the 
knowledge effects of different types of activities. Along with activity extension it might 
also be deemed necessary to make organizational changes to organize these within 
 53 
mode developments. For instance, an export department could be established at the 
home base of the entrant company, or other changes made in its structure. Extension of 
activities will normally require that staff be used in different ways, which may also 
require a variety of organizational changes regarding foreign market visits, additional 
staff deployment, training programmes, and so on. (Ibid. 2007: 388-389) 
 
 
2.7 Foreign operation mode combinations 
 
2.7.1 Multiple mode phenomenon 
 
Instead of replacing one FOM with another, companies may add a FOM to an existing 
one.  The  correct  term  to  use  for  this  phenomenon  would  be  a  ‘mode  addition’  rather  
than a ‘mode switch’. The addition of one – or several – modes to an existing one may 
be a very temporary arrangement where the two FOMs overlap for a short, transitional 
period. In other cases, though, mode additions may take on the characteristics of a long-
term, or even permanent, arrangement. (Welch et al. 2007: 393) The multiple mode 
phenomenon is seldom mentioned in the entry mode literature (Petersen and Welch 
2002: 157). Mode researchers have viewed mode choice mainly as a choice between 
mutually exclusive modes (Welch et al. 2007: 387; Petersen and Welch 2002: 157). As 
a  result,  foreign  operation  mode  has  tended  to  be  treated  as  a  singular  entity  in  the  
literature, even though firms often use multiple or mixed modes in the same foreign 
market (Benito and Welch 1994: 16-17; Petersen & Welch 2002: 157). Benito and 
Welch (1994: 16-17) describe the existence of multiple mode phenomenon extremely 
well with the following comment: “While this reduction in the decision-making 
situation [to concentrate on singular modes] has simplified model building and eventual 
testing, it has been at the expense of reflecting the reality of the situation that companies 
frequently face – of not simply choosing one method versus another, but rather of 
putting together the most appropriate package of methods for penetrating a foreign 
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market”. Following the same line of thinking, Benito et al. (2008: 12) write that “while 
the assumption of discrete alternatives obviously simplifies the research task, it should 
be acknowledged that business practices are somewhat messier”. 
Thus, this ‘multiple mode phenomenon’ can be translated to ‘mode combination’ or 
‘mode package’, depending on the author discussing the topic but, in essence, they are 
the same issue (Benito and Welch 1994; Petersen and Welch 2002; Welch et al. 2007: 
393-413). Welch et al. (2007: 438) concluded that “in general, international business 
theory remains closeted behind the idea of simple, singular mode change, whereas 
companies deal with the reality of mode combinations in the normal course of 
international operations”. 
The aim in the previous foreign operation mode studies has been to understand why 
firms choose one mode rather than another. In these studies, multiple modes are often 
ruled out by the way questions are framed in empirical studies, or because responding 
managers  report  only  their  main  or  primary  mode.  In  addition,  it  is  also  possible  that  
researchers regard cases of multiple modes as anomalies and exclude them from the 
defined population. (Petersen and Welch 2002: 157) As an exception to this inclination, 
Petersen and Welch (2002: 157-158) point the attention to a study of Valla (1986: 25-
26). Valla (1986: 25-26) terms his finding of mode combinations ‘mixed approaches’, 
which accounted for 27% of the cases studied. Valla’s study included 45 French 
exporting manufacturers and their 165 export marketing organizations in four European 
countries, namely Italy, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Sweden, yielding 120 
cases to be studied in terms of operation mode used (Valla 1986: 25-26; Petersen et al. 
2002: 157-158). 
According to Petersen and Welch (2002: 158), a number of studies of specific operation 
modes highlight multiple mode phenomena quite strongly. Management contracts, for 
instance, are often used as part of broader foreign market servicing strategies – they are 
often tied in with other operations as a means of improving the effectiveness of the 
company’s thrust into a particular foreign market (Luostarinen and Welch 1990: 95). In 
addition, licensing operations are sometimes used in conjunction with JV operations to 
obtain greater control over foreign operations, for instance (Luostarinen and Welch 
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1990: 39). A study by Clark et al. (1997: 613-614) revealed that ‘mixed mode’ shifts, 
where companies combined two or more marketing modes simultaneously in a single 
foreign market, accounted for 18% of the cases in which a mode change had taken 
place. 
The reasons to use mode combinations are numerous. Petersen and Welch (2002: 157) 
claim that “mode combinations may lead to improved international market penetration”. 
They also see that particular modes can be used in different ways to achieve various 
objectives such as enhancing the impact of another operation mode or to achieve 
outcomes which would be impossible using a single operation mode. (Petersen and 
Welch 2002: 160) 
 
 
2.7.2 Five rationales for mode combination 
 
Petersen and Welch (2002: 158-160) identify four forms of multiple modes: unrelated, 
segmented, complementary, and competing. Based on their original work, Welch et al. 
(2007: 395-396) took this categorization further with their framework of five rationales 
for mode combination, depicted in Figure 4 on the next page: 
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Figure 4: Different types of multiple mode operations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Welch et al. 2007: 396 
According to Welch et al. (2007: 395), the framework presented above in Figure 4 can 
be used to determine the underlying reasons for an observed mode combination in a 
foreign market. In addition, managers may also use the framework proactively, e.g. as a 
decision tree, to identify needs and opportunities for combining modes in a foreign 
country (Welch et al. 2007: 395). In the following, each of the five rationales for mode 
combination is discussed. 
Unrelated modes occur when a company uses more than one mode in a foreign market 
but there is not connection between their uses within that market. This may reflect the 
operations of a firm that conducts business across different industries or markets. Thus, 
the operations of large, diversified multinationals in a foreign country are likely to be 
handled by different business units of the same firm. (Petersen and Welch 2002: 159) 
The operations of a Norwegian multinational, Norsk Hydro, in India are an example of 
this as illustrated by Tomassen et al. (1998: 7-14) in their study of operation mode 
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choices of Norwegian firms in India. Five of Norsk Hydro’s product divisions, using 
different market servicing modes, operate relatively independently in India, and were 
therefore treated as separate companies, as if strategic business units, in that study 
(Tomassen et al. 1998: 7-14). Importantly, Petersen and Welch (2002: 159) point out 
that if business units are the unit of analysis instead of firms as a whole, no mode 
combinations exist in this case. 
A company may use multiple modes in the same industry or market to serve different 
customer segments. Valla (1986: 33) saw that segmentation was one explanation of the 
multiple modes that were observed in his study of French exporters. He noted that 
sometimes mode combination was used to handle separate customer segments 
differently – for instance, the largest customers may be handled directly, whereas others 
are handled through distributors or sales subsidiaries (Valla 1986: 33). According to 
Welch  et  al.  (2007:  397),  market  segmentation  based  on  firm  size,  to  which  Valla  
referred, is indeed very common. In addition to size of customers, for instance, other 
forms of segmentation may be used, including geographical regions, households versus 
business firms and infrequent buyers versus repeat buyers (Welch et al. 2007: 397). 
In value activity specialization as termed by Welch et al. (2007: 398), multiple modes 
are used in a combined, mutually supportive way achieve the company’s objectives. The 
entrant firm uses different FOMs for different value chain activities (Welch et al. 2007: 
398). Valla (1986: 33) writes that “the objective of such combined approaches is clearly 
to increase efficiency, without being based on any specific segmentation”. An example 
is a firm-employed person based permanently in the country to back up an agent or to 
complement the marketing action of a subsidiary (Valla 1986: 33). In this case, the 
multiple modes’ focus is on the same segment but is concerned with different activities 
in the value chain. For instance, a multinational firm may hand over the manufacturing 
in a foreign country to a licensee but carry out sales and marketing through its own sales 
subsidiary and a clear division of labor exists between the two operation modes. 
Seemingly, the separation of manufacturing and marketing in foreign operations is seen 
most strongly in the global activities of sports shoe and clothing firms such as Nike and 
Reebok. (Petersen and Welch 2002: 159) The division of labor may be subtle: a sales 
subsidiary and local franchisees could both be subordinate to the same principal, such as 
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a multinational franchisor, and cater to the same customer segment but the franchisees 
act as retailers, whereas the sales subsidiary takes care of the wholesaling activities 
(Welch et al. 2007: 398). In these cases, the division of labor necessitates coordination 
among different modes – they operate in a complementary way. Therefore, multiple 
modes are a package that cannot be easily unbundled. In the discussion above, the focus 
has been on the multiple modes working together in an integrated, cohesive manner in 
order to achieve foreign market objectives. (Petersen and Welch 2002: 160)  
Entrant companies may also combine modes in relation to one specific value activity in 
the foreign market. This can be done in two very different ways: either the specific 
value activity is carried out by a local outside agent in tandem with the entrant company 
itself, such as in dual distribution where head-on competition prevails, or the entrant 
company conducts the value activity by itself but uses two combined governance forms 
– contracting and partial ownership. When two combined governance forms are 
employed, this arrangement can be termed ‘hybrid modes’ as in Figure 3 above. 
Reasons to use hybrid modes are numerous but they revolve mostly around bolstering 
commitment and control in a foreign market penetration arrangement. For instance, 
agency problems between the principal and the local partner are of crucial importance. 
In order to safeguard his interests and suppress moral hazard, the owner, that is, the 
principal, may insist on sharing ownership with his agent. In this way, the goal 
congruence between the principal and the agent is promoted – in the case where the 
agent mismanages the business he will impose a loss on himself to extent that his 
minority share loses market value. Agency problems can be seen to arise from moral 
hazard in combination with the difficulties of writing and enforcing perfect contracts – 
contracts that regulate any possible aspect of the agent’s responsibilities and take into 
consideration all future contingencies. Usually, principals remedy these contractual 
inadequacies by monitoring the agents’ behavior closely, but less so in the case of 
international business. Because of the considerable physical and cultural distances in 
international business, monitoring is a costly and sometimes unreliable control 
instrument. Therefore, another remedy for contractual insufficiencies, such as joint 
ownership or co-ownership, may be brought to use. To illustrate, management contracts 
are often used in hotel industry as a foreign operation mode and in some cases, minority 
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ownership is linked to a management contract. This minority ownership may be 
requested by the local management contractee to act as a collateral that effectively 
prevents the possible opportunistic behavior by the foreign contractor. The same 
arrangement can take place in franchising, as well. The profitability of the franchisee’s 
business very much depends on a continuous flow of new, saleable products and 
marketing support by the franchisor. Usually, the franchisee owns the physical assets of 
the local business operation, but in some cases the franchisor takes ownership of part of 
the assets, presumably as a token of commitment and good faith in the financial 
prospects of the local franchise operation. In addition, joint ownership in licensing can 
be explained by a bolstering of the principal’s – the licensor’s – commitment. Often 
times, the licensee is uncertain about the market value of the licensed technology and 
the  extent  to  which  the  licensor  is  committed  to  provide  services  associated  with  the  
technology and to update the technology on a continuous basis. In addition, the licensor 
may  also  see  the  joint  ownership  as  an  opportunity  for  closer  control,  that  is,  
monitoring, of the licensee. Licensors are often afraid that their licensees sell the 
licensed products outside the agreed-upon territory or misuse the licensed technology in 
other ways and possibly even become competitors or create competitors by 
disseminating the licensed technology elsewhere. To safeguard against this risk, the 
licensor may engage in a co-ownership arrangement which opens the door to the 
boardroom of the licensee’s organization and, thereby, enables supervision of the 
licensee’s managers. Sometimes the technology transfer goes both ways and the joint 
ownership secures commitment from both sides. The licensing agreement also has the 
potential to deliver a degree of control over marketing, management and other aspects 
of the JV’s operations. (Welch et al. 2007: 399-401) 
Finally, firms may use multiple operation modes to benchmark local operators (Ibid. 
2007: 401). In this case, a firm actually uses more than one mode to compete with each 
other. The operation modes target the same segment or segments and perform the same 
business activities, but the ownership – in-house versus outsourcing - and location – 
home country versus host country – differ. (Petersen and Welch 2002: 160) This, in 
essence ‘dual distribution’, enables the foreign manufacturer to benchmark and exercise 
greater control over independent dealers by keeping house accounts that are served by 
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their own sales people in the dealers’ districts (Welch et al. 2007: 402; Petersen and 
Welch 2002: 160). Using dual distribution, a manufacturer can monitor the effort and 
capabilities of the dealers (Petersen and Welch 2002: 160). In addition, the 
manufacturer establishes a credible threat of taking over the dealer’s district, provided 
that the take-down and set-up switching costs are likely to be moderate. This permanent 
termination threat may prevent the local operator from shirking. Also, the in-house sales 
channels may serve another purpose, namely to demonstrate new and more effective 
sales and marketing techniques. The concept of ‘flagship stores’ is well known from 
franchising where the franchisor is eager to show the full sales potential of its 
franchising format. Still, though, dual sales channels are challenging and fraught with 
the risk of conflict between the manufacturer and the local distributors – the two 
channels tend to view each other with a great deal of suspicion and treat each other as 
rivals. Also, business-to-business customers are keen to play in-house and outside 
channels against each other for their benefit. The Internet has also played some role in 
the development of dual sales channels. Lately, many companies have added direct, 
online sales channels to their existing sales network of foreign intermediaries. The 
addition of an extra online sales channel may be seen as an attempt to expand market 
reach by catering to new customer segments. From the perspective of the local 
intermediaries, though, the new sales channel can easily appear to be cannibalizing the 
existing export sales channels. By introducing direct online sales channels the entrant 
companies may easily evoke uncertainty and dissatisfaction among existing distributors, 
or, in the worst case, even open channel conflicts. (Welch et al. 2007: 402-403) 
Competing modes may also occur when a company attempts a hostile take-over of an 
export market. The existing local distributor might be able to resist giving up the 
market, depending on the nature of the contractual obligations, but the exporting firm 
still establishes a wholly owned, local sales organization. (Petersen and Welch 2002: 
160) 
In some situations, the distinction between the five rationales for mode combination 
becomes blurred because of the changes in the foreign market and in a company’s 
strategy and organization - for instance, when separate distribution operations in a 
market are coordinated by a new subsidiary, which creates actually a more integrated 
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system (Welch et al. 2007: 403-404). According to Petersen and Welch (2002: 160), the 
degree of integration or coordination of complementary modes can vary across different 
foreign markets even for the same company. They continue that although unrelated and 
segmented modes do not support each other, indirect support might be provided in a 
more general way, such as common staff training programs, staff transfers, sharing of 
some overheads,  sharing  of  market  information  and  contacts,  and  so  on  (Petersen  and  
Welch 2002: 160). Petersen and Welch (2002: 160) see that “mode use is a dynamic 
process subject to transitions and modifications such as mode additions or deletions 
over time”. They continue that “changes in mode combinations will occur in ways that 
are not reflected in studies of individual mode establishment chains and some 
combinations may be deliberately temporary, as firms seek to better position themselves 
for a move to a preferred form of operations in the foreign market” (Petersen and Welch 
2002: 160). 
 
 
2.7.3 Examples of mode combinations 
 
According to Welch et al. (2007: 404), mode combinations may appear in a number of 
forms in foreign market operations. Benito and Welch (1994: 17) present an illustrative 
example of foreign operation modes that a firm might use in different foreign markets at 
a given point in time in response to different internal  and external influences affecting 
the mode choice. Their example is presented in Figure 5 on the next page: 
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Figure 5: Foreign Market Service Packages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Benito and Welch 1994: 17 
This hypothetical illustration of a firm’s foreign market operation modes in different 
markets over time can be read follows: in some markets – markets two, three and four – 
a single mode may be used, whereas in others a combination of modes might be 
employed, such as in markets one and five. In addition, the company’s foreign market 
servicing mode shown at time t2 could be an outcome of a number of package 
alterations during preceding periods, as is the case with the foreign market number four. 
In this market, the firm used a broad package at its entry point – t0. This led to an altered 
package at time t1,  and  eventually,  to  the  full  acquisition  of  the  operation  at  time  t2. 
(Benito and Welch 1994: 17) 
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2.7.4 The roles of individual modes in mode combinations 
 
The roles of different modes in a mode package are important. Petersen and Welch 
(2002: 160) write that “the existence of multiple modes in an integrated system does 
not,  of  itself,  indicate  what  roles  they  are  performing  and  how  they  are  interrelated”.  
They continue that the role played by individual modes may change over time and vary 
across markets even for the same company. For instance, licensing might be the primary 
market penetration mode leading to some associated export sales, or it could be used in 
a supportive role to a foreign JV, creating additional income and facilitating control. 
(Petersen and Welch 2002: 160) 
Petersen and Welch (2002: 160) see that the role played by different operation modes in 
achieving foreign market objectives can vary in importance. One mode is likely to play 
a primary role in ensuring foreign market penetration and revenue generation, whereas 
the remaining other modes play various types of supporting roles. These can include, for 
example, further market penetration and revenue generation, or specialized roles in 
relation to particular objectives such as technology transfer or developing a positive 
political profile such as through a licensing or technical assistance agreement. (Petersen 
and Welch 2002: 160) A hypothetical mode package is illustrated in Figure 6 on the 
next page: 
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Figure 6: Hypothetical mode package 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Petersen and Welch 2002: 161 
In the mode package illustrated in Figure 6 above, the JV plays the primary role in 
achieving market penetration and generating acceptable returns from the foreign 
operation. The use of a JV might have been driven by foreign direct investment 
regulations or by resource constraints within the company. Management contracting and 
exporting are also used to achieve additional revenue, management control and better 
plant utilization. Licensing has a primary role in ensuring contractual control over the 
way the company’s technology is used and that the technology is not disseminated 
elsewhere by the JV partner. In addition, the licensing agreement also has the potential 
to deliver a degree of control over marketing, management and other aspects of the JV’s 
operations. In addition to technology control, the exercise of management control is 
strengthened through the use of a management contract. Needless to say, the driving 
forces regarding mode packages and the roles of the components parts are bound to 
differ as a result of variation in external factors such as government regulations, market 
pressures, the availability of suitable partners, as well as internal factors, such as 
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control, resource availability, and previous international experience, including operation 
mode experience. (Petersen and Welch 2002: 160) 
Given the complexity of mode packages, it is difficult to identify clearly the nature and 
significance of changes in operation mode and operation mode use over time, which is a 
key focus of internationalization research. A switch in roles for a given mode within a 
mode combination might amount to the equivalent of an overall mode change, such as 
when a company decides to change from exporting to licensing as the primary market 
penetration vehicle within an existing mode package. For example, the firm may have 
been using the foreign licensee to assemble the exported parts and distribute the final 
product. Sometimes, a firm is unprepared to invest in its own production facility in the 
foreign market, even though the licensing arrangement has resulted in inadequate 
servicing of customers. In this situation, the company might see the alternative as more 
fully involving the licensee in production and service provision, along with a reduced 
exporting role for itself. This way, the main structure of the mode package remains 
unchanged, but there is a significant change in the roles played by different modes. 
(Petersen and Welch 2002: 161) A further complication is added through adding and 
eliminating roles within an existing mode package (Welch et al. 2007: 409). 
As a further illustration of the complexity of mode combinations and the difficulties of 
measuring changes between different modes in the combination, the example offered by 
Benito et al. (2008: 8-9) is very interesting. These authors refer to the case of Finnish 
elevator and escalator producer Kone and its endeavor in the Japanese market with a 
local company Toshiba as a partner. Over time, the FOMs used by Kone developed 
through a process of mode addition from a simpler to a more complex package, in line 
with the expansion of activities and its relations with partner company Toshiba. From a 
start via exporting with some cooperation in product modification, the alliance that was 
formed extended to a mode package that included exporting, widespread technical, 
market and systems cooperation, as well as licensing and cross-equity arrangement. 
(Benito et al. 2008: 8-9) Importantly, Benito et al. (2008: 9) state that “at no point was 
there a clear-cut shift from one mode to another, as is generally portrayed in the 
literature”. The nature of the alliance changed substantially through both mode addition 
and  the  evolving  utilization  of  different  modes  within  the  overall  mode  package.  The  
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authors claim that it is difficult to tell what Kone’s primary mode of operation was in 
the Japanese market because all modes in the package played an essential role in the 
overall activity. (Benito et al. 2008: 9) Challenging the previous analysis and empirical 
research on mode use, Benito et al. (2008: 9) make a very strong argument: 
“Looking over the whole period of mode development, it is clear that the 
comprehensive mode package at the end is substantially different from the 
starting point, albeit within what could be loosely called the overall Kone-
Toshiba alliance umbrella. It would be difficult to argue that the ‘mode’ 
remained unchanged, even to use the term mode is misleading given both the 
mix of modes used in the package and the diverse roles that each played in an 
individual sense as well as in concert. Positions in the package shifted over 
time: at the outset, exporting was the primary mode and defined the 
relationship, but it became less important as Toshiba took over more of the 
production activity, embedded within an expanded, interactive alliance at 
many levels. The dynamism imparted by mode addition and deletion, and the 
shifting roles of the different modes within the overall package is an important 
characteristic that is virtually missing from existing mode analysis and 
empirical research. Instead, existing treatment of operation modes tends to be 
in a relatively inflexible way, with a focus on overall, substantive mode change 
– induced by alterations in a company’s internal and external circumstances.” 
As discussed above, the way modes may be used within mode packages indicates the 
potential diversity of roles that are involved in foreign market entry and development. 
Supporting modes may play an important role in achieving particular outcomes that are 
of concern to the firm, in addition to, or in support of those sought through the primary 
mode. (Petersen and Welch 2002: 161) Adding a mode to an existing operation, or 
changing the roles of operation modes within an unchanged overall mode package, may 
be actually a more effective way of responding to a change in market circumstances 
than undergoing the disruption and dislocation of a complete mode switch (Welch et al. 
2007: 409). According to Benito et al. (2008: 10), “mode package addition or deletion 
may provide flexibility while a core, successful mode form is retained.” This also assists 
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in maintaining knowledge, staff, and network assets that have been developed through a 
pre-existing mode arrangement (Petersen and Welch 2002: 162). 
 
 
2.7.5 Barriers to mode combination 
 
Welch et al. (2007: 409) state that “with its obvious advantages, one might expect mode 
combination, including mode packaging, to be a standard strategy ingredient of any 
international company”. However, what is known about the internationalization 
behavior of companies, this seems not to be the case. Therefore, one might speculate 
about which barriers to mode combination would explain this seemingly moderate use 
of mode combination, including mode packages, which is shown in empirical studies of 
mode use. In chapter 2.5.1.2, switching costs were identified in many cases to make up 
an effective barrier to otherwise desirable mode changes. (Welch et al. 2007: 409-410) 
In relation to mode combination, Welch et al. (2007: 410-411) identify three further 
barriers to desirable mode arrangements – insufficient scale of foreign market value 
activities, fixed costs of setting up multiple modes, and cognitive limitations. These are 
discussed below. 
First, insufficient scale of foreign market value activities may act as a barrier to 
combine modes. Managers are expected to make operation mode decisions in relation to 
each identifiable value activity of the company. Put differently, managers may take the 
individual value activity as the level of analysis in relation to the organization of their 
international activities. Thus, it is implicitly assumed that decision makers are able to 
distinguish different value activities in terms of the optimal FOM and mode package. 
Even though the individual value activity is taken as the unit of analysis, this by no 
means implies that all decision makers consider the same range or number of value 
activities in terms of the optimal FOM. The differentiation of value activities by FOM 
only makes economic sense if two preconditions are met: first, the individual value 
activity has to exceed a certain minimum economic scale in order to make it identifiable 
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and independently amenable for benchmarking against market providers. Second, the 
value activities should differ substantially in terms of optimal FOM. Thus, the number 
of separable value activities in a foreign market that the decision makers can discern as 
to the optimal mode of operation is to a large extent contingent on the scale of the 
individual value activities. The number of different FOMs used by entrant companies is 
expected to be limited by the scale of the individual value activities. If the decision 
maker is unable to differentiate the value activities in terms of scale and scope 
economies, asset specificity and other economic characteristics, there is no cost-
effective basis for introducing mode combination. (Welch et al. 2007: 410) 
The fixed costs of setting up mode combinations may also act as a significant barrier for 
their use. Welch et al. (2007: 411) write that “the introduction of separate FOMs in a 
foreign market has to be economically justified by the cost savings or revenue gains of 
the value activities that result from allotting them governance forms of their own – after 
deduction of fixed costs associated with adding new modes”. They exemplify their 
claim with the case of Danish pharmaceutical company Lundbeck that researches in, 
develops, produces and markets pharmaceuticals for diseases in the central nervous 
system. They see that when Lundbeck established a representative office in China to 
support and monitor the local distributor, one must assume that the fixed costs incurred 
by this mode addition, such as finding suitable premises, recruiting personnel, and so 
on, were justified by the extra revenue gained in the Chinese market as a result of this 
mode combination. Also, fixed costs of establishing a license arrangement, such as costs 
of writing, negotiating, and enforcing the license contract, in addition to an existing JV 
should be justified by the reduced risk of technology leakage. This, in turn, would result 
in diminished revenue gains. Again, scale is important because the set-up costs tend to 
be fixed – the ‘ink costs’ of a license contract are roughly the same irrespective of the 
market value of the licensed technology. As a result, mode combination is expected to 
be less common for small companies operating in small foreign markets. (Welch et al. 
2007: 411) 
Finally, cognitive limitations may act as a barrier to mode combinations (Welch et al. 
2007: 411). This can also be termed as ‘mode myopia’, as done by Welch et al. (2007: 
411). They see that there is a danger that companies become too narrow and fixed in the 
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range of foreign operation modes that they employ (Welch et al. 2007: 411). Firms tend 
not to consider the full array of operation mode possibilities when approaching foreign 
market entry and there is a risk of becoming locked into a particular FOM (Ibid. 2007: 
411; Calof 1993: 109). For example, an operation mode that may have been used at first 
by chance becomes the mode best understood, or one bad experience means that a 
particular FOM is locked out (Petersen and Welch 2002: 162). Benito et al. (2008: 16) 
state this extremely well when they claim that “sometimes, only one mode form, or 
package, is evaluated, particularly when companies are approached with an offer to sell 
by a foreign company or an offer to act as a distributor or licensee in a foreign market”. 
Thus, when international firms suffer from mode myopia, they find it difficult to 
introduce a previously unused mode into an existing package. There is comfort in 
continuing to employ those modes that the firm has become knowledgeable about, and 
adept in using, in different foreign markets. (Welch et al. 2007: 411) To cope with the 
mode myopia, Petersen and Welch (2002: 162) came to the following conclusion: “In 
general, therefore, a major task for the internationalizing firm is to ensure a high level of 
awareness and knowledge among key staff of the full range of operation forms and their 
potential to be packaged and used in ways that strengthen the process of foreign market 
penetration”. 
 
 
2.8 Synthesis of the literature review 
 
So far in the literature review, FOMs have been defined, followed by a discussion on 
different  FOM  options  and  the  importance  of  FOMs.  Thereafter  the  attention  was  
directed to foreign operation mode selection with the two main approaches – the 
economic-strategic and the process one – to this decision discussed thoroughly. This 
was followed by an example of a mode selection scheme. 
Thereafter, the discussion moved on to more novel thinking regarding FOMs, that is, to 
mode strategies, with its subcomponents mode switching, mode stretching and mode 
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combinations. Although these novel ideas are fresh and therefore, not a lot of research 
has been done on these frontiers, a very good effort to conceptualize all these thoughts 
to one model was done by Benito et al. (2008: 18). This model is depicted in Figure 7 
below: 
Figure 7: Theoretical framework - mode choice and change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Benito et al. 2008: 18 
The model presented in Figure 7 can be read as follows: managerial mode experience 
with other companies, inward mode use and mode experience in other markets all serve 
to affect the mode selection, thus creating mode bias. Based on this mode bias, 
situational factors, internal and external pressures, and mode evaluation and 
comparison, a choice of a foreign operation mode is made. After the selection, the FOM 
is used yielding experience in mode use, which may cause internal adjustments in mode 
use, along with situational factors, internal and external pressures, and mode evaluation 
and comparison. Through this experience in mode use and possible internal adjustments 
thereto, mode is confirmed, changed, or added or deleted to or from an existing mode 
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combination. Again, this mode confirmation, mode change, or mode addition or 
deletion process is affected by situational factors, internal and external pressures, and 
mode evaluation and comparison. Finally, this whole process creates knowledge to the 
firm of mode use, which translates into mode competence and confidence through a 
feedback loop. Mode competence and confidence, then, serves to affect cycle of this 
process, possibly diminishing the mode bias that there was in the beginning. 
Figure 7 sump up the theoretical discussion regarding foreign operation modes in this 
study extremely well. Therefore, this framework serves as the theoretical framework of 
this study, which somewhat guides the empirical part of this research. This research 
turns the attention next to information on South Korea and Finnish firms’ business 
endeavors in this country. 
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3 SOUTH KOREA AND THE FINNISH COMPANIES IN THE 
COUNTRY 
 
 
3.1 South Korea 
 
South Korea, officially known as the Republic of Korea (ROK), occupies the southern 
part of the Korean peninsula. Communistic North Korea, a backward xenophobic 
country that is teetering on the brink of agricultural and economic collapse, forms the 
larger northern part. (Burns 1998: 183) 
South Korea has been one of the world’s most dynamic economies (Genzberger et al. 
1994: 1). South Korea is the 12th biggest economy in the world and fourth biggest 
economy in Asia (Korhonen et al. forthcoming: 1). South Korea was an agricultural 
backwater with relatively few natural resources and it was dominated by its much-larger 
neighbors, China and Japan, throughout much of its turbulent history. Between 1950 
and 1953 the Korean Peninsula was the scene of a devastating war between North Korea 
and  South  Korea,  and  subsequently  served  as  a  focal  point  of  East-West  tensions  
throughout the Cold War. After this Korean War, since the 1950s, South Korea has built 
a modern, internationally oriented industrial economy largely from scratch. (Genzberger 
et al. 1994: 1) The fast economic growth of South Korea started in the beginning of the 
1960s and it averaged eight percent for decades. Even in the 2000s has the country been 
one of the fastest growing economies with a yearly average growth of five percent. 
(Korhonen et al. forthcoming: 1) Not surprisingly, the fast economic growth of the 
country after the Korean War has made people to refer to South Korea as an “economic 
miracle” – South Korea was among the first developing countries in the world which 
managed to achieve the economic level of rich Western countries (Korhonen & 
Kettunen 2006: 52). Interestingly, Korhonen et al. (forthcoming: 1), note that “although 
the role of the country is quite significant in the world economy, it has often remained 
in the shadows of its bigger neighbors, China and Japan”. 
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The population of nearly 50 million inhabitants and the fast-growing markets make 
South Korea an attractive operational environment for foreign firms. Despite this, South 
Korea has been regarded as one of the most difficult countries both in terms of 
exporting and investing. In the past, the problem was the restrictive trade and 
investment policy of the country but also the suspicious attitude towards foreign 
companies. The investment policy of the country was liberalized practically overnight in 
1998, coerced by the Asian Financial Crisis. Thereafter foreign companies have 
invested quite eagerly in South Korea. Although the attractiveness of China has 
decelerated the production investments to the other East Asian countries, almost half of 
the foreign direct investments that South Korea has received have still been directed to 
the production industry. (Korhonen et al. forthcoming: 1) 
 
 
3.2 Distribution channels in South Korea 
 
There is a whole variety of distribution channels that can be used in South Korea. These 
include agents, importers, distributors, wholesalers as well as liaison offices, the roles of 
which vary. Traditionally, foreign exporters and suppliers have used Korean 
commission agents to facilitate their sales into the Korean market. This is because these 
agents have been very helpful not only for the promotion of the exporters’ products but 
also, importantly, for the smooth business relationship that foreigners are very difficult 
to handle directly in Korea. The sales channel that is used and the decision about 
establishing a sales office, a joint venture or an independent manufacturing or sales 
company depends very much on which field of business a foreign firm is in. (Francke 
2008: 6) 
The agents’ and distributors’ rights are stipulated by regulation but basically agreements 
may be written quite freely and the regulations are quite flexible. Written agreements 
between foreign exporters and Korean agents, importers or distributors are quite 
common in the start of a business relationship. Terminating an agreement is accepted if 
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business is not going well. However, it is not so easy to terminate an agreement without 
justifiable reasons. (Ibid 2008: 6-7) 
Korean agents seek principals whose products bring high profits with the minimum 
efforts and, therefore, they may have several dormant agencies if the principals are not 
alert. Korean trading agents are usually the first step to come into the Korean market. In 
case there are good business possibilities, liaison offices are considered. These liaison 
offices are often used as test marketing channels because the Korean authorities accept 
the fact that a liaison office is there for market research purposes and not for profit 
during the first two or three years. After that, the authorities may start looking deeper 
into the operations and a liaison office should preferably be changed into a company 
quickly. (Ibid 2008: 7) 
There is one very specific feature in Korea regarding distribution channels, namely the 
small wholesale business. This wholesale business covers areas from consumer goods to 
industrial products, materials and half fabricates. The wholesale companies are very 
small stalls that are located in big cities in their specialized wholesale markets, such as 
textile market, tools market, shoe market, building materials market, for instance. Firms 
in these markets operate very quickly, they often use cash payments in order to avoid 
taxation and they hold very small stock. They also operate on thin margins but the 
turnaround of their commodities may be extremely high. This is a channel that is used 
by individual buyers, small retailers and big companies, from department store chains to 
industrial manufacturers, too. (Ibid 2008: 7) 
 
 
3.3 Investing in South Korea 
 
What  comes  to  foreign  investors,  joint  ventures  used  to  be  the  first  step  of  an  entry  
strategy in Korea (Korhonen 2005: 134). The establishment of foreign companies in 
South Korea was hampered by the restrictive investment policy of the country, although 
South Korea, as a strong economy, has been an attractive target country for foreign 
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investments for a long time (Korhonen et al. forthcoming: 27). Thus, South Korea has 
had a reputation of a relatively difficult target country for foreign investments 
(Korhonen et al. forthcoming: 29). 
Importantly, however, the legislation concerning foreign direct investments was 
renewed in 1998, as discussed above (Nuutinen 2008: 18). As a result of the Asian 
Financial Crisis, from the end of 1997 onwards, it became harder to get foreign loans in 
Korea. Foreign direct investments were seen as a solution to the crisis and the President 
Kim Dae-Jung made the promotion of foreign direct investments his personal mission. 
In addition, the International Monetary Fund, which granted a record large loan to South 
Korea, recommended the liberalization of the investment policy. A large-scale 
liberalization was implemented by enacting a new liberal Investment Act in 1998. As a 
result of this new Investment Act, almost 16 billion dollars of foreign direct investments 
flooded to South Korea the next year after the new law was enacted. Foreign investors 
were especially interested in buying Korean financial institutions and companies from 
chemical industry. In addition to the liberalization of the investment policy, the Asian 
Financial Crisis with its favorable prices increased the popularity of South Korea as an 
investment destination. In practice, this new investment policy meant that the 
investment permits that were previously required were relinquished and foreign 
investments started to be attracted with different types of incentives, such as tax 
allowances. (Korhonen & Kettunen 2006: 56) The most notable reform was the 
permitting of foreign direct investments through mergers and acquisitions and the 
opening of real estate market to foreign companies. The branches that were open to 
foreign companies were increased. The branches that are totally closed are fishery and 
radio and television activity. The branches that are partly closed for foreign investors 
are related to national security, general maintenance of order, health care and 
telecommunications. (Nuutinen 2008: 18) 
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3.4 Chaebol 
 
When discussing business in Korea, the term ‘chaebol’ cannot go unmentioned. 
Chaebol means a ‘financial clique’ and it is used to describe a large business group, 
originally created by a talented entrepreneur and still largely family-controlled and 
spread over many diversified business fields (Lasserre & Schütte 1999: 97). These 
chaebols, large Korean conglomerates, dominate the business in the country, and 
therefore the South Korean market can be seen as an oligopolistic one. A major share of 
the chaebols was established in the 1950s and these conglomerates have had a 
significant role in the creation of the South Korean “economic miracle”. The South 
Korean state used chaebols as  tools  in  the  implementation  of  the  economic  plans  and  
steered the operations of chaebols through subsidies, loan guarantees and taxation. As a 
result, a tight network was formed between Korean politicians and businessmen. 
(Korhonen et al. forthcoming: 40) 
Nowadays, there are over 50 chaebols in Korea. Originally, these chaebols were family-
run companies. Although they are listed companies with a dispersed ownership today, 
still the founder and his successors exercise a very strong decision authority. It is typical 
for chaebols that they operate on many different fields of business, which means that 
one firm may produce almost everything from microchips to chemicals and from cars to 
oil tankers. The biggest chaebols also belong to the largest companies in the world. 
(Ibid. forthcoming: 40-41) 
When the Asian Financial Crisis hit South Korea in 1997, 11 out of 30 chaebols run into 
bankruptcy. The structures of the chaebols started to be re-organized in the guidance of 
the  South  Korean  state  and  according  to  the  recommendations  of  the  International  
Monetary Fund. The business of the chaebols was changed as more transparent, the 
rights of the shareholders were increased and the reciprocal loaning of conglomerate 
groups was restricted. Chaebols were directed to concentrate on core businesses instead 
of sprawling and the power of the founder family was striven to be decreased. However, 
the South Korean economy rebounded quite quickly after the Asian Financial Crisis, 
leaving  a  part  of  the  reforms halfway done.  As  a  result,  chaebols still suffer from the 
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problems that are created by the management approach of ‘old times’. (Ibid. 
forthcoming: 41) 
 
 
3.5 Chaebols and the other companies in South Korea 
 
In  addition  to  chaebols, there are roughly three million small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) in Korea. These SMEs have remained in the shadows of larger 
chaebols.  The  SMEs  and  chaebols are, however, dependent on each other, as these 
SMEs serve as subcontractors to chaebols and  deliver  parts  to  chaebols’ branded 
products. (Ibid. forthcoming: 41) 
The role of foreign firms has been a minor one in Korea. Foreign companies, unlike the 
local SMEs, have to compete head-on with the chaebols.  Foreign  firms  are  at  a  
disadvantage in a strongly networked environment where chaebols are dominating the 
market and have occupied the distribution channels. During the last ten years, the 
business model of South Korean firms has changed to a more international one but, still, 
there are anti-foreign attitudes in the South Korean business environment. (Ibid. 
forthcoming: 41) 
 
 
3.6 Finnish companies in South Korea over time 
 
The trade of Finnish companies to South Korea started in the later part of the 1970s and 
the first investment project was undertaken in 1984. Over time, only 25 Finnish firms 
have invested in South Korea but a part of the established or acquired units are not in 
the Finnish ownership anymore. However, the trade between Finland and South Korea 
is vivid. The imports have grown significantly faster than the exports from 2003 
 79 
onwards, the exports basically getting nowhere fast. Both in the exports and imports the 
biggest merchandise group is machines, appliances and transport equipment. A 
significant share of the trade includes high technology. (Ibid. forthcoming: 1) 
Mostly Finnish firms have engaged in direct exporting to South Korea, operating 
through an agent in the country. There are roughly 150 Finnish companies that are 
represented in South Korea. (Ibid. forthcoming: 72) 
The biggest Finnish investors are Nokia, Ahlstrom, Fibox and Kone. Finnish firms have 
mainly invested in industrial production in Korea. (Francke 2008: 19) 11 Finnish 
companies have established production activities in the country but not all of these 
companies are in the Finnish ownership anymore (Korhonen et al. forthcoming: 72). A 
significant share of these investments has been directed to electronics and plastics 
industries. Nowadays, the interest of Finnish firms is biggest in information technology 
and telecommunications fields, especially in the software and research and 
development. (Francke 2008: 19) 
The motive for the Finnish firms that established operations in South Korea in the 1980s 
and the 1990s was to increase the world market shares by developing the cost-quality 
competitiveness. To achieve this, companies transferred production to South Korea, 
which enabled taking advantage of favorable production costs without the quality 
suffering from this. The investors were mainly traditional export companies from forest 
and metal industries. However, the investments were quite small in terms of size and 
they were implemented by establishing Finno-Korean joint ventures. The relaxation of 
the investment policy in South Korea as a result of the Asian Financial Crisis also 
enabled acquisitions and the establishment of wholly-owned companies by foreigners in 
South Korea. Thereafter also the small and medium-sized Finnish firms started to invest 
in the country. The motive for these investments was still to enhance the 
competitiveness of Finnish companies but also to source new knowledge and 
technology by investing in South Korean research and development activity. The 
investments have taken place either as acquisitions or by transferring production to 
South Korea. In addition to the investments of traditional forest and metal industry 
companies, firms from chemical industry, information technology and 
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telecommunications industry have invested in South Korea. (Korhonen et al. 
forthcoming: 1-2) The Finnish investments to South Korea have partly been directed to 
those industrial sectors where the chaebols were not very strong, such as paper industry 
(Ibid. forthcoming: 58). 
Korhonen et al. (Forthcoming: 72) see that “in a nutshell it can be said that the spectrum 
of Finnish firms operating in South Korea has diversified to encompass SMEs in 
addition to the large companies”. In addition, the spectrum of branches has diversified, 
although the activity is still mostly on a business-to-business basis. The same applies to 
exporting activity, which is due to the relatively small number of international consumer 
brands in Finland that the South Koreans could become interested in. A central reason 
for Finnish firms to establish operations in Korea is either to take advantage of the local 
knowledge in the company’s own value chain or, alternatively, a significant customer in 
South Korea that the company wants to serve on-site. (Ibid. forthcoming: 72-73)
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4 METHODOLOGY 
 
 
4.1 Method of research 
 
This research is conducted as an inductive research, that is, the empirical information is 
collected first and thereafter the phenomena visible in the empirical information is 
explained utilizing the latest research on the field of internationalization and FOMs. 
However, this study is reported as if it was a regular, deductive thesis because it is 
intended to be easier to follow and read as it is adheres to the general guidelines given 
to the Master’s theses written at the Helsinki School of Economics. 
A major reason why this study was carried out as an inductive research was that this 
research was done alongside CEMAT’s study. CEMAT does research as inductive 
research and this basically forced this research to be carried out as an inductive 
research, as well. The research process started very quickly, basically immediately, after 
getting the assignment from CEMAT, which did not leave much time to go through the 
relevant literature. Studying the literature before starting the interviews would definitely 
have helped a lot in the interview process, possibly yielding opportunities to go deeper 
to some important themes for this study through additional questions, for instance. 
However, the fact that this research was done in parallel with CEMAT’s study helped 
enormously in getting access to the case companies, since the personnel at CEMAT had 
good contacts to relevant companies and persons to be interviewed. 
Through induction general conclusions are drawn from empirical observations. In this 
type of research the process goes from observations to findings and to theory building, 
as findings are incorporated back into existing knowledge to improve theories – theory 
is the outcome of the research in this approach. Inductive type of research is often 
associated  with  the  qualitative  type  of  research  that  this  study  represents,  as  well.  
(Ghauri & Gronhaug 2005: 15) 
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Deduction, on the other hand, means that conclusions are drawn through logical 
reasoning. In this type of research, the researcher builds or deduces hypotheses from the 
existing knowledge and literature, which can be subject to empirical scrutiny and thus 
can be accepted or rejected. In this type of research, theory, and hypotheses built on it, 
come first and affect the rest of the research process. Deductive type of research is often 
associated with the quantitative type of research. (Ghauri & Gronhaug 2005: 15) 
In the research process, methods begin with ideas and facts that lead to propositions, 
theories and predictions. New theories and predictions lead to new ideas and facts, and a 
new cycle begins, leading researcher to new theories. When observed facts are utilized 
in generating a theory that is consistent with these facts, researcher is doing induction. 
Put differently, induction is the process of observing facts to generate a theory and is 
perhaps the first step in scientific methods. While doing the research, propositions are 
formulated after observing the relationship between different variables in the study. 
(Ghauri & Gronhaug 2005: 15-16) Ghauri and Gronhaug (2005: 16) claim that “most 
researchers in business studies go through this method, observing facts that lead them to 
propositions and later to theories”. 
In deduction, consequences of a theory are analyzed. Deduction involves the gathering 
of facts to confirm or disprove hypothesized relationships among variables that have 
been deduced from the existing knowledge. (Ghauri & Gronhaug 2005: 16) 
Interestingly, the processes of induction and deduction are not totally exclusive of each 
other – induction includes elements of deduction and vice versa (Ghauri & Gronhaug 
2005: 16). In this research, there was no deduction involved with the induction since the 
empirical information was completely gathered before going through the relevant 
literature to explain the phenomenon visible in the empirical information. This was 
mostly due to lack of time because the time schedule of CEMAT for the interviews was 
quite strict – CEMAT basically needed the interviews “as quickly as possible” so that 
they could continue with their research regarding Finnish companies’ relationships in 
South Korea to public authorities, local partner companies and local workforce. In 
addition,  I  personally  participated  in  the  writing  work  of  the  CEMAT’s  book  labeled  
“Korea as an Operating Environment for Finnish Firms”  by  writing  a  chronology  of  
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Finno-Korean trade development and the chapter concerning practical problems of 
Finnish firms in South Korea and solutions thereto. 
However, although the study of CEMAT kept me quite busy in the beginning part of 
this  study,  I  benefited  enormously  from being  part  of  the  CEMAT’s  project.  The  first  
thing  was  the  easy  access  to  relevant  companies  as  discussed  above.  Another,  very  
important issue was that I received very helpful tips and constructive feedback for my 
study, especially from Kristiina Korhonen at CEMAT who was in charge of CEMAT’s 
research on South Korea. 
The empirical data for this research has been collected through a total of 13 in-depth 
interviews in nine case companies. The information that was received in these 
interviews was supplemented with secondary sources such as the Internet-pages of the 
case companies and other written material. Personally, I interviewed 8 persons in the 
case firms – Heikki Lehmus from Cargotec, Jouni Puura from Proventia Emission 
Control, Interviewee One from Company A, Hannu Ylinenpää from Lappset, Petri 
Talala from Futuremark, Interviewee Two from Company B, Interviewee Three from 
Company C and Tapani Niemi from Fibox. In addition, I did two other interviews for 
CEMAT but these interviews were not utilized in this thesis. In addition to these eight 
interviews that I carried out myself, I had access to five other interviews that were done 
earlier by the personnel of CEMAT. These five interviews concerned three case 
companies – Company A, Fibox and Company D. From Company A, Interviewee Four 
was interviewed by the personnel of CEMAT on 6th March, 2003 and 24th April, 2007. 
The personnel of CEMAT also interviewed Interviewee Five, a high ranking director of 
Fibox in Korea, on 16th December, 2004 and 23rd August, 2006. Lastly, the personnel of 
CEMAT also interviewed Interviewee Six from company D on 4th February, 2008. The 
information received in these five additional interviews was utilized as supplement 
information to the information that was received in my own interviews. 
The method of multiple-case study research was selected as an empirical research 
strategy for this study. According to Yin (2009: 4), case study method allows researcher 
to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events. A case study is 
an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within 
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its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident. The case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive 
situation  where  there  will  be  many more  variables  of  interest  than  data  points,  and  as  
one result relies on multiple sources of evidence, with the data needing to converge in a 
triangulating fashion, and as another result benefits from the prior development of 
theoretical propositions to guide the data collection and analysis. (Yin 2009: 18) In 
business studies, case study research is particularly useful when the phenomenon under 
investigation is difficult to study outside its natural setting and also when the concepts 
and variables under study are difficult to quantify (Ghauri & Gronhaug 2005: 114). 
Case study has a distinct advantage over other research techniques in a situation where 
“how” and “why” questions are to be asked and when a contemporary set of events over 
which the researcher has little or no control are investigated. (Yin 2009: 13)  
To be exact, this research is conducted as a holistic multiple-case study, holistic instead 
of embedded because there is only one unit of analysis in this study (Yin 2009: 46-60). 
This  unit  of  analysis  is  the  operation  mode  strategies  of  the  case  companies  in  South  
Korea – the analysis takes place on a micro level at each individual case company. 
The interviews were carried out as open-end interviews in which a pre-formulated 
questionnaire was utilized. This questionnaire can be found in Appedix 1. This 
questionnaire was received from CEMAT – it is the same questionnaire template that 
CEMAT was using in all of its individual market studies in its program Managing 
Business in Turbulent Markets.  I  was  instructed  to  go  through  all  the  themes  and  
questions in the questionnaire sheet but I was also asked to go deeper to some themes 
that the interviewee was very knowledgeable of at the expense of some other themes 
that  he  or  she  did  not  have  that  much  information,  though.  This  meant  that  CEMAT  
received information on different themes to varying degrees from different interviews 
but, importantly, it was possible for CEMAT to get a good amount of information on 
each theme when the information from all the interviews were combined. Importantly, I 
was allowed to add my own questions to the question sheet. Three questions that I 
added were the following: “what was the impulse to enter South Korea in the first 
place?”, “at which stage of internationalization did the company enter South Korea?” 
and “why exactly to South Korea?” These questions were all added under the heading 
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“Background information on both the parent company and the subsidiary”. In addition, I 
tried to make as many additional, particularizing questions as possible when the 
operation mode issues of case companies were discussed with the interviewees, the 
number of additional questions naturally depending on how extensively the interviewee 
responded to the original questions that were presented. The interviews were 
prearranged to last for one hour. However, the length of different interviews varied 
considerably, some interviews lasting one and half hours and some only 50 minutes. 
However, all the necessary information was still received in all of the interviews. 
 
 
4.2 Selection of case companies 
 
The case companies were selected in two different ways – either they were pre-selected 
by  CEMAT  or  I  selected  the  companies  personally.  The  companies  that  were  pre-
selected by CEMAT represented those companies that CEMAT was especially 
interested in because the companies had not been interviewed before regarding business 
in Korea. For these companies, CEMAT pointed me a person that would be very 
interesting to be interviewed and I approached this person thereafter and asked for an 
interview. The interviewees were first contacted with an email message, after which I 
contacted the interviewees over the telephone and asked for an interview. The email 
message template sent to the potential interviewees can be found in Appendix 2. In 
some  cases  this  person  was  a  close  acquaintance  to  CEMAT’s  personnel  and  had  an  
extremely long history in the operations of his or her company in Korea. The firms that 
were pre-selected by CEMAT for this study included Cargotec, Company A and Fibox.  
I selected the other companies by going through the article archives of a Finnish 
business paper, Kauppalehti. I searched for articles with a keyword “Korea” to find 
articles on Finnish firms that were active in Korea. Based on this article search, I 
identified Proventia Emission Control, Lappset, Futuremark, Company B and Company 
C very interesting to be interviewed for both the study of CEMAT and my own study. 
Naturally,  I  had  to  have  these  companies  to  be  interviewed  accepted  by  CEMAT.  
Company D was interviewed by the personnel of CEMAT earlier. This interview turned 
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out to offer interesting insights for my study, as well, and was therefore selected as the 
ninth case for this thesis. 
Admittedly,  this  way  of  selecting  the  case  companies  is  far  away  from  being  of  any  
scientific nature. The case companies do not represent any special field of business and 
they are of different age, different size, and their time of doing business in Korea varies 
considerably, as discussed in subsequent chapters. In short, the sample of case 
companies is very heterogeneous. This makes it very questionable to draw any 
generalizations regarding operation mode strategies of certain types of Finnish 
companies or companies on some specific fields of business, for instance. However, 
keeping in mind the exploratory nature of this research on a rather under-researched 
topic and, importantly, the paucity of Finnish companies operating in Korea, the 
selection of case companies becomes a bit more justified. 
 
 
4.3 Data analysis 
 
The interviews of the representatives of the case firms were recorded using an mp3-
player. Thereafter, these interviews were transcribed word-by-word from the records, as 
recommended by Hirsjärvi et al. (2005: 210). There is no unequivocal guideline 
regarding the accuracy of the transcription. In this study, all the interviews were 
transcribed on a word-by-word basis, either by the researcher himself or by the partner 
company of CEMAT. Those interviews that I did myself I transcribed myself, too. The 
interviews that I received from CEMAT were already transcribed either by CEMAT or 
by a partner company of CEMAT. 
Based  on  these  interviews  and  other  sources  such  as  company  websites  and  other  
presentation material, for instance, a case description of each case company was written. 
I would have had access to an analysis program of qualitative data, N-Vivo, at CEMAT. 
This program can be used to categorize research material according to specified themes. 
However, I made a decision not to use N-Vivo, because the interviews turned out to 
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offer different types of information with different order and importance. It was 
necessary to read through each interview many times and write out a case report on each 
case company, which basically told ‘the story of each case firm in South Korea’. The 
interviews were supplemented with other sources as discussed above. When utilizing 
the interviews that I did not do myself, I encountered some problems, since not all the 
questions  that  I  would  have  asked  were  asked  in  the  interview.  For  example,  one  
interview that CEMAT had done earlier was about a firm and its operations in two 
countries, South Korea and Taiwan. As a result, the information that was South Korea 
specific was quite limited, and therefore, I needed to complement this interview 
extensively with other sources. However, this interview offered interesting insights for 
my study and was, therefore, selected as one of the case studies for this research. 
The interviewees were done in Finnish. The case studies were written in English, 
meaning that the translation took place at this point. The case studies look quite same in 
this paper as they did after initial writing of them, with some minor modifications done 
along the way. Some companies, though, have been anonymized because of their wish 
to remain anonymous in the final report. After the case studies were written, each case 
was analyzed in the cross-case analysis utilizing the theoretical framework presented in 
the literature review of this study. 
 
 
4.4 The reliability and validity of the study 
 
The  reliability  of  the  research  refers  to  repeatability  of  the  research  results.  The  
reliability of a measurement or a research, thus, means its ability to create non-random 
results. (Hirsjärvi et al. 2005: 216) The goal of reliability is to minimize the errors and 
biases in a research. The objective is to be sure that, if a later investigator followed the 
same procedures as described by an earlier investigator and conducted the same case 
study all over again, the later investigator should arrive at the same results and 
conclusions. An important aspect is the documentation of procedures so that the other 
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researcher would do the research in a similar way. (Yin 2009: 45) The reliability of a 
qualitative research is enhanced by the researcher’s detailed description of the research 
process (Hirsjärvi et al. 2005: 217). 
In this research, the reliability is strongly undermined by the fact that this was an 
inductive study. Admittedly, I was not very confident at the time of the interviews that 
what the interviews will produce. In other words, I was still on my way to conceptualize 
the phenomenon that is being studied, which meant that I could not document the 
procedure and follow a detailed protocol as to how to proceed from one case to another. 
Because of this, it is highly likely that another researcher would arrive at somewhat 
different results, especially because of the open-end interview structure which meant 
that the interviewer could have directed the discussion with the interviewee to paths at 
his or her own discretion and understanding, which could probably have yielded 
different results. At the same time, though, it could be argued that a researcher with the 
same level of understanding of international business issues and FOMs would have 
arrived at somewhat same results, since, the path of each individual case company in 
South Korea only has followed one track. Of course, differences in interpretation of the 
same interview answers could lead to different conclusions, but, arguably, two 
researcher with relatively similar background information on this topic would arrive at 
somewhat same results. 
Another concept related to the evaluation of a research is validity. Validity means the 
ability of the measurement or research methodology to measure exactly what is meant 
to be measured. The measurements and methods do not always reflect the reality what is 
thought to be measured. The validity of a research can be measured from different 
perspectives. (Hirsjärvi et al. 2005: 216-217) 
The  construct  validity  of  a  research  refers  to  its  ability  to  identify  correct  operational  
measures for the concepts that are studied. To increase construct validity, multiple 
sources of evidence should be used, a chain of evidence should be established and key 
informants should have had to review a draft of a case report. External validity refers to 
defining the domain to which a study’s findings can be generalized. Internal validity 
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only relates to explanatory or causal studies, and therefore, is not discussed in this study 
as this study is an exploratory study. (Yin 2009: 40) 
The  construct  validity  of  this  research  is  quite  high,  as  the  operational  measures  were  
somewhat easy to define in this research. These were the foreign operation mode 
strategies, especially mode switching, mode stretching, and mode combination 
strategies of the case companies in South Korea. Indeed, multiple sources of evidence 
were used – interviews were complemented with other information such information 
from case companies’ websites and with other written material. However, there was a 
strong reliance on only one source of information, that is, interviews, in this research, 
which  decreases  the  construct  validity.  The  chain  of  evidence  was  quite  strong  in  this  
research,  as  it  is  easy  for  the  reader  of  this  paper  to  follow  the  case  descriptions  and  
cross-case analysis to either directions when searching for the basis of the conclusions 
that were made. Seven interviewees reviewed a draft of the case descriptions of the 
companies that they represented, which somewhat increases the construct validity of 
this research. 
The external validity of this research is mediocre. The external validity problem has 
been a major barrier in doing case studies, critics typically seeing that single cases offer 
a poor basis for generalizing (Yin 2009: 43). Obviously, this critique hits its target in 
this research, as well, for two important reasons. First, the FOM strategies of only nine 
firms were studied in this research. When this number is compared to the total number 
of Finnish companies that are active in South Korea, roughly 150, it can be seen that 
this sample is not very representative of the whole population. However, case studies 
rely on analytic generalizations, striving to generalize a particular set of results to some 
broader theory, which is quite different from the approach of survey research that aims 
at statistical generalization (Ibid. 2009: 43). Because of the scope of this study, it would 
have been impossible to investigate the foreign operation mode strategies of all Finnish 
firms that are active in Korea. In addition, Benito et al. (2008: 21) raise up an interesting 
point worth noting here: “The extent of detail and nuance required is unlikely to be 
obtained via large questionnaire surveys: the burden on informants’ knowledge, 
reflection and memory are just too excessive. Longitudinal research is needed to obtain 
acceptably accurate accounts of companies’ internationalisation patterns and processes.” 
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Therefore, when only analytic generalizations are considered, the generalize ability of 
this study is enhanced. However, one needs to keep in mind that the FOM decisions and 
FOM strategies are always very company and situation specific, which makes the 
generalize ability of the research findings a bit irrelevant in this study. 
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5 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
The empirical information has been collected by interviewing representatives from the 
following nine case companies: Cargotec, Proventia Emission Control, Company A, 
Lappset, Futuremark, Company B, Company C, Fibox and Company D. The selection 
of the interviewee from each case firm was based on the position of the interviewee in 
the company and his or her experience in the company’s operations in Korea. In every 
case, the person that ‘knew most of the company’s business in Korea’ was sought. 
Usually this person turned out to be a person from the executive or Vice President level 
in charge of strategy, business development or commercial operations, for instance. 
Sometimes these persons had a title of a marketing director or an export manager. The 
titles and positions of each interviewee have been more thoroughly covered in each case 
description. However, in case of anonymous interviewees, the exact position in the 
company is not revealed for the sake of confidentiality. 
First, nine cases are presented in a very detailed way describing the case firms’ ‘story in 
Korea’ regarding their operation mode strategies and other relevant business issues. 
These ‘other relevant business issues’ are discussed and included in the case 
descriptions for two important reasons. First, the information obtained through the 
interviews is meant to help other Finnish companies that are either interested in starting 
or already engaged in business in Korea as comparative information which they can 
utilize in their own decision making. Second, when analyzing the operation mode 
strategies of the case firms in Korea, it is important to preserve the context in which the 
strategic moves take place. Therefore, this ‘other information’ is offered quite 
extensively in this study besides the information that is directly connected to the 
operation mode strategies of the case companies in Korea. After presenting the 
individual cases, a cross-case analysis is offered where all the cases are wrapped up, 
which helps in reading this thesis and in assessing the operation mode strategies of 
Finnish companies in Korea. 
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5.1 Cargotec 
 
Cargotec is a cargo handling company, headquartered in Helsinki, Finland. Cargotec 
offers cargo handling systems and related services for loading and unloading of goods. 
Cargotec offers its solutions under three brands – Hiab, Kalmar, and MacGREGOR. 
Hiab offers on-road load handling solutions for moving, lifting, loading and unloading 
products, goods and raw materials to and from vehicles. Kalmar is a provider of 
container and heavy duty materials handling equipment, automation applications and 
related services for ports, terminals, distribution centres, and heavy industry worldwide. 
MacGREGOR is a provider of marine cargo flow and offshore solutions and their 
related services for commercial cargo, offshore support and naval logistics vessels as 
well as for oil rigs and bulk terminals around the world. (Cargotec; Lehmus 17.1.2008) 
The interviewee from Cargotec was mr. Heikki Lehmus, Vice President of Business 
Development and Quality. Lehmus represents Hiab brand and therefore wanted to 
discuss only Hiab’s Korean operations. Therefore, the Korean operations of Cargotec 
are analyzed only concerning Hiab’s activities in Korea, excluding the other business 
units’  operations  even  though from time to  time some references  to  those  were  made.  
Thus, in this interview Hiab represent a Strategic Business Unit of Cargotec, having its 
own  business  strategy,  objectives  and  competitors  than  those  of  the  other  brands.  
(Lehmus 17.1.2008) A more detailed description on Strategic Business Unit, SBU, can 
be found in Welch et al. (2007: 431), for instance. For purposes of this study, Hiab is 
seen as an SBU of Cargotec and Hiab will be seen as if it was the internationalizing firm 
in this case. 
Hiab’s equipment is used in local transportation, building industry, waste handling, 
recycling, agriculture and forestry, public service utilities and the defence forces. Hiab’s 
product range includes loader cranes, demountable lift systems, truck-mounted forklifts, 
tail  lifts,  and forestry and recycling cranes.  The roots of the present Hiab date back to 
the 1970s, Hiab having developed mainly through a series of company acquisitions to 
the shape that it has today. In 2007, Hiab’s sales were 931 million Euros. In the end of 
2007, Hiab employed 4418 people. Hiab has 15 production units in Sweden, Finland, 
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the United States of America, the Netherlands, Ireland, Spain, Poland, Estonia, China 
and Korea and sales companies and representative of?ces throughout the world. 
(Cargotec) 
The interviewee, mr. Lehmus, was employed by Hiab roughly between 1997 and 1998. 
He was strongly involved in the Korean operations right from the beginning of his 
career at Hiab, being responsible for business development in the unit at that time. 
(Lehmus 17.1.2008) 
According to Lehmus, Hiab started its Korean operations ‘some day in the 1970s’. Hiab 
has been a global player for decades, which was illustrated by its strategy to have its 
own sales company on each significant market already in the 1970s. Korea belonged to 
these ‘important markets’, leading to the decision to start Korean operations already 
then. However, the interviewee had only red reports on Hiab’s Korean operations from 
that time and could not specify the exact operation mode used during that time. Today, 
the interviewee sees that the Korean market is among the ‘eight most important 
markets’ for Hiab. Especially cranes are selling good in Korea. (Lehmus 17.1.2008) 
In the beginning of 1990s, Hiab established its own sales company in Korea. At first, it 
was in the form of a JV with a local firm and thereafter it was acquired completely by 
Hiab. When Lehmus was employed by Hiab in the end of 1990s, he saw that the sales 
company in Korea had been operating for years in very established conditions. He saw 
that the volume development had been quite good in the beginning of 1990s. However, 
a drastic change took place in 1997 at the same time as the Asian Financial Crisis broke 
through. The demand plunged and competitive situation in relation to local players 
collapsed. Even though straight competition at the same technological level did not 
exist, there were still Korean providers of load handling solutions and the relative 
competitive advantage of these Korean companies rose significantly. The words of mr. 
Lehmus probably describe the situation that Hiab was facing in 1997 the best way: 
“Although you are recording and it is so long time ago – nearly 10 years – we 
were in piss big that time! It was (…) roughly 15 million, 10 million Euros our 
turnover and we were doing manly losses. So we were in a situation to decide 
what we do next? In autumn 1997 we had two basic options – first, either pack 
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your suitcases and go home and record N million Euros of losses, or, second, 
‘believe in sports and stay in the game!’ The only way to stay in the game was 
to take a quick measure to shift to local production very strongly.” (Lehmus 
17.1.2008) 
The interviewee, having just entered the company and being responsible for business 
development, was in charge of the solution to the problem Hiab had encountered. A 
decision was made to continue operations in Korea by shifting to local production. Hiab 
acquired a local firm, that best suited to be transformed into the objectives of Hiab. The 
Korean firm, Hana, was a little bit of a competitor, producing some cargo handling 
equipment, among other things. Due to Asian Financial Crisis at that time, these kinds 
of acquisition targets were very cheap, many target companies being in liquidity crisis. 
This applied also to Hiab acquisition – Hiab acquired this Korean firm very cheaply 
because this company was in liquidity crisis like many other Korean firms. As a result 
of  the  acquisition,  Hiab’s  sales  company  and  local  production  firm  Hana  were  
integrated to form a new company, Hiab Hana. The valuations of the companies were 
done in a specified way and Hiab invested much-needed working capital in the new 
firm. Even though the original investment was ‘very cheap’, Hiab has been investing 
continuously to new firm to maintain capacity. The interviewee states that the amount 
of total investment is hard to measure. At the time of interview, Hiab Hana employed 82 
persons and estimated turnover for 2007 was nearly 30 million Euros. (Lehmus 
17.1.2008) 
According to the interviewee, when the two companies embarked on the common route, 
the arrangement was a joint venture. Hiab owned 70% and the local Korean 
management 30% of the new company. Out of this 30%, the Chief Executive Officer of 
Hana owned half of it and there were eight members from the Korean management team 
that  held  shares.  JV worked  well  and  there  were  no  major  conflicts.  However,  after  a  
few years, the CEO of the Korean company wished to leave, he had had some problems 
submitting to be ‘only the local leader’ in a big international company instead of an 
independent CEO of a local firm that he was used to be. The firms had signed a 
redemption agreement and the CEO of Korean company started selling his shares in the 
JV immediately after the redemption agreement allowed it. Because the situation was 
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hard for both parties, Hiab naturally did not object this but redeemed his shares. Again, 
a few years after this, Hiab redeemed also most of the shares of other members of 
management team. These persons were very eager to have their shares redeemed, since 
when forming the JV during the Asian Financial Crisis they did not get money for their 
shares. However, technically Hiab Hana was still a joint venture at the time of the 
interview, since some members of the management team still held shares, seeing that 
holding  the  shares  of  the  JV is  a  better  investment  for  them than  holding  money on  a  
bank  account.  The  persons  that  still  hold  shares  have  said  that  they  are  ready  to  sell  
them but Hiab allows them to keep the shares if they wish since, according to the 
interviewee, there is a certain public relations advantage if a firm is registered as a JV in 
Korea. On regular commercial sector this PR advantage does not help but in public and 
military  projects  a  JV  status  ‘lifts  a  foreign  company  one  step  forward’.  (Lehmus  
17.1.2008) 
At the time of the interview, Hiab Hana had a large marketing and service center in 
southern Seoul and a production plant for special cranes in Chungpu. The share of 
exports of the production in the plant is small, roughly 25% but Hiab Hana aims at 
increasing it. The exports from this plant are mainly to Japan, Taiwan and Vietnam. Due 
to the JV arrangement, Hiab has been forced to reorganize its operations in Korea 
extensively. Before the acquisition, Hiab had a large service center in Incheon and a 
sales company in Seoul that acted also as a sort of headquarters for the Korean 
operations. Hana had a production plant in Chungpu and a small marketing and service 
center in Seoul. In addition, both companies had their own dealer networks. A few years 
after  acquisition,  Hiab  Hana  divested  Hiab’s   service  center  in  Incheon  and  the  sales  
company and headquarters from Seoul was relocated next to the production plant in 
Chungpu. At the same time, Hiab Hana strongly enlarged the marketing and service 
center  formerly  owned  by  Hana  that  was  located  in  Seoul,  also  moving  this  unit  to  a  
new and better-known address. (Lehmus 17.1.2008) 
What comes to management of Hiab’s Korean firm, expatriates have been utilized as 
Chief Executive Officers. When Hana was acquired, the operations of Hiab were led by 
a Swedish expatriate. This person headed Hiab for five years and left after the 
acquisition was made. He was followed by a Finnish expatriate, who has lived in Korea 
 96 
for 30 years and, naturally, speaks Korean, which helps both him and Hiab greatly in 
the leadership of the company. (Lehmus 17.1.2008)  
Culturally, Korea has been a very hard place to operate for Hiab. The most apparent 
cultural problems have been related to language and communication issues because in 
the acquired company there was from one to three persons that could tolerably speak 
English. These people became some kind of ‘gatekeepers’, all the information and 
communication went through these gatekeepers. Hiab never knew how the information 
was  understood  in  the  place  where  it  was  to  be  acted  upon  and  there  were  scary  
misunderstandings, luckily in minor issues. This problem applied especially to technical 
knowledge, Hiab had to verify many times that the original message was understood 
correctly because the information often changed many times as it passed through the 
information chain. Over the years, however, Hiab has been able to find personnel with 
better English skills. Another cultural-related problem for Hiab has been Korean 
authoritarian organizations and structures, making the cooperation a bit hard. According 
to the interviewee, Hiab has to be very careful when giving instructions to the 
employees because Korean workforce does not question anything. Instead, they change 
their working procedures immediately after getting instructions, even though the 
manager had meant the instructions as to critically evaluate current practices, not as 
direct orders to execute immediately. In short, there is a lack of discussion between 
Korean workforce and Finnish managers, which is different from what Finnish firms are 
used to when dealing with problems in Western World. (Lehmus 17.1.2008) 
 
 
5.2 Proventia Group 
 
Proventia is an international automation and environmental technology group whose 
products reduce the harmful impact on the environment caused by industrial and other 
activities. Proventia has organized its operations into two business groups, Emission 
Control and Production Technologies, respectively, and a separate Ventures unit, the 
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mission  of  which  is  to  expand  Proventia’s  operations  into  new  areas.  The  Emission  
Control business group provides solutions for controlling engine and power plant 
emissions and the Production Technologies business group supplies production 
technology for making production processes more efficient. The turnover of the 
company was roughly 16,7 million Euros in 2007. Proventia employs 30 people in 
Finland, Switzerland and Asia. (Proventia) 
The interviewee was Mr. Jouni Puura, President of Liaison Office in Korea, who 
represented Emission Control business group. Emission Control is the only business 
group of Proventia that is present and active in Korea. Therefore, the operations of 
Proventia in Korea are analysed from the viewpoint of a Strategic Business Unit, 
Emission Control. As a result, Emission Control is seen as the internationalizing firm in 
this context, instead of parent company Proventia. (Puura 31.1.2008) 
Proventia Emission Control has its roots in Finnkatalyt, a company founded in 1994 to 
develop solutions for exhaust gas purification. Since the establishment, the company has 
operated on the international market and exports have always accounted for a 
considerable  part  of  its  net  sales.  The  share  of  international  business  of  Emission  
Control  is  over  90  %.  Proventia  Emission  Control  was  one  of  the  firms  that  were  
awarded the internationalization award of year 2007 of the President of the Republic of 
Finland as recognition of important activities in an international operating environment 
that benefit the Finnish economy and business. (Proventia) 
The solutions that Emission Control offers are diverse. The basic product, emission 
purifier, is offered in many altered variations to different emission sources. The 
emission purifiers are offered to various diesel-driven machinery, such as material 
handling machines, excavation machinery and agricultural and forest machinery. 
Purifier solutions are also offered for power plants and ships using various fuels. In 
addition, Emission control offers purifier solutions as retrofits to diesel engines that are 
already in use. Emission Control has participated extensively in many retrofitting 
projects globally from California to Korea. In Hong Kong and Korea, for example, 
purifiers of Emission Control have been installed in tens of thousands of vehicles used 
in city areas. (Proventia) 
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According to the interviewee, Korea is of utmost importance as a market for Emission 
Control. In the words of the interviewee, “Korea is probably even too important a 
market  for  us!”  Emission  Control  has  operated  in  Korea  more  permanently  for  a  very  
short time, as a liaison office was established in September 2007. The first Asian office 
was established in the beginning of 2003 as Finnkat Asia in Hong Kong, the name 
Finnkat instead of Emission Control because Finnkatalyt Oy was another company from 
which Emission Control was formed in 2007 in addition to Swiss ENWA GmbH. A 
liaison office is the lightest operational form in Korea, without the obligation to 
bookkeeping, even. The liaison office in Korea was legally established under Finnkat 
Asia in Hong Kong. The business in Korea for Emission Control has increased rapidly 
and there has been a lot of activity, which led to the decision to transfer activities from 
Hong Kong to Korea. Emission Control considered if they would handle Korean 
business from Hong Kong as they had done earlier but the decision was made to come 
to Korea more permanently. Technically, the office in Hong Kong still exists although 
there was physically no one at the time of the interview. (Puura 31.1.2008) 
The interviewee is the only person from Emission Control who is physically in Korea. 
A major driving force for Emission Control to engage in business in Korea was a sort of 
‘business foray trip’ in 2003 when the fast growth was discovered. As a result, Emission 
Control  had  to  find  a  partner  quickly,  and  Finpro  was  selected  to  aid  in  the  selection  
process.  Emission  Control  was  in  a  rush  to  catch  a  project  that  was  about  to  start,  
making the selection to happen very quickly. The interviewee says that ‘luckily there 
was Finpro’s knowledge about this partner’, making the selection process a lot easier 
for Emission Control. In addition, Finpro continued the cooperation with Emission 
Control also after the selection, which further made the decision making easier. The 
partner  of  Emission  Control,  basically  working  as  an  agent,  is  engaged  in  many other  
businesses, as well, and has other cooperative agreements, even with another Finnish 
firm. This agent is active on many frontiers, importing building materials from Central 
Europe, for instance. The most important assets of this agent for Emission Control are 
the connections to various important players in the Korean market and language skills. 
These ‘connections’ are of utmost importance for Emission Control as the business of 
Emission Control is very legislation-driven, that is, as the environmental laws become 
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stricter, it helps the business of environmental solution providers. Often times, 
according to the interviewee, the main customer is the local Ministry of the 
Environment and the personal connections to this ministry and its subinstitutes are 
extremely important. For instance, in a large retrofitting project where emission 
purifiers are installed in local diesel-driven vehicles, in which Emission Control is 
engaged, the Ministry of Environment is controlling the project but the actual work is 
carried out by certain subinstitutes of the ministry, making the connections to these sub 
institutes also crucial for Emission Control. As a result, Emission Control has been 
trying to establish connections also these sub institutes as much as possible. (Puura 
31.1.2008) 
 Certain kind of ‘introducers’ are important when dealing with government officials in 
Korea. After being introduced, company representatives may present their cases and 
suggestions to government officials and can start building the relationships on their 
own. As said, the agent of Emission Control has very good connections to both 
ministries and their sub institutes and to other key players in the market, as well. In 
addition, the agent has a long experience in business in Korea and with foreign 
companies. This partner has offered Emission Control facilities in Seoul, Emission 
Control does not have any own production or other facilities in Korea. Instead, the 
liaison office is actually in the facilities of the partner. The interviewee is in charge of 
the Korean office but the actual business and financial flows are between the 
headquarters in Oulunsalo, Finland and the Korean customer, the interviewee basically 
controlling the operation and supporting the partners and customers. The cooperation 
and communication between Emission Control and the agent partner has been good. 
The interviewee and the agent jointly visit ministries and customers in Korea, the agent 
acting as an interpreter to overcome huge language barriers that the interviewee 
highlighted. The interviewee saw that the English language is a major problem in 
Korea, even many of the government officials do not speak English. Therefore, the 
language skills of the partner are extremely important. (Puura 31.1.2008) 
Emission Control is also engaged in cooperation with another partner on the Korean 
market, namely SK Corporation, one of the biggest Chaebols in Korea. SK Corporation, 
which has its main business operations in oil and chemical industry, also has an 
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environmental business group. Interestingly, Emission Control is representing the 
environmental sector products of SK in Europe, showing a sign of two-way cooperation 
that can take place between a principal and a partner. The products of SK are a bit 
different than those of Emission Control. The interviewee terms SK Corporation a kind 
of ‘customer partner’, being something between customer and a partner in cooperation 
in  Korea.  In  the  first  project  of  Emission  Control  in  Korea,  in  which  a  complete  end  
product was delivered from Finland to the end customer, SK Corporation as a customer 
partner took care of the installation. However, in the second, bigger project that was still 
in-progress at the time of the interview, certain components are delivered from Finland 
and the agent partner takes care of the installation. (Puura 31.1.2008) 
A major activator for the business development of Emission Control in Korea has been 
good reference deliveries, such as in Hong Kong, for instance. As a result of good 
references  in  Hong  Kong,  Emission  Control  has  been  able  to  act  as  an  adviser  for  
Korean ministries that are in charge of environmental investments. Emission Control 
had good references for many years in Hong Kong, having participated in three different 
projects there, out of which the first was the biggest large-scale project in the world 
actually. Due to these good references, information on Emission Control has passed on 
to  the  persons  working  in  the  Korean  Ministries.  Before  Emission  Control  started  its  
cooperation with SK Corporation, it had already started projects in Korea with the aid of 
the actual agent partner as a result of interviewee’s ‘business foray trip’. A ministerial 
delegation from Korea went to Hong Kong to acquaint themselves with a project in 
Hong Kong and one member of this delegation was a contact from SK Corporation. 
This person came to talk with Emission Control as the operations in Hong Kong were 
presented, which sparked off the cooperation between SK Corporation and Emission 
Control. (Puura 31.1.2008) 
In addition to the language problems, the interviewee highlights the cultural differences 
that can bring about problems when operating in Korea. According to the interviewee, 
many things do not work as they do in Finland and issues are not treated in the same 
way. He sees that the communication is different regarding different issues and when 
negative issues, especially, are raised up, they are handled in a totally different way than 
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in Finland. The interviewee sees that cultural sensitivity and cultural knowledge, 
naturally, helps to overcome cultural barriers that he sees to exist. (Puura 31.1.2008) 
 
 
5.3 Company A 
 
Company A is a log house manufacturer established in 1981. The log houses are 
marketed throughout Finland and exported to the Nordic countries, Central Europe, 
Russia, Japan, Korea, China, Indonesia and Thailand, among others. (Company A; 
Interviewee Four 6.3.2003 and 24.4.2007) Company A offers its log houses and related 
services, such as installation, to both detached house buyers and leisure-time house 
buyers. In addition to family living purposes, Company A log houses are built also for 
the needs of tourism and representation. (Company A) The turnover of the company is 
roughly 17 million Euros. Company A employs approximately 80 people. (Interviewee 
Four 6.3.2003 and 24.4.2007) 
Two persons were interviewed from Company A and the information from these 
interviews is merged to depict the development of the operations of Company A in 
Korea. The main source was the interview on 31st January, 2008 with a high-ranked 
manager Interviewee One. This information was supplemented with information from 
two distinct interviews with Interviewee Four. The interviews with Interviewee Four 
took place on 6th March, 2003 and 24th April, 2007. (Interviewee One 31.1.2008; 
Interviewee Four 6.3.2003 and 24.4.2007) 
There was a time when Korea was a more important market for Company A than it is 
today. In the end of 1990s, just before the Asian Financial Crisis, Korea was seen as one 
of the ‘stake markets’ for Company A. The first exports to Korea took place in 1995 and 
the firm has sold yearly a small quantity of log houses to Korea, roughly from five to 10 
houses a year. During the most recent years, houses have not been sold at all to Korea, 
leading Company A to concentrate more on the Central European and Russian markets 
and  changing  the  status  of  the  Korean  market  from  a  ‘stake  market’  to  a  regular,  
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‘among-others market’. However, the company has not totally given up its Korean 
operations,  the  basic  approach  to  sales  to  Korea  is  that  Company  A  sells  houses  to  
Korea if somebody is interested in buying them. Still, though, the firm is neither 
targeting resources nor devoting interest and energy to the Korean market. (Interviewee 
One 31.1.2008) 
Company A selected Korea as a market basically by accident, because a good partner 
was found. The partner, who became the importer of Company A log houses to Korea 
later, attended a permanent housing exhibition in Stockholm and came to the exhibition 
house of the company. Showing his interest, the Swedish representative of Company A 
asked him to contact the headquarters in Finland, which sparked off the cooperation that 
was to follow. Company A neither planned an entry to Korea nor screened the Korean 
market with a result that it would be worthwhile to enter Korea. Instead, it was the 
approach of this Korean importer who bought several houses from the company and 
could show that Korea was a good, developing market and worth the stakes to put there. 
(Interviewee One 31.1.2008) 
Company A does not have personnel of its own in Korea. The company has one 
representative, working as an importer for Company A. This importer, located in Seoul, 
sells also other firms’ products along with Company A log houses and has sub 
representatives in the Korean market. The production takes place in Finland and the 
deliveries are made as sea freight in containers to Korea. The installation is handled by 
the importer, with the aid of Company A if needed – from time to time the company has 
sent or suggested a group of independent carpenters from Finland who have installed 
log houses in Finland and in other parts of the world to take care of the installation. 
These carpenters have then been able to educate local carpenters and installers to do the 
job. (Interviewee One 31.1.2008) 
After a good start with export operations in Korea from 1995 onwards, Company A had 
high  profit  expectations  on  the  Korean  market,  the  yearly  turnover  was  expected  to  
triple or quadruple if a sales subsidiary was established (Interviewee Four 6.3.2003 and 
24.4.2007). Partly as a result of this, a decision was made to establish a sales subsidiary 
in Korea in 1997, named ‘Company A Korea’ (Interviewee One 31.1.2008). A further, 
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and perhaps more important, trigger for this development was the request from the 
importer to move to a sales subsidiary strategy, as the sales had started to go down after 
a good start and the importer saw that a sales subsidiary strategy offers a stronger way 
of doing business in Korea. The importer saw the local presence as very important to be 
able to sell log houses in Korea. Actually, South Korea was the first target country for 
Company A in Asia and the second country to be served through a sales subsidiary 
strategy, the first country having been Germany. The suggestion of Korean importer to 
become the CEO of the Korean sales subsidiary easened and speeded up this 
establishment significantly. The original plan was to penetrate ever deeper into the 
Korean market and make Korea as the Asian area headquarters from which China, 
Japan, and Thailand, for instance, would have been served. (Interviewee Four 6.3.2003 
and 24.4.2007) The importer, indeed, became the CEO of Company A Korea and he 
had three salesmen in the sales subsidiary that was established (Interviewee One 
31.1.2008; Interviewee Four 6.3.2003 and 24.4.2007)  
However, everything did not go as planned: this new unit failed in Korea (Interviewee 
Four 6.3.2003 and 24.4.2007). The sales figures did not grow as expected even though 
Company A had invested quite a lot to establish the company and to running expenses. 
Simply, the sales figures did not justify the sales subsidiary, leading to the decision to 
divest this unit and dissolve this arrangement. After the sales subsidiary was run down, 
Company A returned to serve the Korean market using an importer. (Interviewee One 
31.1.2008) 
A number of reasons for the failure of subsidiary operations in Korea can be identified. 
A major failure was the appointment of a wrong type of person to head the subsidiary 
operation as the CEO. This person was a natural selection to lead the operations because 
he was acting as an importer for Company A in Korea, and when he proposed the 
subsidiary operations to be started and agreed to head the operations, Company A 
obviously did not even consider other alternatives. Lack of knowledge of this person led 
Company A to make the wrong selection. Initially, he had seemed like an ideal person 
to be in charge of the Korean operations. He was a Korean but he had lived in Sweden 
for 25 years. Being of Korean ethnicity, he naturally knew deeply his home country. In 
addition, he knew a lot about construction business, management systems and 
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marketing methods. More importantly, he knew also about Scandinavia and Finland 
since he had been for decades in Sweden. However, all these qualities did not live up to 
expectations.  Company A admits frankly that this recruitment was a mistake and later 
development in Korea can verify that this really was the case. (Interviewee Four 
6.3.2003 and 24.4.2007) 
Even though Company A had expected this CEO to be a ‘unique leader’ who knows 
both the Korean and Nordic business culture, he had lost his contact with the Koreans, 
to say. After those 25 years in Sweden, he was not an ‘insider’ anymore in Korea but 
changed to a foreigner that did not have access to important Korean networks. One 
Korean board member of Company A Korea questioned the selection many times but 
the message was hard to catch by Company A due to Koreans being very polite people 
– this board member could not openly question the selection but tried to convey this 
message indirectly. It took three times before Company A realized that he was trying to 
tell that the selection was totally wrong. The selling of log houses was seen to be a trust 
business, since the houses were large investments and they enjoyed a status of a 
luxurious product in Korea. To be able to even contact wealthy and influential potential 
customers, the CEO had to have a high, respected position in the networks. The person 
that was erroneously selected did not have this position neither the networks because he 
had lived for such a long time abroad. (Interviewee Four 6.3.2003 and 24.4.2007) 
Another mistake was the neglect of monitoring the CEO properly. This led to a couple 
of problems. First, the CEO located a model house, in fact also functioning as the sales 
subsidiary, of Company A in a completely wrong place to be fruitful for the company in 
its marketing efforts in Korea. The model house was opened in Koyang city in the 
Gyonggi province that surrounds the capital city Seoul in April 2002. Every third year 
an international flower exhibition is organized nearby in the city of Ilsan. Company A 
did not ask carefully, where the subsidiary will be located. The company thought it is in 
Ilsan city and saw it to be a beautiful flower city, a very good spot for a model house. 
Yet, to a great astonishment, when invited to the opening ceremony of the subsidiary, 
Company A was only to realize that this CEO had placed this model house outside the 
city  in  rural  areas  behind  trees  –  the  location  was  awful  and  access  to  this  house  was  
very  difficult.  Company  A  admits  that  they  should  have  been  with  this  subsidiary  
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development from the very beginning and follow carefully instead of trusting this CEO 
too much as to where to locate the unit. Second, the CEO was handling his own 
businesses instead of concentrating on the business of Company A in Korea. The 
company was to realize some odd issues – the CEO, along with three other persons 
employed in the subsidiary, was selling ties to Sweden and special bed-sheets for 
hospitals. At the time that this CEO had his own office, this office was totally for 
different purposes than selling Company A in Korea, although it had signs of Company 
A and the walls of the office were fitted with pictures of log houses. Clearly, this CEO 
did not concentrate on the operations of Company A. (Interviewee Four 6.3.2003 and 
24.4.2007) 
Company A came to realize also that this CEO was good in socializing in small circles 
but not an extrovert  as expected from a CEO. This CEO was reported to be quite shy 
and insecure about himself – in short, he did not have the capacity to be a CEO. As a 
result, he did not manage to sell log houses to the extent expected. Company A had 
hired him with a constant salary, which turned out to be a mistake since he still received 
his pay even though he did not perform. Later Company A changed his salary 
arrangement to a bonus-based one, agreeing to pay actually even more than the constant 
salary in the case of good sales but he still did not manage to sell the houses. After not 
getting bonuses due to insufficient sales, this CEO moved to another company. Even 
before this CEO left Company A Korea, Company A had sent an expatriate, a 
construction  engineer,  to  remedy  and  control  the  situation  that  the  CEO  had  created.  
This expatriate was in Korea and in Thailand for a long time, acting as a regional 
director. Now, Company A is deciding where to locate the area headquarters, possibly 
having even production capacity, a major possibility being at the time of interview 
China. This decision definitely has its effect also on the Korean subsidiary, as well, 
which, based on the interviews, still technically exists, even though it has been 
essentially run down and does not have any personnel. (Interviewee Four 6.3.2003 and 
24.4.2007) 
However, not all the troubles can be attributed to the mistakes made by the CEO of the 
subsidiary and poor monitoring by the parent company.  Asian Financial Crisis between 
1997 and 1998 was immediately visible in the sales of Company A in Korea – no 
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houses were sold during that time. The products of Company A became significantly 
more expensive in Korea due to the plunge in the value of Korean currency Won, which 
meant that finding customers became troublesome. (Interviewee One 31.1.2008) This 
hard market situation combined with the erroneous selection of CEO, which led to poor 
location of the model house, took away the basis for good sales development in Korea. 
(Interviewee Four 6.3.2003 and 24.4.2007) After this total slowdown in Korean sales, 
the sales have recovered. In some years Company A has exported more, in some other 
years less, depending also on the situation at the importer because he is representing 
also other companies in Korea. (Interviewee One 31.1.2008) 
Despite major problems with the sales subsidiary operations in Korea, Company A has 
operated quite comfortably in Korea, even though it has not achieved its objectives 
there. Interviewee One indicated that exporting to Korea has been very easy – “I would 
compare it to exporting to Sweden!” Interviewee One sees that it is extremely beneficial 
for a small manufacturer to have a local person who knows the local systems and, 
therefore, can do things in the way they should be done in Korea. Company A has 
strong confidence in the local importer in terms of organizing personal relationships in 
Korea and in public relations and Goodwill activity. The relationship network of the 
importer is seen to be of extreme importance, almost invaluable. At least it would be 
very hard to operate on the Korean market without this relationship network, as 
indicated by Interviewee One. He sees that the development of relationships always 
takes so much time and resources, which means that a company cannot create those 
relationships to the end customers but a foreign firm is better off when it establishes 
relationships only to the Korean partner and its personnel, instead. In addition, the 
language abilities of the importer are seen to be important because, according to 
Interviewee One, it is almost always a necessity to have a translator when dealing with 
the Koreans. The importer and its staff are proficient in English, solving essentially this 
language problem for Company A. The translation work done by the importer for 
installation and reception instructions for log houses and for other documents has been 
of great importance, too. (Interviewee One 31.1.2008) 
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5.4 Lappset Group 
 
Lappset Group is one of the leading providers of playground equipment in the world 
(Lappset). The product range of the company includes playground equipment, public 
fittings and sports equipment. A major share of the turnover, 90%, comes from 
playground equipment, followed by a 6-7% share from public fittings and the rest from 
sports equipment. (Ylinenpää 21.2.2008) In 2007, the firm’s turnover was 45,6 million 
Euros and the company employed 324 persons (Lappset). The history of Lappset dates 
back to the end of 1960s when the founder of the company started to realize his vision 
to make playgrounds softer and warmer using wooden playground equipment instead of 
metallic solutions that were mostly used during that time. After a rapid growth and 
following the founder’s vision that the Finnish market is way too small to concentrate 
on exclusively, the company was already in the 1970s selling in Scandinavia, Benelux-
countries and Japan, even. Having continued on a successful path, Lappset operates 
today a subsidiary in four countries, exports are directed to over 40 countries and 70% 
of the group’s turnover comes from abroad. (Lappset; Ylinenpää 21.2.2008) 
The interviewee from Lappset was Mr. Hannu Ylinenpää, the marketing director. The 
interviewee has been in contact and cooperated with the Korean importer extensively 
during the last five to 10 years, thus being a good informant for this research. 
(Ylinenpää 21.2.2008) 
Interestingly and surprisingly, Korea is the biggest export market for Lappset Group, 
having held this position for three consecutive years, possibly being the biggest export 
market still in 2008, according to the interviewee. The sales volumes to Korea are 
roughly equal to Spain, another big export market for Lappset. The fact that Korea is the 
biggest export market for Lappset is, indeed, very surprising, since usually the biggest 
export markets for small and medium-sized Finnish companies, to which Lappset can 
roughly be categorized, are found nearby in the neighboring countries such as Germany, 
Russia, or Sweden. Clearly, therefore, Korea is as a market of great importance to 
Lappset. Lappset is a powerful actor in Korea but in other Asian countries the market 
shares are very small, even though these other countries have huge potential for the 
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company, as admitted by the interviewee. The share of Korea out of Asian sales of 
Lappset is roughly 80-90%. As a result of the importance of Korea as an export 
destination, Lappset has given Korea a higher priority. Korean market gets ‘special 
treatment’ because of the ABC-classification of Lappset, in which ten most important 
export countries get faster delivery and service regarding certain products and quicker 
responses to inquiries. (Ylinenpää 21.2.2008) 
Lappset has served the Korean market through an importer. This importer acts as the 
reseller for the company. The cooperation began in 1993 when the importer approached 
Lappset at a trade fair in Germany and suggested cooperation in the Korean market. 
During this time, Lappset did not have a deliberate internationalization strategy but the 
firm entered different export markets in twists of fate almost, as admitted by the 
interviewee. If Lappset was approached by a potential agent or distributor, the firm first 
screened  the  approaching  company to  see  whether  it  was  reliable,  did  business  on  the  
right segment, had good customer contacts and did not represent competing products. If 
this screening did not produce negative results, a one-year tryout period was usually 
granted to the company. Later, if business worked out fine, an official resale agreement 
was written between the parties. (Ylinenpää 21.2.2008) 
The Korean importer does not only represent the products of Lappset in Korea but has 
also other principals. However, Lappset is the main supplier of this importer, having a 
share of roughly 80% of the business of this importer. When the cooperation began in 
1993, the importer had other products to represent from the field of construction 
business but over the years the products of Lappset grew in relative importance to the 
importer. Again, during the last couple of years, the importer has taken on new 
construction business products from other principals to represent on a solitary basis. The 
importer has four principals to represent in Korea, Lappset being the main supplier 
today, still. According to the interviewee, the Korean importer is quite exceptional to 
other resellers of Lappset. This is because the Korean importer is active only on one 
customer segment, that is, the Korean construction firms. Normally, Lappset categorizes 
customers in a very subtle way, the customer segments ranging from public customers 
to private customers, consisting of housing companies, construction firms, 
kindergartens, to business-to-business customers, consisting of amusement and theme 
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parks, pubs, camping sites, hotels, and finally to ‘passive customers’, consisting of 
construction designers and architects. In Korea, however, the importer does business 
with only roughly 20 construction companies. To facilitate growth in the fear of 
maturing market in Korea after a couple of years, the Korean importer has also started 
to  create  contacts  with  public  sector  lately.  So  far,  however,  the  way  this  Korean  
importer does business has been very simple when compared to Europe. The importer 
has its sales function, consisting of two salesmen and 20 construction firms as 
customers. This is way easier than in Europe where Lappset has 8000 customers to 
serve and maintain contacts with. For the importer, it has been quite easy to create new 
business because the customer count has been so narrow. Lappset has been the market 
leader in Korea for the last three to five years. (Ylinenpää 21.2.2008) 
According to the interviewee, a major reason for Korea being the biggest export market 
for Lappset is the sheer size of the Korean market. In addition, although the importer 
has served only a narrow segment, the housing production has been vivid in Korea, 
which has boosted the business for the playground equipment of Lappset at the same 
time. However, there is perhaps a more important reason and thrust for Korean market 
to be so important for Lappset and, on the other hand, Lappset being in such a 
commanding position in Korea. This is the managerial decisions made by Lappset 
during the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and 1998. As a result of this crisis, the 
housing production declined and, therefore, the number of projects available to Lappset 
and its competitors declined. Lappset managed to direct its importer through these hard 
times so that it was among ‘the winners of this crisis’. Lappset granted special discounts 
to the importer by binding the discounts to the value of the Korean currency won. Won 
was bound to the value of the US dollar and when Euro appreciated against the US 
dollar, this made the purchases by this importer from Lappset more expensive. Lappset 
helped the importer with this problem by offering these special discounts. In addition, 
Lappset offered the importer longer payment terms. After the importer survived from 
this crisis, the number of competitors declined. As a result of being among ‘the winners’ 
with the help of Lappset, the importer has been able to grow the business of Lappset in 
Korea, the growth equaling roughly 20% during the last five years. (Ylinenpää 
21.2.2008) 
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The Korean importer buys the products from Lappset to their own account and then 
sells the products by itself. Lappset does not even know the price charged from the end 
customer even though the firm has tried to ask the end prices often.  The importer has 
bypassed these questions by stating that the prices charged from the end customers have 
been determined on a project basis, essentially hiding information from Lappset. All the 
production takes place in Rovaniemi, Finland and the products are exported to Korea in 
containers usually on a weekly basis because of high volumes. Nowadays the exports 
take place mainly over the sea route but earlier also the Trans Siberian railway was 
used, but congestion on this route caused delivery delays, which can be harmful in the 
construction business where project schedules are very important, leading to the 
decision to utilize mostly sea route. Lappset takes care of the delivery until the port of 
Busan in Korea and thereafter the delivery is handled by the importer. The installation 
work is handled by the importer either by itself or with the help of its cooperative 
partners. A fruitful solution to the delivery arrangements has been the offer of Lappset 
to the importer to take the most sold products to its warehouse and pay in half a year 
payment term, which, in effect, creates the importer a possibility to deliver products 
with a shorter delivery time. This arrangement has been in place for the last three years 
and has offered the importer a competititive advantage, since Lappset has been the 
fastest supplier from Europe because of this arrangement. Korean importer has utilized 
extensively so-called ‘my design’ department of Lappset in its business. This 
department creates customer-specific solutions from standard modular components, a 
service that has been highly valued by Korean customers. (Ylinenpää 21.2.2008) 
In addition to pure sales volumes, Korea has been an important market for Lappset 
because the Korean importer has been able to sell and install playground equipment 
throughout a year, thus balancing the utilization of production capacity at the firm’s 
factory. In Finland, for instance, the high season is on the second and third quarter of 
the year, which creates pressure in the production and could possibly cause shutdowns 
in production during the winter times when the installations are not possible. However, 
sales to countries such as Korea have meant that Lappset has actually never had to stop 
production because of winter conditions. (Ylinenpää 21.2.2008) 
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The cooperation with the importer has always been at a good level. Lappset has actually 
never encountered any problems in this relationship, minor language problems being the 
exception. According to the interviewee, Korea has been quite an easy market for 
Lappset since the company has been able to allow the importer to work alone to a large 
extent in Korea. Korea has not required a lot of effort from Lappset – visits to and from 
Korea have been quite rare and normally the contacts are handled through email and by 
phone. The importer has had good contacts to its customers and the prices have been 
lower than those of the main competitors on the market partly with the help of Lappset, 
especially during the Asian Financial Crisis years. The possibility of buying customer-
specified solutions has helped the importer to a large extent. In addition, the shorter 
delivery times because of the warehousing option discussed above has helped the 
importer to build a strong market position in Korea. Lappset has greatly appreciated the 
importer’s way of giving feedback. Even though the importer has concealed the resale 
prices as discussed above, the feedback mechanism works strictly and honestly. 
According to the interviewee, the Korean importer is quite exceptional from other 
importers because it takes up the defects in products in a constructive way and offers a 
solution right away, thus assisting Lappset in product development and quality control. 
Many  other  importers  are  seen  just  to  identify  the  defects  and  concentrate  on  
complaining about the problems instead of trying to offer solutions. (Ylinenpää 
21.2.2008) 
Even though Lappset started its Korean operations quite randomly after an approach 
from a potential importer, nowadays the company is assessing rigorously where it wants 
to be present and where to direct resources to. Asia is seen to be a very important 
market area because the markets are not growing in Europe. As said, although Lappset 
is strong in Korea, the market shares are very small in other parts of Asia. China, Japan, 
Taiwan, Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam are seen to offer a lot of potential in the 
future. As a result of this huge potential and to devote more resources to China, a sales 
office was opened in Shanghai to better serve local resellers, including the Korean one, 
too. There is a possibility to establish a warehouse in the Chinese sales office. If this 
warehouse was built, Lappset could deliver products to the Korean market in a week 
instead of four weeks that the deliveries take at the moment. (Ylinenpää 21.2.2008) 
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Although  the  cooperation  with  the  Korean  importer  has  worked  out  smoothly,  the  
language barrier has been seen to create problems, especially in the beginning of the 
cooperation. Initially, the English abilities of the contact persons at the Korean importer 
were poor and caused difficulties in the cooperation: 
“They [Koreans] sent a fax stating ‘please send the airplane’, meaning that 
they wanted the delivery as air freight, but we had to ponder what they 
actually mean!” (Ylinenpää 21.2.2008) 
Later, these people have been replaced and there are people with good English skills 
working for the importer. Lappset raised up this language problem issue with the 
importer, which, for its part, offered a solution to the language problem. The importer 
understood the problem and took measures to remedy the situation. (Ylinenpää 
21.2.2008) 
 
 
5.5 Futuremark 
 
Futuremark, founded in 1997, is a company that is focused on the state of the art 3D 
graphics programming. In a nutshell, Futuremark develops and sells performance 
measurement programs for computers and mobile devices. The company has divided its 
operations into three separate units – PC Products and Services, Mobile and Embedded, 
and Futuremark Games Studio. (Futuremark) 
PC Products and Services unit is the most known part of Futuremark, revolving around 
the graphics and performance measurement of personal computers. Futuremark’s 
3DMark and PCMark benchmark products and related online services are world famous 
in the PC industry. PC Products and Services unit serves world’s leading chip 
companies, PC brands, component manufacturers, independent PC media, and millions 
of individual private customers. (Futuremark) This ‘PC side’ is where it all started ten 
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years ago and it still forms the biggest part of the business, in terms of both resources 
committed and turnover generated. (Talala 5.3.2008) 
The Mobile and Embedded unit is the second biggest business unit for Futuremark and 
this unit is growing clearly most strongly, having achieved a tremendous 114% growth 
in turnover in 2007. This ‘mobile side’ brings the strongest growth for the company at 
the time of the interview, whereas the markets for ‘PC side’ have saturated relative to 
‘mobile side’ during the recent years. (Talala 5.3.2008; Futuremark) Mobile and 
Embedded business unit does benchmark software development and licensing to 3D 
graphics firms, chip manufacturers, cellular phone and other handheld device 
manufacturers and wireless network operators. In addition, a growing part of the 
business is the licensing of Content Creation Tool Chain for automotive, cellular phone 
and embedded industries. (Futuremark) The business on the ‘mobile side’ is mostly 
concentrated on the newest technology and products – Futuremark tests the usability 
and performance in the newest and finest mobile devices. For instance, the more a 
mobile device has multimedia, video, photographing and gaming features, the better it is 
for Futuremark. (Talala 5.3.2008) 
Futuremark Games Studio is engaged in the development of games for personal 
computers (Poropudas 2008; Futuremark). In addition to these three business groups, 
Futuremark provides a website YouGamers.com, where PC players can test their 
computers regarding how well one can play different new games and the website can 
then give recommendations as to how to update the computer to overcome possible 
bottlenecks in performance.  (Talala 5.3.2008) 
Futuremark is headquartered in Espoo, Finland and the firm has a subsidiary in Silicon 
Valley, USA. The company also has a sales office in China and sales and distribution 
partners around the world. (Futuremark) In 2007, the turnover of the company was a bit 
less than four million Euros and the number of personnel was 65, out of which 59 were 
working in Finland (Talala 5.3.2008). Futuremark has been praised for its fast growth – 
the firm was RedHerring Hot-100 EMEA winner in both 2006 and 2005, and the 
company was the 85th most rapidly growing technology company in Europe according 
to Deloitte’s Technology Fast 500 Study (Futuremark). 
 114 
The interviewee was mr. Petri Talala, Vice President of the company and in charge of 
the mobile business. At the time of the interview, he had been working for Futuremark 
for roughly two years. At the time the interviewee was hired by Futuremark, the 
company had differentiated the mobile business from the regular business, that is, the 
‘PC side’ of Futuremark. The newly-formed mobile business needed a leader, and the 
interviewee was selected for that spot. According to the interviewee, Futuremark very 
soon realized that a major share of mobile business activity is in Asia and the company 
already had one customer there as a very active one, Samsung, one of the biggest 
chaebols in South Korea and one of the biggest companies in the whole world. 
Therefore,  in  effect,  Samsung  already  existed  for  Futuremark  as  a  customer  in  South  
Korea when the mobile business was started and Futuremark also saw that there were a 
number of mobile, high-technology firms as potential customers and partners for 
Futuremark. As a result, a decision was made to put a lot of effort and resources to the 
South Korean market. (Talala 5.3.2008) 
As  said,  the  mobile  business  is  growing  most  strongly  in  the  company at  the  moment  
and this growth comes mainly from Asia, to be exact from South Korea, China and 
Japan. These three markets are strategically extremely important for Futuremark today. 
What makes South Korea even more important as a market is that South Korea is in 
many ways a forerunner in the development of mobile business. There is a large mobile 
industry in the form of LG and Samsung. There are a huge number of small firms from 
the field of mobile business, too. Also, the chip development for mobile components is 
very strong. Lastly, the South Korean people are very much into all kinds of game, 
mobile television, mobile, and multimedia services. The interviewee did not specify 
which  market  is  more  important,  but  said  that  South  Korea  and  Japan  are  clearly  the  
forerunners in the mobile business and therefore, extremely important markets for the 
company. To identify other major markets for Futuremark, the United States is an 
important market for the whole company, not just to the mobile business. On the other 
hand, Europe and Finland are not that important markets for Futuremark, the company 
serving basically only one customer in Finland, for instance. In South Korea, 
Futuremark serves almost purely just mobile business customers, with some exceptions. 
(Talala 5.3.2008) 
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Futuremark is running its business in South Korea through a sales agent located in 
Seoul.  In  principle,  this  sales  agent,  a  South  Korean  person,  works  alone.  He  has  his  
own mobile software company that develops all kinds of mobile software for South 
Korean mobile phone manufacturers. This agent representation is a ‘side business’ to 
this company or person and the agent is also representing another firm, of Finnish-
Japanese origin, in South Korea. (Talala 5.3.2008) 
The sales agent basically helps in opening doors to new firms by finding valid contacts 
and is personally quite active in the development of Futuremark’s business locally in 
South Korea. The role of the sales agent is not big in the sales process because after the 
initial contacting and meetings with potential clients the deal is driven through by 
Futuremark itself and the South Korean customer, the sales agent basically just 
receiving his commission from those sales cases that end up to an agreement. However, 
this sales agent is extremely valuable to Futuremark. His value is in the experience and 
knowledge  of  the  South  Korean  mobile  industry.  He  knows the  South  Korean  mobile  
industry and South Korean mobile business firms well, especially small and medium-
sized companies. (Talala 5.3.2008) 
“ (…) why it works so well for us, is that this guy is an old hand, knows a 
number of persons and even on high level, so when I say that this meeting 
should be arranged, this agent digs out a number from his phone book to that 
company and calls there and that is it! It is of great importance to us.” (Talala 
5.3.2008) 
As highlighted by the interviewee, everyone knows global South Korean firms such as 
LG and Samsung but the smaller firms are also extremely important for Futuremark as 
potential customers. There are a massive number of small and medium-sized companies 
that Futuremark has been negotiating with in South Korea. These firms have engaged in 
a very high-level high-technology product development in mobile environment for new 
types of mobile applications and mobile user interfaces. (Talala 5.3.2008) 
The agent, being an experienced player in the market and knowing valid contacts, 
basically contacts relevant South Korean firms interested in Futuremark and arranges 
meetings. These meetings with potential South Korean customers are then attended by 
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both the agent and the interviewee but quite soon the deal-making is taken care of by the 
interviewee himself, the sales agent providing linguistical help if necessary. In short, the 
sales agent does the first introduction and the rest of the process is handled by 
Futuremark itself. If this initial contact leads to interest on both the customer’s and 
Futuremark’s side, then the deal is closed after an email exchange between the parties, a 
phone  call  or  another  visit  to  the  customer.  As  stated  by  the  interviewee,  this  
arrangement  is  very  light  for  Futuremark  but  it  has  worked  very  efficiently  and  well.  
The delivery of software is handled completely electronically, the only things moving 
physically are the agreements on paper between the parties. (Talala 5.3.2008) 
Samsung has been a triggering customer for Futuremark for its South Korean 
operations. As said by the interviewee, Samsung was received as a customer before 
nothing was actually done in South Korea. (Talala 5.3.2008) 
“If I am honest, Samsung was received before we had done nothing in South 
Korea. We created our first mobile product and they noticed, in one way or 
another, that ‘this is what we need, let us contact Futuremark!’ But right after 
that we got an such impulse that we examined the South Korean market in a 
more detailed way and realized that a lot of effort and resources should be put 
there and pay visits there and investigate the market even more.” (Talala 
5.3.2008) 
The first mobile product was created by Futuremark roughly four to five years ago and 
Samsung was one of the first customers for this product. When the mobile business was 
differentiated from PC business, Futuremark immediately saw, partly because of the 
impulse from Samsung, that the growth of mobile business is in Japan and South Korea, 
and all the available resources and effort was put to these countries. Therefore, South 
Korea came to be seen immediately as an important market when the mobile business 
was started on its own. (Talala 5.3.2008) 
The story of Futuremark in South Korea has been helped by two important issues. First, 
the fact that this company has developed a ‘de-facto’ standard product for performance 
measurement, basically Futuremark being the world leader in performance 
measurement,  has  meant  that  it  has  not  had  to  search  for  all  the  customers  itself  but  
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some customers have also approached Futuremark, such as large South Korean 
Samsung. The value of getting Samsung as a customer lies not only in large purchases 
of Samsung itself but the purchases of performance measurement products from those 
companies that want to be suppliers to Samsung. Once Samsung informs its potential 
suppliers that it uses Futuremark’s performance measurement products to assess which 
supplier gets the deal, this triggers the potential suppliers to purchase Futuremark’s 
performance measurement products to make sure their offering gives a good account of 
itself  when  Samsung  testes  it.  In  effect,  the  sales  in  South  Korea  have  partly  worked  
through this type of ‘snow-ball effect’ – first from a huge customer to a number of 
smaller firms. Second, the state sponsored research institute, Electronics and 
Telecommunications Research Institute, ETRI from now on, has played an important 
role as a customer for Futuremark. Although not big in terms of financial profit, this 
cooperation has a lot of reference value for Futuremark. ETRI uses Futuremark’s 
products to assess the future requirements of mobile devices from mobile games point 
of view. ETRI examines what is required from the mobile devices of the future so that 
they can run mobile games from a higher, more developed level. ETRI then shares the 
research findings with the South Korean mobile game sector and, indirectly, brings 
Futuremark’s name to the awareness of the South Korean game industry. (Talala 
5.3.2008) 
The agent relationship of Futuremark is actually very interesting for two reasons. First, 
the agent has, for one reason or another, ended up assisting Finnish firms quite similar 
to Futuremark earlier, too. Actually he has worked for a small Finnish software 
company and he has even set up a South Korean office for that company at one time. 
Second, this agent was found in quite a creative and clever way – with the help of 
another small Finnish software company. This small company was later acquired by a 
large international firm but when it was independent, it was very active in South Korea. 
People from this small company and Futuremark worked on the same field and shared 
extensively ideas and thoughts, and this small Finnish company told Futuremark that it 
uses this agent in South Korea. Thereafter Futuremark contacted this person and asked 
if he was interested in cooperation, which led to the cooperative agreement. At that 
time, this person was working for another Finnish firm that was partly also acquired by 
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an international company and partly run down. As a result, this person had extra time to 
devote to Futuremark’s business in South Korea and he already knew a lot about 
Finnish mobile knowledge and working culture. According to the interviewee, there is a 
lot of ‘shared community’ type of thinking at least between the smaller Finnish firms, 
leading to sharing of information and experiences from abroad. (Talala 5.3.2008) 
The cooperation between the agent and Futuremark has remained similar to how it 
actually started. Neither of the parties has neither had time nor priority to deepen the 
cooperation. The cooperation is quite a lot on a practical level, basically the interviewee 
telling the agent that he is coming to South Korea and listing the firms that should be 
contacted for the possible business negotiations. According to the interviewee, the 
cooperation is of an ‘ad-hoc’ type more or less, the agent receiving his commission for 
those contacts that actually lead to a new deal. From time to time the agent has 
expressed his interest in taking on the representation of Futuremark in other countries, 
as well, such as Taiwan, but so far he has been quite busy with his own software firm, 
leaving the representation to remain just on the South Korean market, still. The fact that 
the South Korean agent is very knowledgeable of the mobile business helps Futuremark 
a lot because usually it is sufficient to send a documentation of new solutions to keep 
him  aware  of  new  developments  so  that  he  can  communicate  those  to  South  Korean  
customers. He only may have something to ask about new solutions through email or 
phone. On the other hand, he is very active in communicating the requirements and 
needs of potential customers to Futuremark, this communication usually taking place on 
a weekly basis. (Talala 5.3.2008) 
Major problems in South Korea for Futuremark have been of two types. First, there has 
been a linguistical and a cultural barrier. The English skills of South Koreans are seen to 
be weak and the interviewee does not speak Korean, leading to misunderstandings from 
time to time. (Talala 5.3.2008) 
“You only need to be strict in the language issues. You may agree on 
something in an appointment and even try to verify through email, for 
instance, that this was our common understanding, but still it may be that the 
South Korean counterparty has understood the issue wrong, even when the 
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issues have been written on paper. So you just need to verify many times that 
this really was what we agreed on.” (Talala 5.3.2008) 
The cultural barrier relates to how issues proceed after the agreement has been made. 
According to the interviewee, a Finn is used to trust that if somebody promises 
something, he actually does it. In South Korea, sometimes people speak and promise 
but nothing happens, as highlighted by the interviewee. This is not a South Korea-
specific phenomenon but happens in many other parts of the world, as well, but it is 
different from Finnish culture. According to the interviewee, often the best way to get 
things done in South Korea is to be in face-to-face contact with South Koreans instead 
of trying to get things done from Finland. The interviewee says that when one is in 
South Korea with the customers and the sales agent, things proceed quite smoothly, but 
when one goes back to Finland, it may be that there is a stopping in the smooth flow of 
the issues. (Talala 5.3.2008) 
Second, a major problem in the South Korean business culture is the neglect of paying 
invoices on time. This is totally different from Finnish business culture, where invoices 
are mostly paid on time duly. (Talala 5.3.2008) 
“ (…) if an agreement is written and we deliver the products and send an 
invoice, the basic starting point is that nothing will be paid!” (Talala 
5.3.2008) 
Futuremark needs to do rigorous follow-ups on invoices and ask the customers to pay 
their  invoices  and  usually  even  twist  arms  a  bit  to  get  the  South  Korean  customers  to  
pay. This problem applies to all kinds of South Korean customers of Futuremark, small 
and large. Futuremark is a global firm but it has only encountered this problem in South 
Korea, not even in other countries of Asia, meaning that this is a very South Korea-
specific problem. As a solution to this problem, Futuremark does not deliver anything to 
South Korean customers before the product has been invoiced and the invoice is 
actually paid by the South Korean customer. The South Korean customers have 
accepted this change with a good grace and this arrangement in payments works fine. 
(Talala 5.3.2008) 
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5.6 Company B 
 
Company B is the world’s leading designer and manufacturer of silicon capacitive 
acceleration and pressure sensors (Company B). Company B is active in the field of 
electronics, having its core competencies in measurement techniques, measurement 
equipment and sensors. Mostly Company B’s solutions are concentrated on measuring 
motion and pressure. (Interviewee Two 6.3.2008) Company B’s sensor design and 
production is based on a path breaking technology, the name of which is not stated here 
due to confidentiality reasons. Company B is actually the sole manufacturer of this 
unique technology that was originally developed in the 1970s (Company B; Interviewee 
Two 6.3.2008; Company B Business Review 2007). Much of the success of Company B 
can be attributed to this own unique technology (Company B). Company B offers 
sensors for the measurement of acceleration, motion, inclination, shock, vibration, 
angular rate and pressure (Company B Business Review 2007; Company B). The 
application areas of these sensors range from the automotive industry to a wide range of 
other industries as well. Applications in the automotive industry include Electronic 
Stability Control (ESC) and Antilock Braking Systems (ABS) as well as car alarm and 
navigation system applications. (Company B) Company B is the leading manufacturer 
and supplier of a certain type of acceleration sensors for the automotive industry 
(Company B Business Review 2007). Other industries where Company B’s sensor 
products are utilized include sports and wellness, medical and instruments and terminal 
applications. The measuring needs are gaining importance in these industries. 
Applications in these industries include, for instance, activity monitoring of adaptive 
cardiac pacemakers, altimeter for navigation, activity monitoring for training effect and 
calorie consumption, and inclination measurement for electronic levels and laser 
instruments. (Company B; Company B Business Review 2007) 
Company B has divided its operations into two business units. (Company B Business 
Review 2007). The business unit serving automotive industry creates 85% of Company 
B’s turnover and is, thus, by far the more important business unit for the firm. However, 
the business unit that offers sensing solutions to other industries is becoming more 
important all the time, since new application areas for sensors are emerging all the time. 
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(Company B; Interviewee Two 6.3.2008) In Korea, Company B is active with both of 
its business units, the ‘automotive side’ being where it all started but the other business 
unit increasing its relative importance all along (Interviewee Two 6.3.2008). 
Interviewee Two was an executive in charge of Company B’s strategy. He has actively 
participated in the development of Company B’s Korean business right from the 
beginning. Company B was owned by an American parent firm from 1995 to 2002, 
Company B, in effect, being a subsidiary of this American company. At that time, the 
interviewee got to know the manager of Korean operations of this parent firm. This 
manager and interviewee then examined whether there would be demand in the Korean 
market for Company B’s sensors. According to the interviewee, it was roughly 10 years 
ago that this screening process started. After some initial examinations, it was 
discovered that the Korean automotive industry is developing quickly. Korean car 
manufacturers equip their cars well, in the same way as Japanese car manufacturers, so 
that the standard equipment usually contains almost everything that is available for a 
car. This is very different from the approach of, for instance, German car manufacturers 
who  sell  different  equipment  and  features  to  a  car  as  options  to  be  selected  by  a  
customer. The fact that Korean cars are so well equipped already as ‘standard cars’ 
means that a lot of assisting systems, to which Company B provides sensors, are sold to 
Korean car manufacturers, which makes Korea quite an important market for Company 
B. After the realization of the potential in the Korean market, the first projects started in 
roughly 1999 or 2000. It took roughly three years for Company B that it could start 
producing significant turnover in Korea. Step by step, Company B started to get into 
projects and those projects running. It required time to get designs accepted by Korean 
car  manufacturers  but  as  time  passed,  those  cars  that  had  such  systems  to  which  
Company B provided sensors started to be mass produced, Company B’s sensors 
enjoying a ‘standard status’ in the systems installed to these cars. From 2003 onwards 
Company B started producing turnover in Korea because of getting its sensors to the 
mass production of Korean cars. For Company B in Korea, it all started from braking 
systems such as ABS and moved on to suspension systems. The company could have 
participated in the boom of airbag systems 10 years ago as its first endeavor in Korea 
but  the  company  did  not  have  a  sensor  for  airbag  systems  at  that  time.  After  serving  
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braking system and suspension system developers, Company B has also started to 
provide sensors to Electronic Stability Programs (ESP) that are aimed at correcting the 
driving mistakes. Besides the automotive industry, the electronics industry has grown to 
be an important customer for Company B in Korea. The role of Korea in the global 
electronics industry is growing continuously and the Korean electronics industry has put 
itself to a strong global position on those areas of electronics outside automotive 
industry where Company B wants to enlarge its business to. (Interviewee Two 6.3.2008) 
By  far,  the  most  important  market  for  Company  B  is  Germany  today.  The  reason  for  
this is obvious: the world’s largest suppliers of electronic control systems for 
automotive industry are in Germany. Out of the 85% of Company B’s turnover that 
comes from the automotive industry, a major share comes from Germany, because the 
sensors are mostly delivered directly to Germany or to a destination country indicated 
by a German company. However, the Korean market is very important for Company B 
because the penetration rate of those systems to which Company B provides sensors is 
higher in Korea than in many other markets. In addition, roughly 10% of the world’s car 
production takes place in Korea, which is significant. According to the interviewee, the 
Korean automotive industry has developed remarkably during the last 15 years. 
Initially, the Korean car manufacturers just put together parts purchased from around 
the world without their own design but nowadays they have engaged in design of the 
cars and are competing with the Western car designs almost on par. (Interviewee Two 
6.3.2008) 
The turnover of the company was over 70 million Euros in 2007 out of which less than 
five percent comes from Korea. 99% of Company B’s production is exported. Company 
B employs roughly 700 persons, from which almost 500 are working in Finland and 
almost  200  in  Mexico,  with  the  rest  in  subsidiaries  in  Japan,  China,  Germany and  the  
United States. In addition to the headquarters and its production in Finland, Company B 
has a production site in Mexico. (Company B; Interviewee Two 6.3.2008) In Korea, 
there is no personnel, since the Korean market is served through local sales agents 
(Interviewee Two 6.3.2008). 
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At the time of the interview, Company B was running its business in Korea through two 
different sales agents, both located in the capital city Seoul. Another serves the 
automotive industry and the other serves other industries. In effect, the sales agent 
responsibilities in Korea are divided according to the strategic business unit division of 
the company. (Interviewee Two 6.3.2008) 
As discussed above, the automotive industry was where it all started for Company B in 
Korea. Having started its Korean operations as a subsidiary of an American firm, 
Company B became ‘independent’ in 2002 when a Scandinavian investment company 
acquired Company B to its portfolio. This investment company basically bought 
Company B out of the American company. As a result, Company B could start its 
Korean operations by its own. The connections were dissolved to the previous parent 
firm’s subsidiary in Korea. However, the manager of this subsidiary organized issues 
very much in favor of Company B: a company, engaged in automotive component 
business different from that of the American parent company, was established in Korea 
and Company B orchestrated its  ‘own man’,  a Korean person, to that company to sell  
Company B’s products in Korea. Company B officially transferred the representation 
agreement from the subsidiary of the previous parent firm to the new company, and 
there was a dedicated person educated to sell Company B’s products in Korea and his 
salaries were paid directly by Company B. Company B, obviously, did not own this 
newly-formed company but had this above-mentioned person situated in the small new 
company. Still today, this agent is the main channel of Company B to the automotive 
industry. In effect, this sales agent is literally an agent because all the agreements are 
written between Company B and the Korean customer and the financial and 
merchandise flows take place directly between Company B and the Korean customer. 
(Interviewee Two 6.3.2008) 
Another representative was selected in 2006 and it had operated one and a half years at 
the time of the interview. This representative is geared towards consumer goods 
business and instrumentation. Company B utilized the services of Finpro, an advisory 
firm providing internationalization assistance to Finnish firms, to search for this 
representative. Company B was looking for a representative that operates outside of 
automotive industry. This representative is purely independent, Korean reseller of 
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electronic components. This partnership has slowly produced results – as stated by the 
interviewee, ‘it takes time to get designs in.” The consumer electronics market is seen to 
be a very competed one and Company B is not very strong in this market in Korea yet. 
(Interviewee Two 6.3.2008) 
Neither of the sales agents is exclusively serving Company B in Korea. The sales agent 
in the automotive industry is enlarging its business closer to Company B’s products, one 
clear sign of this being fixing itself up with an American-French principal and trying to 
increase the volume in the automotive industry to the same customers that Company B’s 
products are directed to through this arrangement. In addition, this agent is also trying to 
approach firms outside of automotive industry. Another sales agent, on the other hand, 
has for a long time served a number of electronics producers, both American and 
European, whose products this agent has sold to mobile phones, navigators and many 
other handheld electronic devices that are manufactured in Korea extensively. This 
agent was selected because it has a strong technical expertise, it has a lot of engineering 
knowledge to design products to the customer and create prototypes, and it has sound 
abilities to handle the commercial business when the product to which Company B 
provides a sensor goes to production. Neither of the sales agent representation 
agreements is on an exclusive basis, meaning that Company B has not written exclusive 
sales agreements in Korea but the company has a free hand in the selection of more 
intermediaries, if needed. According to the interviewee, it is quite easy to enter into a 
non-exclusive agreement with a Korean partner firm because Korean firms are quick to 
change principals if the business is not developing as expected. In other words, the 
loyalty of the agent towards the principal is not very strong in Korea. (Interviewee Two 
6.3.2008) 
Korea is the only country where Company B has a representative in the automotive 
industry. In all other markets Company B does the selling function itself with its own 
personnel.  This  arrangement  has  been  in  place  in  Korea  right  from  the  beginning  but  
Company B has been contemplating whether it should replace the intermediary with its 
own personnel as many competitors have done. At the time of the interview, the 
company did not see it worthwhile replacing the intermediary. The networking is in the 
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focal point here. The network of an agent is seen to be of crucial importance to 
Company B. (Interviewee Two 6.3.2008) 
“I would emphasize the network, you need to have certain relationships and 
proceed with them. The building of this network and finding right persons is 
essential so that you can build the first contacts to some firms – to be able to 
do this, you should either have someone recommending you or another way of 
reaching this network (…) if you have relationship activity, it brings you 
quickly quite far compared to if you start sending brochures and calling to 
completely strangers (…) Building up this without a Korean agent would be 
impossible.” (Interviewee Two 6.3.2008) 
However, at the same time, Company B sees that an agent can use its network primarily 
to its own benefit and only uses this network secondarily to the principal’s benefit. This 
secondary benefit for Company B is that it gets more easily inside the Korean market 
through the network of the agent. The agent has another interest, though, namely to find 
another principal through its network if Company B’s product is not competitive 
temporarily. In the case that the agent changes the principal, Company B would 
naturally be in a stronger position if it had developed its own network of relationships in 
Korea. (Interviewee Two 6.3.2008) 
A major challenge for Company B in Korea has been the language issues. The 
interviewee sees that the language barriers are quite big: 
“One of the biggest problems of the Korean national economy is the lack of 
people able to speak English. You can see it in our business, too, for example 
in the automotive industry, in the system supplier companies, there are a few 
persons that have been abroad during their studies who of course speak good 
English but those who have not been abroad have not been able to develop 
their English skills. It is clearly on a lower level than in Finland, for instance. 
And obviously it is a matter of culture – maybe they do not want to speak if 
they feel they cannot. All in all, it is very hard to get English text out from 
them [Koreans]. They rather speak the local language and they would like 
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someone to translate the text rather than to speak themselves (…) It is a drag 
clearly.” (Interviewee Two 6.3.2008) 
In solving this language problem, the sales agents are of crucial importance to Company 
B. The persons at the sales agents are reported to speak rather good English. Company 
B has not had any other options but to trust the sales agents’ language and translation 
skills. (Interviewee Two 6.3.2008) 
Another challenge has been the propensity of Koreans to copy foreign products. 
According to the interviewee, the Koreans try to protect their own industries as much as 
they can and there is a will to start producing locally some advanced technologies that 
are imported. To receive the maximum utility locally, one Korean university has 
suggested that the silicon technology and sensor technology are worth of investments 
and efforts and this suggestion is implemented in some form at Samsung with partly 
funding from the state of Korea. The interviewee sees that the copying of products is 
wide in Korea, regarding mostly products that can be produced with small investments 
and efforts. The technology of Company B is very unique and requires large 
investments in production technology, which has prevented Koreans from copying. 
However, the fear of copying is always present for Company B in Korea: 
“All the time you need to be on the alert for sharing of information so that it 
will not be misused. Either so that it is forwarded to competitors or so that it is 
forwarded to players that can copy the products. There you need to be very 
careful. This kind of ‘confidentiality’ mark, its value is not that high as it is in 
Finnish culture and business life, for instance. If someone has stamped such a 
mark it may be that it will not be appreciated. Someone may even try to 
remove such a stamp from documents and forward the information or even 
forward as such.” (Interviewee Two 6.3.2008) 
As a result of the risk of copying and the attitude of Koreans towards confidential 
information, Company B has limited the sharing of information to only that information 
that the Korean customer needs and not further. The company avoids sharing of 
information that could have confidential value in Korea. (Interviewee Two 6.3.2008) 
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5.7 Company C 
 
Company C is a global technology company, serving the pulp and paper industry, 
mining and construction industry, energy industry, automation industry, and recycling 
industry. Company C was formed in a large merger in 1999. However, the history of 
different parts of the present Company C dates back to the 1750s, even, Company C 
being a very traditional Finnish engineering works company, indeed. The company 
employs over 28,000 persons in more than 50 countries. (Company C) At the time of 
the interview, Company C had divided its operations in three different business units 
(Company C 2007; Company C; Interviewee Three 26.2.2008). After the interview, 
though, the corporate structure of Company C was changed. Today, the business units 
are termed segments or business lines. There are still three business lines, though. 
(Company C) However, the content and functions of these business lines are still mostly 
the same as in the previous business unit division. For the sake of simplicity and 
consistency with the interview, the former business unit division is followed in this 
study. 
Company C’s Division A provides paper, pulp, tissue, board and panel board machines 
and equipment for the paper and pulp industry. These solutions are complemented with 
process automation and power generation technologies. (Company C 2007; Company C 
Division A) Company C Division B offers rock and minerals processing systems and 
equipment and metal recycling systems to customers in quarrying, aggregates 
production, construction, civil engineering, mining and minerals processing. Company 
C Division C provides process industry analyzers and sensors, automation and 
information management application networks and systems to power generation, oil and 
gas, metals recycling and pulp and paper industries. (Company C 2007; Company C) 
All business units offer maintenance and aftermarket services (Company C 2007).  
In 2007, Company C’s total net sales were over 6 billion Euros, Division A having 
roughly a 46% share, Division B a 42% share, and Division C a 12 % share, 
respectively (Company C 2007; Company C). Company C is truly a global company, 
having production on all continents. The main market areas are Europe and North 
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America, which account for over half of net sales. (Company C) However, Asia and 
South America are becoming increasingly important, Asia-Pacific region commanding 
roughly 25% of net sales and South and Central America 15% (Company C 2007; 
Company C). 
Interviewee Three was a highly-ranked Vice President in the company. This person was 
probably the most valid person to be interviewed when considering the scope of this 
study, even though he admitted not having exact information on certain aspects of 
Company C’s operations in Korea. The interviewee indicated that he knows generally a 
lot about the operations of Company C everywhere in the world but his knowledge on 
particulars in Korea might be limited because ‘Korea is operating mostly on its own’, 
the last Finnish person having returned six to seven years ago. Therefore, in some issues 
the information received is second-hand information but, at the same time, still very 
useful for the purposes of this study. (Interviewee Three 26.2.2008) 
In principal, all three business units of Company C are active in Korea, the operations of 
Division A being the most extensive. However, the business of Division B is relatively 
small in Korea, naturally since the mining activity is a very small-scale operation in 
Korea – Korea is not a mining country. As a result, Division B is not physically 
established in Korea. Divisions A and B are physically located in the same address in 
Seoul  but  they  are  administratively  differentiated  from  each  other.  Company  C  
everywhere and always differentiates the business units from each other 
administratively, even though sometimes they are actually located in the same place 
physically. (Interviewee Three 26.2.2008) In this location, a sales office, from which 
both business units are served in Korea, was established in 1995 and it employs 4 
persons. In addition, Division A established a service center in Daejeon in 2004. This 
service center employs 8 persons. Daejeon service center provides a wide scope of 
services for the Korean pulp and paper industry, services ranging from providing spare 
parts, to rolls services and to maintenance services. In addition, this service center acts 
as an extensive back-up for Division A’s deliveries in Korea. (Company C 2007; 
Interviewee Three 26.2.2008) 
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Today, Korea is only a ‘mid-important’ market for Company C. Company C reports 
country-specific turnover figures on the 10 most important markets and Korea does not 
belong to those. However, a change has taken place since there was a time that Korea 
was an important paper machine market for Company C. A major influencer for the 
development of sales was the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998 and 1999. Before the Asian 
Financial Crisis, Korea was shortly a very important paper machine market, possibly 
even the biggest for one or two years. During this time, a number of Korean firms 
ordered paper machines simultaneously, forming a significant peak in demand. After the 
crisis, new paper machines have not been ordered, changing the focus of Company C in 
Korea from new investments of customers to modernization and service business. From 
the very low sales volumes during the Asian Financial Crisis, the sales have recovered 
to a decent level. Yet, Company C is far away from the pre-crisis peak sales volumes 
mostly because new paper machines have not been sold in Korea. Paper production is 
quite significant in Korea, although there are almost no raw materials, namely wood and 
pulp, in the country. Finland, a large producer, has a capacity of roughly 13 million 
tons,  whereas  Korea,  regarded  usually  as  a  minor  producer,  has  a  capacity  of  over  10  
million tons. What makes Korea an interesting market for paper production is that the 
population is large and that the Korean culture is quite advanced, meaning that masses 
of books, papers and advertising material are consumed in the country. In addition, 
there is a strong export industry requiring packaging materials. (Interviewee Three 
26.2.2008) 
Before the sales office was established in Seoul in 1995, the Korean market was served 
through sales agents. Originally, Company C had entered the Korean market by 
following demand when the Korean paper producers started to invest in production. 
According to the interviewee, maintaining a sales agent network is sufficient for a long 
time in this kind of business where customers’ investments are large and require years 
of decision making before the actual contract is signed. The purchase processes of 
customers are long and they have many phases and as long as customers are just 
considering  whether  to  purchase,  an  agent  can  do  the  job  for  Company  C.  When  the  
sales prospects start finally realizing, then establishing a local presence becomes a 
matter of consideration. (Interviewee Three 26.2.2008) 
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Company C enjoys a very strong market position in Korea. Neither paper nor pulp 
machines have ever been manufactured in Korea, which clearly helps the business of 
Company C. The country entered the paper business quite late – the first pulp mill in 
Korea, Donghae Pulp, was established in roughly 1976 and the establishment of this 
pulp mill led to paper machine investments by the customers of Company C. 
(Interviewee Three 26.2.2008) 
When the paper machine business really started to grow as a result of sales prospects 
transforming to actual sales, Company C saw that it should be present physically in 
Korea to be able to handle the business better. Having perceived the use of sales agents 
to  be  insufficient,  an  own  unit,  a  sales  office,  was  established  as  a  greenfield  
investment. Company C, following the company policy to own all units completely 
wherever the local law allows this, owns 100% of the Korean unit. (Interviewee Three 
26.2.2008) 
Company C has staffed its Korean operations completely with local employees, the last 
Finnish person having left Korea six to seven years ago as discussed above. All the 
sales and other activities in Korea take place between the local Korean staff and 
customers. Company C strives to appoint a local management to its foreign operations 
everywhere, not just in Korea, for two important reasons. The first, and most obvious, 
reason is that a Finnish expatriate is very expensive compared to a local employee, 
especially if a family is accompanying the expatriate. Also, Company C does not see 
that a foreign expatriate can bring a lot of additional value to leading the local 
operations, especially in a case such as Korea where the local language forms a major 
cultural barrier. It would take enormous efforts from an expatriate-to-be to study the 
local language and utilize it. The second, and perhaps more important, reason is the 
relationship network of the local employees. This is seen to be of extreme importance in 
Korea: 
“It is truly important to use local people because it is a society that is not very 
transparent. These large chaebols do a lot of business among themselves. And 
then there is this relationship network issue and so forth. There are a number 
of such issues that are hard for an outsider to learn and ‘get in’ (…) Generally 
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speaking, I see that using local partners or local employees, is important.” 
(Interviewee Three 26.2.2008) 
The business of Company C is carried out quite in a simple way in Korea. In a paper 
machine project, for example, it is typical that core components come from the factories 
of Company C but standard steel structures are sourced locally. Company C has not 
engaged in technology partnerships or other forms of cooperation with Korean firms. 
(Interviewee Three 26.2.2008) 
When operating in Korea, the interviewee sees only one minor problem that Company 
C has encountered. That is the language barrier. However, he at the same time admits 
that there are a number of persons in the management of Korean companies that have 
studied in the Western countries, mostly in the United States, that speak good English. 
But he sees also that for a part of the Koreans English still is a challenge, English being 
relatively hard for Koreans. However, the interviewee sees that Company C has actually 
never suffered from this problem, all the Korean employees of Company C speaking 
good English. The interviewee sees that one can find well-educated, language-skilled 
employees in Korea nowadays, which solves the language barrier problem for Company 
C. All in all, Company C has been very pleased with the local management. 
(Interviewee Three 26.2.2008) 
For the future, Company C is quite careful with its expectations on the development of 
the Korean market. Company C sees that the Korean market is quite saturated and that 
the growth mainly comes from other countries. However, the company is actively 
monitoring the internationalization efforts of its Korean customers and seeks to follow 
them outside of Korea. According to the interviewee, good reference deliveries in Korea 
greatly help in getting in on foreign investments of Korean customers. (Interviewee 
Three 26.2.2008) 
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5.8 Fibox 
 
Fibox, a privately-owned Finnish company, is one of the largest enclosure 
manufacturers in the world. The company is the market leader in thermoplastic 
enclosures that are used for protecting electrical and electronic components operating in 
hostile environments. (Fibox) Fibox offers enclosing solutions to electric and electronic 
devices – typically the enclosures of Fibox go to industrial devices to protect their 
control electronics (Niemi 18.2.2008). Fibox has subsidiaries in 10 countries, 
production units in four countries, and a number of local distributors on each continent 
(Fibox). The production units are located in Finland, Germany, Korea, and China. 
(Fibox; Niemi 18.2.2008) The main market areas for the firm are the Western Europe, 
the United States of America, Korea, and China. The turnover of Fibox is roughly 60 
million Euros and the personnel count is roughly 500. The interviewee from Fibox Oy 
was Mr. Tapani Niemi, the main owner of the company who has actively participated in 
the development of the Korean operations of Fibox. (Niemi 18.2.2008) Niemi was the 
main architect of the management buy-out deal where the active management acquired 
the enclosure business of Fiskars to form Fibox in 1991. Fiskars, established in 1649, is 
one of the oldest industrial firms in Finland. Fiskars had started its enclosure business in 
the 1960s. (Fibox) The information that was received from Niemi was complemented 
with two distinct interviews with Interviewee Five on 23rd August, 2006 and 16th 
December, 2004. Interviewee Five was a high-ranked director of Fibox in Korea. 
Today, the Korean operations of Fibox consist of a production plant in Incheon, a little 
bit west of the capital city Seoul, and a supporting sales office in Busan, the harbor city 
in the southern part country. Korea is very essential as a market for Fibox – Korea is the 
Asian  base  of  the  firm.  All  the  operations  in  Asia  are  built  on  the  foundations  of  the  
company’s operations in Korea. In addition to the local Korean market, Fibox serves 
Japanese, Australian, Taiwanese, and Singaporean markets from Korea, for instance. 
Fibox employs roughly 40-50 people in its Korean operations. Fibox has a company 
policy not to reveal country-specific turnover figures. Fibox is a well-established brand 
in Korea, enjoying actually a market leader status. (Niemi  18.2.2008) 
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Initially, the thrust for the Korean operations of the company was a trade fair contact in 
Germany in the beginning of the 1990s. A company that later became the importer for 
the firm’s products in Korea approached Fibox at this trade fair indicating its 
willingness to represent Fibox in Korea. According to the interviewee, Fibox has always 
had a strong brand value in its offerings, which naturally attracted the Korean importer 
to make its move. However, Fibox was looking for a distributor to Korea at that time on 
purpose. Therefore, the start of the company’s operations in Korea was not a random 
move dictated by an approach from a potential importer but also a part of a deliberate 
strategy. At that time, Fibox had sold to the Japanese market for a long time and the 
company  was  ready  to  exploit  market  opportunities  in  other  Asian  countries,  as  well.  
(Niemi 18.2.2008) 
Right from the beginning and even today, Fibox has had many partners in its sales in 
Korea. These partners are electric wholesalers and special distributors, the total number 
of these partners equaling roughly 20. The cooperation with these partners started in the 
beginning of the 1990s and the number of these partners has increased over time. In 
fact, it was the Korean importer of Fibox that organized the relationships to these 
partners. Interestingly, a major part of the business in the industrial goods market in 
Korea takes place through fixed ‘tool markets’ that always should be attended. These 
tool markets can be found in different cities in Korea – there are three tool markets in 
Seoul, for example. For Fibox, the electrical supplies tool markets are very important in 
Korea. (Niemi 18.2.2008) 
This importer-led operational form was in place for three to four years. This had worked 
quite well but Fibox felt the lack of transparency between the importer and itself. More 
specifically, Fibox ‘could not see the market’ and it was not sure whether everything 
was done correctly. A major change factor was a request and recommendation by the 
importer to engage in own production in Korea because of copying of the company’s 
products in the country. This copying issue is well described with the following 
comment: 
“In Korea, if business starts to look interesting, copiers come around. And 
then we heard that people are beginning to copy our products there. If we had 
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not entered the country with our own production, our market would have 
started to decline. At that time, the local production had a different 
significance as now (…) Korea was a very inward-oriented state at that time.” 
(Niemi 18.2.2008) 
The importer said Fibox that it would be wise to engage in own production in Korea. 
However, this importer was looking for a joint venture, a common operational form 
between a local and a foreign firm in Korea at that time. Fibox, though, rejected this 
approach because the role that was offered in this arrangement was not suitable for the 
company. According to the interviewee, the management of the JV would have been 
next to impossible, leading Fibox ‘to lose the case anyway’ and the Korean firm to be 
able to control everything in the new company. The interviewee sees that a foreign firm 
needs to be very careful when negotiating a possible JV arrangement with a Korean 
firm: 
“Here you need to be very careful, this kind of JV case, suddenly you realize 
that you are about to receive a role where you are to lose!” (Niemi 18.2.2008) 
Many  types  of  JV  arrangements  were  planned  and  tested  but  none  of  them  ever  
materialized. According to the interviewee, “it was luck we did not do it!” As a result, 
Fibox decided to establish a production plant itself as a greenfield investment in 1995 in 
Incheon,  west  of  the  capital  city  Seoul.  In  fact,  Fibox  was  seemingly  the  first  foreign  
firm to establish a 100% own production plant in Korea. The importer, naturally 
disappointed at the decision and also low in significance after the establishment of the 
local production, was removed from the sales channel, Fibox basically taking on the 
role of the importer and handling the relationships to the sales partners itself. The 
cooperation with these sales partners has worked out extremely well, since Fibox enjoys 
the status of a market leader in Korea. (Niemi 18.2.2008) 
When the decision to engage in own production was made, there were also other 
motivators for this than the ones described above. At that time, roughly 1993 or 1994, 
Fibox was contemplating where to establish its Asian base. The company wanted to 
establish a production unit in East Asia. China was already then seen as a very lucrative 
option. However, the infrastructure in China was seen to be underdeveloped at that 
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time. Japan was another option under consideration but the Japanese market was way 
more developed, that is, closer to saturation than the Korean market that was just 
emerging. Fibox saw that it had a lot of good business starting in Korea, which made 
the company to establish its Asian base there. In addition, the central location of Korea 
affected the decision, since it is a short way from Korea to China, Japan, and Taiwan. 
Also, Korea was itself a big industrialized country already then. Just like Japan, Korea 
has traditionally been a large producer of machines, equipment and industrial 
automation, being of extreme importance to Fibox as the company sells its products to 
machine and equipment manufacturers. (Niemi 18.2.2008) 
The Korean subsidiary of Fibox, consisting of the production plant in Incheon and 
supporting sales office in Busan, is engaged in production, sales, and research and 
development activities. (Niemi 18.2.2008) The enclosures produced in the Korean 
production plant are labeled with the company’s own trademark (Interviewee Five 
16.12.2004). Major sales activities are also handled in Incheon besides pure production. 
The company has divided the Korean market into three distinct market areas – the 
northern market covering Incheon and the capital city Seoul region, the central market, 
and the southern market with a major harbor city Busan. The office in Incheon is 
responsible  for  sales  to  northern  and  central  markets,  whereas  the  supporting  sales  
office in Busan has assumed the responsibility of sales to the southern region. The 
Korean unit has been led by a Finnish expatriate that has lived in Korea for a long time 
and can speak fluent Korean, which helps him a great deal in his work. (Niemi 
18.2.2008) 
Later, Fibox will move its operations in Incheon to Songdo, a high-tech region close by. 
This high-tech region, being a very ambitious undertaking and meant to be developed as 
the new international business hub in Northeast Asia, has been built on reclaimed land 
and it is connected to the Incheon international airport via a bridge. (Niemi 18.2.2008) 
Originally, establishing a company in Korea was not easy for Fibox. For instance, 
buying land was extremely hard because a foreigner was not allowed to own land before 
the relaxation of the investment legislation in the country in 1998 as a result of the 
Asian Financial Crisis. (Niemi 18.2.2008) 
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“It is a lot harder than in Finland, for example. Not the investment, that is 
easy, but with all these authorities and bureaucracy, they [Koreans] say it is 
easy there, but it was very hard compared to Finland. And 1994 or 1995, it 
was really, really hard!” (Niemi 18.2.2008) 
Thereafter, according to the interviewee, all this bureaucracy has become a lot easier in 
Korea. He says that today Korea has manners and infrastructure to handle these kinds of 
investments and foreign firms. When the investment legislation was relaxed in 1998, 
Fibox received a status of “foreign investment company”, which granted it the same 
rights that the Korean firms were enjoying. (Niemi 18.2.2008) This status included 
many  benefits  for  Fibox.  The  use  of  foreign  personnel  became  easier,  Fibox  was  
allowed to buy buildings and land, and the repatriation of profits became easier. The 
state of Korea also encouraged foreign investors – after Nokia, Fibox was the second 
Finnish firm to receive the export award from the state of Korea. (Interviewee Five 
23.8.2006) 
According to the interviewee, knowledge of the Korean language is a requisite if 
successful operations are sought in the country. It has been very hard for Fibox to find 
personnel that are able to speak English. The company employs highly-educated Korean 
persons with university backgrounds, which greatly alleviates the language problem. 
(Niemi 18.2.2008) 
To get inside the Korean market, one should obtain a Korean organization that is able to 
create the necessary contacts and relationships in the market. For a foreigner, it is next 
to impossible to get such an understanding of the market that a Korean person can have. 
(Niemi 18.2.2008) 
Anticipating the future, the interviewee sees that the business of Fibox will develop 
along  with  the  market  in  the  country.  The  company  plans  to  increase  the  product  
offerings to the country slightly. However, an interesting point is raised up by the 
interviewee, namely the possibilities coming from North Korea: 
“But what can really change a lot, if it breaks through, is that North Korea is 
integrating more and more to South Korea. Then the ‘low-cost’ function that 
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China has had, vanishes. Because North Korea is even cheaper and, 
moreover, South-Korean firms know Korean way better than Chinese. And it is 
so close [geographically]. It can change it, it can change the structure very 
quickly. Then, Korea would be in a situation where it has the ‘high-tech’ 
knowledge item and the ‘low-cost’ item. This would be a unique situation in 
the world.” (Niemi 18.2.2008) 
 
 
5.9 Company D 
 
Company D is a global leader in the development, manufacture and marketing of high-
performance fiber-based materials. Nonwovens and specialty papers of the firm are used 
in a large variety of everyday products, such as filters, wipes, flooring, labels, and tapes. 
The unique fiber expertise and innovative approach has yielded Company D a strong 
market position in several business areas in which it operates. The company employs 
6,500 persons and operates sales offices and production facilities in 20 countries on six 
continents. In 2007, the net sales of the company were 1.8 billion Euros. The main 
geographic markets of the company, in terms of net sales, are Europe, North America, 
Asia Pacific, and South America. Europe is the biggest market area with a 62 % share of 
the  net  sales,  followed by  North  America,  with  23  %.  Asia  Pacific  commanded seven  
percent and South America six percent of the net sales, the rest being distributed to the 
rest of the world. Company D has divided its operations in two segments – Fiber 
Composites and Specialty Papers. These two segments comprise six business areas – 
Filtration, Advanced Nonwovens, Home & Personal Nonwovens, Glass Nonwovens, 
Release & Label Papers, and Technical Papers. (Company D) Company D is a public 
company listed on the Nasdaq OMX Helsinki Stock Exchange and it is mainly owned 
by the Company D family (Company D; Korhonen 2006: 100). 
The interviewee from Company D was one Senior Vice President and a member of the 
board of the Korean subsidiary at one time. (Interviewee Six 4.2.2008) The information 
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received in this interview is complemented with information from Korhonen (2006: 
100-109). 
Company  D  established  a  production  plant,  a  paper  factory,  as  a  joint  venture  with  a  
Korean partner in 1987 (Interviewee Six 4.2.2008). The joint venture was named 
Company D Korea and it was the first production investment of Company D in Asia. At 
that time, Company D was present in Asia only through a sales office in Singapore and 
agents  in  Japan  and  South  Korea.  Asia  was  seen  to  be  an  important  market,  but  
understanding of the region was limited and in the case of South Korea, non-existent. 
During the first visits of the company’s representatives to South Korea the country was 
found to  be  attractive  with  its  rapid  economic  growth.  Especially,  the  rapid  growth  of  
the Korean automotive industry was seen to create strong sales potential for the 
company. (Korhonen 2006: 103) 
This paper factory produces filter materials for the automotive industry, namely oil, 
fuel, and air filters for car engines and other engines (Interviewee Six 4.2.2008). To be 
exact, the customers of Company D Korea are producers of filters for automobiles, 
trucks and heavy-duty equipment, as well as for specialty filter markets (Korhonen 
2006: 103). In addition, there is a research and development department at the factory, 
producing valuable results for the company. At the time this Korean production plant 
was established, the main location for the filter materials of Company D was Italy. 
Therefore, Italians were responsible for the start of the Korean project. (Interviewee Six 
4.2.2008) 
Initially,  the  main  thrust  for  the  start  of  Company  D’s  Korean  operations  was  an  
approach by a Korean businessman who saw that the products of Company D should be 
produced in Korea, although Company D had also recognized the market potential in 
Korea at that time as discussed above (Interviewee Six 4.2.2008; Korhonen 2006: 103) 
Already then, Company D was the leading producer of filter materials for the 
automotive industry in Europe. In addition, the Korean car industry was starting to grow 
to the power that it enjoys today. (Interviewee Six 4.2.2008) In addition to Company D, 
the major competitors of the firm had plans to establish operations in Korea, but 
importantly, it was seen that there was room for only one engine filter paper producer. 
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Therefore, Company D needed to hurry and try to find a trustable Korean partner who 
could manage the local business environment. (Korhonen 2006: 103) After evaluating 
several possible partners, this Korean businessman then contacted Company D and 
asked whether Company D was interested in the cooperation. (Interviewee Six 
4.2.2008; Korhonen 2006: 103) Having responded in the affirmative, Company D 
provided the know-how and mostly the financial resources, too, for the new JV. 
(Interviewee Six 4.2.2008) Company D representative concluded the nature of the 
investment as follows: 
“The Korean partner had the market knowledge and relations, while we had 
the know-how and technology” (Korhonen 2006: 103) 
A joint venture was established with Korean On Yang Pulp Company, later known as 
Shin Ho Paper. This partner firm was a highly diversified chaebol that had never had a 
foreign partner before. Interestingly, Company D was interested in Shin Ho Paper also 
because it was a family-run company like Company D. (Korhonen 2006: 103) The joint 
venture bought a former box-board factory on an industrial site just outside of Daegu, 
the fourth biggest city in Korea in the southeastern part of the country (Korhonen 2006: 
103; Interviewee Six 4.2.2008). This former box-board factory was transformed into a 
specialized paper mill (Korhonen 2006: 103). The Korean partner and its customer 
relationships strongly influenced on the location and acquisition decision that was 
made. (Interviewee Six 4.2.2008) 
The first years of the South Korean unit from 1988 to 1992 were difficult. Marketing 
and sales remained below expectations, the operations were making losses, and the 
relationship with the local partner was problematic. As the situation got worse, 
Company D management even discussed the closure of the JV. However, the engine 
filter paper market in Korea and Southeast Asia was growing faster than any other 
market, creating a potential for Company D Korea. In addition, a new global 
management structure was being implemented at Company D at that time and it was 
seen that this might be able to solve the problems in the Korean unit. (Korhonen 2006: 
103) After a couple of years from the start  of the JV, Company D decided to buy the 
Korean  party  to  the  JV  out,  and  continued  the  operation  on  its  own  (Interviewee  Six  
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4.2.2008). In addition, in 1992, Company D decided to relocate its regional sales office 
in Singapore to Korea because the Singaporean sales office had not been able to 
penetrate Asian markets quickly enough (Korhonen 2006: 104). This sales office is 
located in Seoul and it sells all the products of Company D. Nowadays, Company D is 
operating a sales office in all relevant Asian countries. (Interviewee Six 4.2.2008) 
The production unit in Daegu serves mainly the Asian market. A major share, 80 %, of 
the production is exported and the remaining 20 % is sold locally to Korean customers. 
China is the biggest export destination from this factory, other main export destinations 
being Indonesia, Thailand, Pakistan, Malaysia, India, Japan, and Taiwan. A couple of 
years ago, Company D was struggling with the capacity of the Korean production plant 
– the production capacity of filter materials was to be increased in Asia. (Interviewee 
Six 4.2.2008) As a result, Company D added another paper machine to the Korean 
production plant in 2004 to support the growing customer demand in the Asian region 
(Interviewee Six 4.2.2008; Korhonen 2006: 107). China was the main export market of 
the  Korean  plant  already  then  and,  therefore,  China  was  seen  to  be  an  option  for  the  
location of the new machine, as well. However, according to the interviewee, a decision 
was made to locate the new machine to Korea for a couple of strong reasons. First, there 
was ample space on the site of the existing production plant for another machine. 
Second, according to the interviewee, it is always more efficient the more there are 
machines on the same plant. Third, Company D had already learnt significantly about 
operating in Korea, which further affected the decision making in favor of locating the 
paper machine to Korea. (Interviewee Six 4.2.2008) 
The production plant in Korea employs roughly 100-120 people (Interviewee Six 
4.2.2008). There are almost 20 employees in the sales office in Seoul (Korhonen 2006: 
109).  These  operations  are  mainly  staffed  with  local  employees,  with  only  two  
Europeans physically located in Korea. The factory manager is Italian and the factory 
controller is Finnish. There was a time, however, that there were more Europeans in 
Korea. This was in the beginning of the Korean operations roughly 20 years ago. At that 
time, there were a number of Europeans and Finns teaching the locals and creating the 
necessary know-how to be utilized. Then, it was many years that there were no people 
with European origin at all present. It was with the adding of the second paper machine 
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to the production plant that these two Europeans, an Italian factory manager and a 
Finnish controller, were sent to Korea on a more permanent basis. (Interviewee Six 
4.2.2008) 
Company D is engaged in a wide business network in Korea. The company has a 
significant number of Korean customers and it purchases quite a lot from Korean 
subcontractors and cooperative partners. According to the interviewee, it is best to leave 
the actual business to the Koreans since they are best at handling it in their own country, 
naturally. However, no unit should be staffed with only Koreans but there needs to be 
persons with other nationalities, too. This is because a multicultural staff helps the 
interaction and enhances the materialization of different business objectives in the firm. 
In addition, through this kind of policy Company D can assure that certain corporate 
procedures are followed throughout different business units of the whole firm. 
(Interviewee Six 4.2.2008) 
What comes to problems in Korea, the Korean hierarchic society has been sometimes in 
conflict with the Company D style of management when the company has been trying 
to fully integrate the Asian units into its global network. In this network, all units 
despite their location will have the same cumulative knowledge, which is shared with 
other units. The parent firm shares its values also with the Asian staff making no 
difference between the home country and host countries. Sometimes this, though, means 
that local practices are overrun, which creates potential for conflict. (Korhonen 2006: 
109) In addition, the language skills of the Koreans have been a bit of a problem for 
Company D. It has been hard to recruit highly-educated people with adequate English 
skills. (Interviewee Six 4.2.2008) 
Despite some problems in the beginning of the operations in Korea, Company D has 
achieved notable success in the country. The role of the production unit in Korea is 
more important than ever for Company D’s Asian business. Since its establishment in 
1987, it has been one of the most profitable units of Company D, and a figurehead of 
the company’s internationalization. (Korhonen 2006: 109) 
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5.10 Cross-case analysis and discussion 
 
The sample of the Finnish companies operating in Korea was very heterogeneous in this 
study. This heterogeneity applies to many aspects of firms’ characteristics, such as age, 
turnover, number of personnel, and the branch, for example. The sample included both 
very old firms, such as Company C and Company D, and very young ones, such as 
Futuremark and Proventia. Some of the companies could probably also be characterized 
as Born Global companies or international new ventures because they have targeted 
international markets right from their inception. Oviatt and McDougall (1994: 49) 
define an international new venture as “a business organization that, from inception, 
seeks to derive significant competitive advantage from the use of resources and the sale 
of outputs in multiple countries”. These international new ventures have also been 
termed “born globals” and “global start-ups” (Madsen & Servais 2004: 645). A Born 
Global label could be stamped on Proventia, Futuremark, and Company B. The size of 
the companies in the sample varied enormously both in terms of turnover and the 
number of personnel. There was Futuremark with a turnover of less than four million 
Euros and then there was Company C with over six billion Euros in turnover in 2007. 
There  was  Proventia  with  only  30  employees  and  there  was,  again,  Company  C  with  
over 28,000 employees. The branches that the companies are active in varied also 
greatly - from load handling business to environmental technology, from log houses to 
programming, from playground equipment to engineering works firms, and finally from 
enclosure solutions via electronics to fiber-based materials. In case of two firms, 
Cargotec  and  Proventia,  the  Korean  operations  were  examined  from  a  viewpoint  of  a  
strategic business unit instead of the whole firm. In addition, the present 
internationalization stage of the firms varied also significantly. Some firms were quite 
far  in  their  internationalization,  serving  their  customers  on  a  global  basis  through  
advanced international operations on many continents, whereas some firms were still on 
their way to further internationalization. 
What  comes  to  the  interviewees  selected  for  this  study,  they  were  almost  all  strongly  
involved in the development of their companies’ operations in Korea right from the 
beginning. The interviewee from Company C admitted that the information he could 
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provide was partly second-hand information because the Korean operations of the 
company are handled by the local Koreans nowadays. Otherwise, the interviewees in 
this study included different types of Vice Presidents, executives, different types of 
managers and directors, a main owner, and a President of the liaison office, all strongly 
involved in the Korean operations of their firms and therefore, able to respond 
extensively and precisely to the questions presented. 
For the most of the studied firms, Korea was an important target market. For Proventia, 
Lappset,  Futuremark,  and  Fibox,  Korea  was  of  utmost  importance  as  a  target  market.  
For Cargotec, Company B and Company D, Korea can be seen as an important market. 
Korea has changed in significance as a market for Company A and Company C – for 
both  companies,  there  was  a  time that  Korea  was  more  important  but  the  country  has  
lost its relative importance to other countries thereafter. 
A vast majority of the studied firms entered Korea either in the 1990s or 2000s. 
Cargotec’s Hiab was a pioneer since it entered Korea already in the 1970s. Company D 
was also quite an early-mover in Korea, having served the country through a sales agent 
before entering the country on a more committed basis in 1987 with a production plant. 
The majority of the companies started their business in Korea intentionally, that is, as a 
part of their internationalization strategy. Cargotec’s Hiab had a strategy to have an own 
sales company on each significant market, including the Korean one, already in the 
1970s. Proventia, Company B, Company C, Fibox and Company D basically followed 
demand to Korea. Company A, Lappset and Futuremark, on the other hand, did not 
enter Korea on purpose. For these companies, the start of the Korean operations was 
somewhat random – they did not plan the entry to Korea as a part of their strategy. For 
Company A and Lappset, a triggering force was an approach by a Korean partner who 
wanted to represent the company in Korea. After starting the operations in Korea, these 
firms have come to realize the market potential in the country. Futuremark already had 
Samsung, a large Korean chaebol as its customer when it started its mobile business, 
which aroused the company’s interest in the Korean market and made Futuremark to 
realize the huge potential for its products there. 
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When analyzing the development of the operation mode use in the selected case 
companies, it can be seen that actual development has taken place in six out of nine 
studied companies. The operation mode use in the case firms over time in Korea is 
depicted in Figure 8 below: 
 
Figure 8: The development of the operation mode use in South Korea in the selected 
case companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As can be seen from the Figure 8 above, the firms that have seen actual development in 
their operation mode use are Cargotec’s Hiab, Proventia Emission Control, Company A, 
Company C, Fibox and Company D. These developments on an individual company 
level are analyzed below. 
Cargotec’s Hiab established a sales company originally as a joint venture with a Korean 
partner in the beginning of 1990s but acquired this sales company completely thereafter. 
As a solution to the hard market situation in the end of 1990s, Hiab acquired a part of a 
Korean company in 1997 and formed a joint venture with this company. Later, Hiab 
purchased most of the shares of the Korean management team that originally had 30 % 
Year         1980    1985 1990 1995 2000 2005                  2010 
Cargotec        JV (later own SC)              JV                              Own unit 
Proventia                   Sales agent         Liaison Office 
Company A                            Importer       Sales subsidiary              Importer 
Lappset                   Importer 
Futuremark                           Sales agent 
Company B              1st sales agent     2nd sales agent 
Company C                      Sales agents  Sales office  Service center 
Fibox          Importer         Production plant 
Company D           Sales agent                    JV      Own unit 
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of the JV’s shares but, still, the arrangement is technically a joint venture because there 
are still some members of the management team that hold the JV’s shares. However, in 
essence,  this Korean unit  of Hiab is now an own unit.  Thus,  it  can be seen that major 
inter-mode switches, some mode combination and some mode stretching has taken 
place in the case of Hiab. Changing initially from a JV sales company to a completely-
owned sales company represent a major inter-mode shift. In addition, a change from 
own sales company to a JV again represents another inter-mode switch. Unfortunately, 
the case study of Cargotec’s Hiab did not specify the exact reason for the first inter-
mode switch from a JV sales company to a wholly-owned sales company. The reason 
for the second inter-mode switch, from an own sales company to a JV again, was clearly 
the drastic change in the competitive environment, to be exact Hiab needed to adapt 
itself to new market circumstances as the external environment suddenly changed to its 
disadvantage. The change from a JV to a wholly-owned unit, in essence, represents 
inter-mode switching, mode packaging and mode stretching. Inter-mode switching 
because Hiab, technically, owns the Korean unit nowadays. However, at the same time 
this new operation mode solution represents a bit of a mode package, because there are 
still some members of the Korean management team who hold shares. In other words, 
the former JV and new ‘own company’ have grown together to some extent, although, 
admittedly, it can be questioned whether a wholly-owned subsidiary and a JV can exist 
in a mode package. Simply, there is no rationale for this kind of mode combination – 
rationally, these two operation modes could exist as opposed to each other but not in a 
combination. Clearly, the difficulty of identifying, assessing and measuring mode 
combinations as suggested by e.g. Welch et al. (2009: 6-11) is palpable here. Instead of 
terming this new arrangement of Hiab in Korea a mode package, perhaps a more correct 
term would be a mode stretch – the previous organizational form of a JV has virtually 
grown to be an almost wholly-owned subsidiary, ‘almost’ being a keyword here since 
this arrangement is purely neither a JV nor a wholly-owned subsidiary.  
Proventia started to serve the Korean market through a sales agent after a business foray 
trip in 2003 and established a liaison office in Korea in 2007. However, this kind of 
refinement in the operation mode can be seen as a very minor one, since the liaison 
office is the lightest operation mode in Korea and there is only one person physically in 
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this  office.  Still  though,  a  mode  package  can  be  identified  here,  exactly  as  in  Valla’s  
(1986: 33) example of a firm-employed person based permanently in the country to 
back up an agent or to complement the marketing action of a subsidiary. The rationale 
for this mode package is clearly value activity specialization – modes are used in a 
mutually supportive way to achieve Proventia Emission Control’s objectives. 
Company A first served the Korean market from 1995 onwards through an importer but 
soon established a sales subsidiary in the hope of deeper market penetration and 
earnings. Clearly, the reason for this inter-mode switch was the expectation of strong 
market growth in Korea. This inter-mode switch also had some characteristics of mode 
stretching as the importer of the company in Korea was hired to work as the CEO of the 
newly-formed sales subsidiary, which eased the path to the mode switch that Company 
A undertook. However, this sales subsidiary was unsuccessful, leading Company A to 
run down this unit, which is essentially a sign of de-internationalization that can occur 
at any stage of internationalization, as the internationalization literature suggests (e.g. 
Welch and Luostarinen 1988: 84). Thereafter, Company A returned to serve the Korean 
market through an importer, this time different than the original one that had also 
participated in the sales subsidiary arrangement. When Company A changed its 
operation mode from a sales subsidiary to an importer again, this inter-mode switch was 
triggered by the admittance of managerial misjudgement that was committed both when 
the decision was made to establish a sales subsidiary and during the implementation of 
this sales subsidiary strategy. 
Company C served Korea first through sales agents and established a sales office in 
1995 and a service center in 2004. Unfortunately, the case did not specify exactly why 
the inter-mode switch from using sales agents to establishing an own sales office took 
place. However, at the time Company C established this sales office, it enjoyed strong 
demand for its paper machines in Korea, and a strong hypothesis can be drawn that the 
reason for this establishment was to better serve the Korean customers with a more 
committed operation mode. Also, the establishment of the service center in 2004 can 
most likely be attributed to the same cause. 
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Fibox started its sales to Korea through an importer in the beginning of 1990s but soon, 
after  three  to  four  years,  established  an  own production  plant  in  1995 although it  was  
tempted into a JV arrangement that it rejected. The reason for this inter-mode switch 
was a change in the external conditions in the form of fears that Fibox’s products will 
be copied in Korea if the company does not start own production quickly in the country. 
Company D entered Korea with a sales agent originally and established a production 
plant as a joint  venture with a local partner in 1987. Later,  a couple of years after the 
start  of  the  JV,  Company D bought  the  Korean  party  to  the  JV out  and  continued  the  
operation on its own. The reasons for the first inter-mode switch – from a sales agent to 
a JV – seemed to be the strong market growth in Korea, that is, a change in external 
environment, and Company D’s desire to benefit from the market knowledge of the JV 
partner. This is line with Hennart’s (1988: 365-367) argument that “often, the main 
motive for entrant companies to form JVs with local firms is to benefit from the local 
market knowledge of the latter. Arguably, this market knowledge is difficult to buy on 
an arm’s-length basis.” The subsequent inter-mode switch from the JV to an own unit 
can probably best be explained with Gomes-Casseres’s (1987: 100) argument that “after 
acquiring experience and knowledge on the local market through the JV arrangement, 
the entrant firm will no longer need the local JV partner and the entrant firm may 
convert the JV to a wholly-owned subsidiary. In the light of information that the case of 
Company D provided, it seems that this is exactly what happened in this inter-mode 
switch. The argument of Gomes-Casseres (1987: 100) could probably also be used to 
explain Cargotec Hiab’s switch from the JV to a wholly-owned unit but that mode 
switch is a bit more complicated having features of mode packaging and mode 
stretching, as well, as discussed above. 
For  these  six  companies,  the  direction  of  the  development  in  the  use  of  foreign  
operation modes in Korea is from low-commitment operation modes to high-
commitment operation modes, just like the foreign operation mode and 
internationalization literature suggests. An exception to this stage pattern of 
internationalization is brought about by Company A, which had to divest its sales 
subsidiary in Korea and return to serving the market through an importer. This was a 
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sign de-internationalization that can occur at any stage of internationalization (Welch 
and Luostarinen 1988: 84). 
The companies that have not seen development in their operation mode use in Korea are 
Lappset, Futuremark and Company B. These firms have continued to serve the Korean 
market with the same arrangement that the operations in Korea were originally started 
with. Lappset has continued its business in Korea utilizing the same importer that was 
selected originally in 1993, mainly because the business has flourished and it has not 
needed a lot of effort from Lappset to serve the Korean market with this type of 
arrangement.  Futuremark  has  seen  its  business  to  continue  with  the  same  sales  agent  
that was selected in the beginning. As the interviewee from Futuremark stated, “neither 
of the parties has neither had time nor priority to deepen the cooperation”. In addition, 
this kind of light arrangement where the sales agent basically only provides contacts has 
worked out extremely well for Futuremark. Company B has continued its business in 
Korea through the same sales agent that was selected in the beginning but the company 
has also added another sales agent to serve a different customer segment than the first 
agent serves. This could be seen as an intra-mode switch, although Company B has not 
replaced its intermediary but added another. 
For these three companies – Lappset, Futuremark and Company B - that have not seen a 
change  in  their  FOMs  in  Korea,  a  number  of  reasons  can  be  identified  for  this  mode  
change inactivity. When going through these three cases, an obvious impression is that 
the business has worked out so well through these arrangements that there has not been 
a real reason to undertake a mode switch. This can be translated loosely to a number of 
switching costs or barriers. What comes to take-down barriers, these companies may 
fear the loss of customers owing to their loyalty to current agent or importer and 
appreciate the personal bonds to individuals in existing foreign operations. Set-up 
barriers, on the other hand, are probably in play in the form foreign operation learning 
costs and loss of customers owing to failures in initial phase of own operation. Also, 
this mode inactivity could probably be attributed to mode myopia (Welch et al. 2007: 
411). Petersen and Welch (2002: 162) wrote that “an operation mode that may have 
been used at first by chance becomes the mode best understood”. This mode change 
inactivity also reflects the notion of Benito et al. (2008: 16) that “sometimes, only one 
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mode form, or package, is evaluated, particularly when companies are approached with 
an offer to sell by a foreign company or an offer to act as a distributor or licensee in a 
foreign market”.  However, the cases did not exactly specify why these firms did not 
undertake mode switches, which means that serious conclusions for mode development 
inactivity for these firms cannot be drawn. 
The magnitude of the operations of the case firms in Korea is dictated by the selected 
operation mode. Naturally, those companies that have invested in the country have more 
extensive operations. If the magnitude of the operations is measured in terms of number 
of personnel in Korea, the companies that have established production facilities have 
widest operations in the country. Company D employs the largest number of people in 
Korea – from 120 to 140 – in its production plant just outside of Daegu and the sales 
office in Seoul. Cargotec’s Hiab that operates a marketing and service center in Seoul 
and production plant in Chungpu employs 82 persons in the country. Fibox, having a 
sales office in Busan and a production plant in Incheon employs from 40 to 50 people in 
its Korean operations. After the companies that have engaged in production in Korea 
comes  Company C that  has  established  a  sales  office  in  Seoul  and  a  service  center  in  
Daejeon. Company C employs 12 people in its Korean operations. After Company C, 
there is Proventia’s Emission Control that has established a liaison office in Seoul that 
could be regarded as a very small-scale sales office. Proventia Emission Control 
employs only one person in Korea. Those firms that serve the Korean market through 
direct export, either through agents or importers, do not have their own personnel in the 
country. Therefore, the operations of Company A, Lappset, Futuremark and Company B 
can be regarded as quite minor in the country in terms of number of personnel 
employed. However, the number of personnel is only one indicator of the magnitude of 
the operations in the country and, therefore, should not be looked at exclusively. Other 
indicators, such as turnover generated in Korea, might be very useful, as well. However, 
because of the scope of this study and the reluctance of some interviewees to go deep in 
country-specific turnover figures, the magnitude of the Korean operations of the case 
companies in terms of turnover is not addressed in this study. 
Those case companies that had invested in Korea and, therefore, had own personnel in 
the country mostly staffed their Korean operations with local Koreans. The management 
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of the Korean operations, however, has often been made the responsibility of foreign 
expatriates. Cargotec’s Hiab and Fibox have employed expatriates as Chief Executive 
Officers in their Korean operations. Both in the case of Cargotec’s Hiab and Fibox, the 
Finnish expatriate working as a CEO has lived in Korea for a long time and can speak 
fluent Korean, which naturally helps greatly in managing the operations. Company D 
used to have more foreign expatriates in its Korean operations when the operations were 
started but there was a time there were no expatriates at all present in Korea. Later, 
when the production capacity was increased in Korea, Company D sent an Italian 
factory manager and a Finnish controller to manage the Korean operations. Proventia’s 
Emission Control has had a Finnish expatriate in its liaison office since it was 
established in 2007. Company A and Company C, on the other hand, have relied on the 
local Koreans to manage their operations. At the time Company A had a sales 
subsidiary in Korea, the CEO of this subsidiary was a Korean person that had lived in 
Sweden for 25 years. All of the personnel of Company C in Korea are locals, the last 
Finnish person having left six to seven years ago from the country. 
The companies that served Korea through direct export utilizing middlemen had found 
their partners in various ways. For three firms, Company A, Lappset and Fibox, the 
initial contact to a Korean middleman was a trade fair contact. In addition, Proventia’s 
Emission Control found its second partner when a Korean ministerial delegation came 
to familiarize itself with the company’s projects in Hong Kong. This could loosely be 
seen  as  a  trade  fair  contact,  as  well.  Two  firms,  Proventia’s  Emission  Control  and  
Company B, have found a partner with the help of Finpro, a Finnish internationalization 
service provider organization. Proventia’s Emission Control found its first partner, a 
sales agent, in Korea with the help of Finpro, whereas Company B found its second 
sales agent utilizing Finpro’s services. In the first place, Company B had organized its 
own person, essentially working as a sales agent for Company B, to a new company that 
was formed in Korea after Company B was acquired by an investment company. 
Interestingly, Futuremark found its sales agent with the help of another small Finnish 
software firm. Company D, first engaged in direct export through a sales agent in Korea 
and thereafter a partner in a JV with a Korean firm, found its JV partner due to an 
approach by this Korean partner. 
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For the majority of the case firms that used direct export through local middlemen, the 
middlemen were also serving other principals. This was the case for Proventia’s 
Emission Control, Company A, Lappset, Futuremark and Company B. Unfortunately, it 
did not become evident in the company cases whether the sales agents of Company C 
and Company D and the importer of Fibox served other principals at the time when 
these arrangements were in place. 
What comes to major problems when operating in Korea, all case firms report the low 
level of English skills of the local people. This problem is reported by truly all firms, 
the ones that have served Korea through direct exporting and the ones that have invested 
in the country. However, the seriousness of this problem as seen by the case companies 
differs quite a lot. Some case firms see that the level of English skills among Koreans is 
very bad and can lead to serious misunderstandings and problems in the running of 
business in Korea, whereas some case firms see that the level of English skills is, 
indeed, a problem but it has not created major problems for the operations. Other 
problems in Korea as reported by the case companies are related to wider cultural 
issues, such as the authoritarian Korean organizations, the neglect of paying invoices on 
time as in the case of Futuremark, the propensity of Koreans to copy foreign products, 
and cultural differences in general. 
What comes to the most important assets of the Korean partners of the case firms, three 
important assets clearly stand out: the relationship network of the partner, the 
knowledge of the local market and the language abilities of the partner. By relying on 
the partner’s connections and market knowledge, many case firms have proceeded 
significantly in their endeavor to penetrate deeper into the Korean market. The language 
skills of the partner are seen to be very important, even invaluable, by many case firms. 
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6 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This study contributed to the knowledge of foreign operation modes both theoretically 
and empirically, yielding interesting insights on both domains. Theoretically, this study 
pointed attention to the novel approaches when analyzing foreign operation modes and 
their use. The newest research regarding FOMs was reviewed in the theoretical part of 
this study. It was seen that this new thinking of foreign operation modes significantly 
challenges the previous thinking on this field. Taking note of the newest research 
regarding FOMs, this study applied these new concepts empirically on Finnish firms’ 
operation mode strategies in South Korea, which offered insightful views that are of 
interest both academically and practically. 
Importantly,  this  study  offered  further  research  on  foreign  operation  mode  topics  that  
have been somewhat neglected in the previous research. This study provided further 
evidence of mode switching that has not been covered extensively previously. This 
study also shed some more light on mode stretching and mode combination, topics that 
are quite novel in the field of foreign operation modes and, therefore, in the need of 
further evidence to refine the theories. This study did one’s bit in offering further 
research that was asked on these topics by e.g. Benito et al. (2008: 21-22) when they 
invited more longitudinal research to uncover these aspects more. More specifically, 
they stated that “more exploratory, in depth and longitudinal qualitative studies would 
seem to be a critical first step” (Benito et al. 2008: 22). 
To shed some more light on the more novel approaches to foreign operation modes, this 
study analyzed the foreign operation mode strategies of a selected group of Finnish 
firms in South Korea. This study placed special emphasis on mode switching, mode 
stretching and mode combination strategies. In order to answer the research problem, 
first a theoretical framework that was depicted in Figure 7 was presented. Based on this 
framework, or to be exact on the subcomponents of this framework – mode switching, 
mode stretching, and mode combinations -, nine empirical cases of Finnish companies 
in South Korea were analyzed. 
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Inter-mode switches turned out to be quite common in this study, which further 
corroborates the notion that they are, indeed, common, although the existing literature 
on the topic has neglected these aspects. A total of five case companies out of nine had 
engaged in inter-mode switching, either once or more times. Mainly the inter-mode 
switches were triggered by the changes in external environment. Some evidence on 
mode combinations was received, too, although mode combinations did not appear to be 
common among the case companies. Only in one case, Proventia Emission Control, was 
there a clear occurrence of a mode combination. The case of Cargotec’s Hiab was a lot 
more difficult to assess, whether there was a mode combination or not. If the mode 
combination of Cargotec’s Hiab is accepted, then there were two companies out of nine 
that engaged in mode combinations. Mode stretching, neither, was not very common 
among the case companies, as it occurred in only two case companies out of nine. Intra-
mode switches turned out to be very uncommon, this basically having taken place in 
only  one  case  company  and  it  was  also  questionable  whether  the  addition  of  another  
sales agent by Company B can be seen as an intra-mode switch,  even. The companies 
that did not change their FOMs had their reasons for this largely in switching barriers 
and mode myopia. 
This study also gave some further evidence supporting the theory of gradual 
internationalization that was originally presented by Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul 
(1975). By far, the majority of the mode switches were from low-commitment FOMs to 
higher-commitment FOMs, which is in line with the notion of the establishment chain 
that was presented by the above-mentioned authors. 
Clearly, there is an apparent need for future research on these newer approaches to 
foreign operation modes that were dealt with in this study. These newer approaches – 
mode switching, mode stretching, and mode combinations – are rather underresearched 
but still, according to scholars studying FOMs and according to this study, the reality of 
many companies that operate internationally. Therefore, more research on these topics 
is called for.  
There are a number of ways to respond to this call. Each researcher, naturally, has his or 
her  own  discretion  as  to  how  to  approach  the  research  that  is  to  be  conducted.  If  the  
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footsteps of this research are followed, a first step would be to investigate the foreign 
operation mode strategies of other Finnish firms in South Korea. This could possibly 
corroborate the findings of this study, or, interestingly, yield contrasting results, the 
reasons of which would be very interesting for drawing a more complete picture of 
these newer approaches FOM strategies. Alternatively, these newer approaches to FOM 
strategies could be studied in other country contexts, be it then Finnish firms in some 
other country or companies from any country operating in another country. Directing 
the attention from a country level to a company level, investigating FOM strategies in 
multiple countries for a single firm would be of great interest, as then there would be 
more knowledge as to if the FOM strategies of a single company differ from one target 
country to another. To highlight the interest in this aspect, the attention can be turned to 
Petersen and Welch (2002: 160), who saw that the degree of integration or coordination 
of  complementary  modes  can  vary  across  different  foreign  markets  even  for  the  same 
company. Directed by these thought, one could make a hypothesis that the FOM 
strategies of an individual company might vary across different national markets. It is 
natural that the FOM strategies vary across different markets for an individual company 
because, as was discussed in theoretical part of this paper, there is no pre-agreed 
formula  that  helps  a  company  to  make  its  operation  mode  decisions.  As  a  result,  the  
variance in the FOM strategies is likely to be high for a single company across different 
markets. However, it would be interesting to see if the FOM strategies in terms of mode 
switching, mode stretching and mode combinations also vary across different markets 
for a single company. 
In addition, the idea of Clark et al. (1997: 618) that the sequential development of a 
firm’s internationalization can take place at the firm level rather than within individual 
markets raises up an interesting aspect for future study of FOM strategies, as well. 
Namely,  it  would  be  interesting  to  see  if  a  firm’s  strategy  with  regards  to  mode  
switching, mode stretching and mode combinations follows the same line of 
development as that expressed by Clark et al. (1997:618) with regards to operation 
mode  development.  For  instance,  it  would  be  interesting  to  see  if  an  introducing  of  a  
mode combination by a single company in one target country leads to introducing of 
mode combinations in other target countries, as well.
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7.3 Interviews 
 
Interviewee One 
A high-ranked manager 
Company A 
Finland 
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31st January, 2008 approximately 40 minutes 
 
Interviewee Two 
An executive in charge of strategy 
Company B 
Finland 
6th March, 2008 approximately 60 minutes 
 
Interviewee Three 
A highly-ranked Vice President 
Company C 
Finland 
26th February, 2008 approximately 45 minutes 
 
Interviewee Four 
Company A 
Finland 
6th March, 2003 and 24th April, 2007 
 
Interviewee Five 
A high-ranked director 
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Fibox 
Finland 
23rd August, 2006 and 16th December, 2004 
 
Interviewee Six 
Senior Vice President and a member of the board of the Korean subsidiary at one time 
Company D 
Finland 
4th February, 2008 approximately 70 minutes 
 
Lehmus, Heikki 
Vice President of Business Development and Quality 
Cargotec, Hiab business unit 
Helsinki, Finland 
17th January 2008 approximately 85 minutes 
 
Niemi, Tapani 
The main owner 
Fibox 
Kirkkonummi, Finland 
18th February, 2008 approximately 65 minutes 
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Puura, Jouni 
President of the Liaison Office in Korea 
Proventia, Emission Control business unit 
Seoul, Korea 
31st January 2008 approximately 65 minutes 
 
Talala, Petri 
Vice President in charge of mobile business 
Futuremark 
Espoo, Finland 
5th March, 2008 approximately 80 minutes 
 
Ylinenpää, Hannu 
Marketing Director 
Lappset Group 
Rovaniemi, Finland 
21st February, 2008 approximately 75 minutes 
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APPENDIX 1 – Interview questions 
Helsinki School of Economics/ Center for Markets in Transition 
Interview questions 
 
Managing business in turbulent markets 
 
1. Background information on both the parent company and the subsidiary 
? Line of business 
? Size of the company in Finland and host country (turnover, personnel) 
? Main products and markets 
? Role of the target country for the company 
? Value of the investment (€, $) 
? Location (eg capital, special economic zone) 
? Other locations that were considered suitable  
? Share of ownership (majority, minority, 50-50, 100%) 
? Way of establishment (greenfield investment, acquisition) 
? Main operations of the subsidiary (eg production, R&D, sales office)  
? What was the impulse to enter South Korea in the first place? 
? At which stage of internationalization did the company enter South Korea? 
? Why exactly to South Korea? 
 
2. Influence and implication of the recent changes (eg Estonia’s EU membership, 
China’s WTO membership, South Korea’s financial crisis)  
? What have been the major changes in the host country during the past 15 years 
(1991-2005)? 
? What are the impacts on the business environment? 
? What are the impacts on the firm? 
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? What makes the country attractive for foreign investors? 
? What are the major deterrences to investment? 
 
3. Company’s relationship with the public sector 
? Courts of law and legislation (implementation and interpretation of laws in 
practice) 
? Role of personal relationships with government authorities and state authorities 
(who and in which issues or problems) 
? Role of lobbying in business 
? Role of public relations, goodwill 
? Role of corruption in business 
? Major problems related to the public sector 
? Major solutions of the problems related to the public sector 
 
4. Company’s relationship with the foreign partner company 
? How did the cooperation begin? 
? Who took the initiative? 
? How has the cooperation developed? 
? What were the factors affecting the partner selection? 
? What were/are now the motives for cooperation? 
? Were/are the motives for cooperation of both partners similar? 
? Were/are the expectations about cooperation realized? 
? What is the distribution of work between partners? 
? How has the know-how been transferred? 
? How has the trust been built? 
? Role of written contracts in cooperation? How detailed are contracts? 
? Role of personal relationships in cooperation? 
? Role of friendship relations in cooperation? 
? What have been the major problems in cooperation? 
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? How have these problems been solved? 
 
5. Company’s relationship with the local companies 
? What are the major competitive edges of the local companies? 
? What kind of cooperation or contacts do you have with other local companies 
(e.g. customers, subcontractors) 
? Are there any differences in practices when doing business with the local 
companies (compared to Finnish companies) with respect to following issues: 
role of written contacts, role of personal relationships, role of friendship 
relations, and differences in problem-solving? 
? What have been the major problems with the local companies? 
? How have these problems been solved? 
 
6. Company’s relationship with company employees 
? Attitude towards foreign employer? 
? Education and professional skills of the local workforce in relations to the wage 
level? 
? What motivates local workforce? 
? Are  local  employees  given  responsibility  and  are  they  willing  to  take  
responsibility? 
? Are there any social responsibilities of the employer towards employees (eg 
health care, housing, children’s day-care)? 
? The role of labour unions? Development of unionization level of local workforce 
in the future? 
? Role of local hierarchies in the organisation? 
? Equality (eg female managers) 
? Role of etnic/religious groups in business (eg Russians in Estonia, Chinese in 
Malaysia) 
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7. Future of the host country, local companies and Finnish businesses there  
? How the cooperation with the local partner is expected to develop in the future? 
? What are the major risks related to the business environment in the future? 
? What are the major risks related to the Finnish business in the host country in the 
future? 
? Are there problems, which are common for all Finnish companies operating in 
the host country? 
? How the problems could be solved? 
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APPENDIX 2 – Email approach to potential interviewees 
Email message that was sent to the potential interviewees: 
 
Dear ”Interviewee” 
 
The Center for Markets in Transition (CEMAT) at the Helsinki School of Economics is running 
a research program on rapidly developing markets (among others Russia, China, South Korea, 
Baltic countries, India, Latin America) that investigates these markets in terms of their business 
environment and business opportunities from the viewpoint of Finnish companies. We ask You 
for an interview for the part of the research that deals with South Korea. 
 
The research aims at explaining: 
- which factors contribute to enlargement of operations or to transfer of operations outside 
Finland and the selection of the target country 
- challenges that companies encounter in a changing business environment 
- what the enlargement or transfer of Finnish firms’ operations to these areas means in practice 
- how the Finnish companies view their operations are integrating to local society 
- what problems there is in the activity and how these problems could be solved 
- what differences and similarities are there regarding the themes mentioned above between 
different areas 
 
The empirical material for the research will be collected by interviewing the representatives of 
Finnish companies operating in the target country and of local partner companies of those firms. 
Interviews will be conducted as confidential and responses will be treated as anonymous. The 
research information will be used in the research projects of CEMAT and in the academic 
refinement of this research project. The research results will be published in a publication series 
of the Helsinki School of Economics and a report will be delivered to each interviewee. 
 
We will contact You during the next couple of days to agree on a possible interview. 
 
 
Best regards, 
 
Kristiina Korhonen, research manager 
Anu Penttilä, research assistant 
Mayumi Shimizu, research assistant 
Heikki Huhtanen, research assistant 
 
Helsingin kauppakorkeakoulu 
Center for Markets in Transition (CEMAT) 
PL 1210, 00101 Helsinki 
Puh. +358 50 313 8191 
Fax  +358 9 4313 8706 
